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TO Dr. D. A. FitzGerald, M/O P^ April 16l 1958 
Mr. Richard F. Cook, Acting DD/M 
Mr. John H. Ohly, DD/P , -\ 
1-Edwin H.Arnold, DD/S
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X~l: Dr. Raymond T. Moyer.. Regional Director, O/1 E
 
FROM: C. Tyler Wood, Assistant to the Director for Evaluation
 
SUBJECT: Korea Evaluation Report
 
Attached is a copy of the recently completed Korea Evaluation Report.

I am sending it to you and the few other top ICA officials listed in this
 
memorandum on an informal basis, in order that, before it is sent to Mr. 
Smith or to others within or outside the organization, I may have the 
benefit of your views as to whether it contains anything which is seriously 
wrong and which should be corrected before wider distribution is made. 
I should appreciate it if you would let me have your answer to this
 
question, if possible, within a week, so that further distribution can be
 
made promptly.
 
As you know, this Report has been prepared by a team consisting of
 
two experienced men who have spent about five months in studying the
 
country and in writing their Report. This is a relatively short time in
 
which to cover all aspects of the circumstances affecting the country and
 
our operations there. It is therefore possible that there may be some
 
omissions and errors in certain of the details. 
I should not think, however,

that we would want to bother with correcting such items in the original

report unless they were of considerable importance and resulted in giving
 
a seriously wrong impression to the reader on something that really matters.
 
In view of the care which has been exercised by the members of the team, I
 
should think it unlikely that many cases of this nature would be found.
 
The Report also contains conclusions and recommendations which represent

the personal judgment of the Evaluation Team. Some of these items may be
 
wholly at variance with the views and judgments of others, including yourself

and the experts in your organization. You will, of course, take issue with
 
such items at the time of the Regional Director's review and preparation of
 
a Plan of Action, but I suggest that you will probably not want to do so in

this first quick review I am now asking you to make, except in the most
 
unusual cases.
 
I feel it is important to remember that our Evaluation Reports are
 
merely the first stage in a process designed to bring about a careful
 
examination of our programs, and that it is the Plan of Action which is
 
developed on the basis of the Report which is the final product.
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COMPARATIVE STATISTICS
 
(as of mid-1957 unless otherwise indicated)
 
(conversion at 1,000 = $1) 
Area (e) 

Population (a) 
Population growth (b) 
Population density (a) 

Labor force (a) 

Distribution of 

labor force (a) 

Unemployment (a) 
Literacy rate (a) 
Teachers (a) 

Schools (a) 

Students (a) 

Doctors (a) 

Life expectancy (e) 

Hospitals (a) 

Diet (a) 

Railroads (a) 

SOUTH KCREA 
37,000 sq. ml. 
22 million 
1.8%per annum 
570 per sq. mi. 
Approx. 9 million 
Agriculture & forestry 
Commerce & finance 
70% 
10% 
Manufacturing 
Government 
Fishing 
Mining 
Other 
1.1 million 
65% 
3% 
3% 
2% 
1% 
11% 
One per 304 people (1956) 

Elementary 4,260 
Secondary 1,567 
Univ. & colleges 71 
Normal schools 18 
Other 3,165 
17% of population, of which 
75% primary, 17% secondary, 
2% university, 6% other 
6,400 in 1956 
47 years (est.) 
2,932 hospitals and clinics 

and 700 dispensaries in 1955
 
2,060 calories per capita 

1,800 miles 

CONTINWTAL U.S. 
3,022,000 sq. mi.
 
151 million (1950) 
1.5%per annum 
50.7 per sq. mi. 
67 million (July 1957) 
11% 
-

-
-
-
-
-
3 million (July 1957) 
97% 
-
122,614 (1954)
 
29,550 " 
1,852
 
-
-
21% of population 
-
70 years 
-
3,200
 
221,000 miles
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UTH KCONTINENTAL U. S.
 
Rods.(t) .9,000 miles of highways 181,000 miles
 
Electric power (a) 183,000 KW 696 billion KW
 
Arable land (a) 5.5 million acres (23%)
 
Industrial and mining
 
production (d) 1M 2 6- _ (est.)
 
coal (1,ooo NT) 1.3 1.8 2.4
 
Tungsten ore (1,000 Mr) 3.1 3.7 3.5
 
Cotton cloth (mosq.yds.) 121 147 167
 
Rubber shoes (mil.pro) 23 24 26
 
Agricultural production (e) 1954/55 1955/56 1956/57
 
Rice, rough (1,000 MT) 3,270 3,180 2,510
 
Barley (1,000 MT) 980 840 730
 
Soybeans (1,000 MT) 160 149 153
 
Exports of principal
 
commodities (e) 12L6 19.U
 
Rice (1,000 MT) - - -

Laver (MT) 0.9 0.2 0.6 0o1
 
Fish (1,000 MT) 0M6 004 0.7 2.3
 
Agar-agar (MT) 1.2 0.8 0.9 0.6
 
Raw silk (MT) 1,8 1.4 1.5 0.9
 
Tungsten ore (1,000 MT) 11.4 5.2 10.0 4°5
 
Other metallic minerals
 
and metals 2.0 1.3 2.3 3.6
 
Graphite (1,000 MT) 0.7 1.5 2.0 2.7
 
Anthracite (1,000 MT) 0.7 0.4 - -

Other _L2 6.4 .2 6.8
 
Total Exports 24.2 17.6 25.2 21o5
 
GNP (a) & (d) 
(hwan converted 1,000:$l) 195 1956 1957 1957
 
In 1955 prices $1,045 $1,075 $1,100 $1,250 $407 billion
 
Per capita 49-5 50 50.5 56 $29380
 
Cost of living (e) 1 1 195 1957
 
(1953 = 100) 135 229 285 349 105
 
Wholesale price index (f) Dec'55 Dec'56 Dec'57
 
(Sept. 1955 = 100) 81 118 110 107 (1953 1
00)
 
Cars (c) One per 7,414 people
 
Phones (c) One per 500 people
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SOUTH.'x'MA 	 S.~J 
Radios (c) 	 One per 143 people 
The following footnotes apply to the Korean column only: 
(a) 	 From Summary of Basic Data, Office of Statistics & Reports, ICA/W, 
August 27, 1957 
(b) From Country Data Book, Department of State 
(c) From A World of Facts, .Civic Education Service, Inc. 
(d) From OEC FY 1959 ProTram Submission, October 8, 1957 
(e) From Office of Statistics & Reports, ICA/W 
(f) 	 From Monthly Treasury Bulletin, ROK Ministry of Finance, 
November 23,. 1957 
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In 1950 the United Nations, with strong U.S. support, chose
 
to resist the invasion of South Korea by Communist troops from
 
the North. After more than a year of fighting up and down the
 
peninsula, armistice negotiations were initiated. 
Not until two
 
years later, however, was the armistice signed. Since the signing
 
of the armistice there has been a state of suspended hostilities
 
on either side of the line of demarcation between North and South
 
Korea near the 38th parallel. Massive troop concentrations are
 
aligned on eithaer side of the demarcation line and what amounts to
 
a military stalemate obtains.
 
The Republic of Korea has the second largest arny in the
 
Free World with 21 divisions amounting to some 700,000 men under
 
arms.
 
The U.S. commitment in Korea goes beyond assistance to the
 
military forces. 
The United States undertook to rehabilitate war­
torn Korea and this was essentially accomplished by the end of
 
1957 in all phases except housing. In addition, the United States
 
has set as one of its objectives assisting the Koreans to reach
 
and to maintain levels of essential consumption at least equal to
 
what they were in 1949-50. Present levels of consumption slightly
 
exceed those of 1949-50.
 
The accomplishment of the program has been impressive. 
How­
ever, this has been a costly undertaking for the United States.
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6r: 1957 the total cost of our military and economic programs 
amounted to an estimated $1.2 billion. The reconstruction and rebabi­
litation since the Korean War have cost the United States $1.5 bil-­
lion. Last fiscal year the United States obligated some $332 million 
in economic aid. It is expected that the cost to the United States 
of economic aid in Korea will be reduced over the next several ye&O 
(the estimated availability for the present fiscal year is $279 
million) but it is doubtful if aid funds can be reduced mach below 
the $130 million dollar mark if essential standards of consumption 
at the 1949-50 level are to be maintained and reasonable progress in 
the economy achieved. In brief, even with maximun development of 
the economy,, Korea with its present population and present resources 
cannot earn enough foreign exchange to take care of its requirements 
for essential imports and for continued modest economic development. 
The Republic of Korea has a population of about 22 million 
people in a land area about the sime of Indiana. The farm popula­
tion is about 70 per cent of the total# and the number of farmers 
are equal to those of the United States east of the Mississippi. 
Development of land resources approaches the maximum, and other re­
sources for potential economic development, such as minerals and 
fisheries, are limited. Short of some unforeseen discovery of new 
resources it seems clear that Korea cannot maintain a self-supporting 
economy as well as the Free World's second largest army. The contri­
bution of Korea to its present army is the equivalent of $60 million 
annually. However, it does not follow that the elimination of the 
-2­
Korean Army would result in a saving of $60 million to the economy. 
Korea presently suffers from widespread underemployment as well as 
sizable unemployment and it is doubtful if the economy could imme­
diately absorb more than a small proportion of the 700,000 men 
now under arms although it could use to very good advantage certain 
elements with special training. Very possibly some form of public 
relief would be required, at least during the transition stage. 
As a matter of basic policy the United States is committed
 
to the peaceful unification of Korea. Such a unification is
 
likely to occur only if the over-all situation between the free 
and the Communist worlds changes. If such a unification were to 
occur and there were free access to North Korean resources, the 
economic position would undoubtedly improve substantially but the 
Evaluation Team is not competent to say whether North and South 
Korea together could be self-supporting. 
The most outstanding feature of the U.S. aid program in 
Korea since the war has been its success in bringing about recon­
struction of a war-devastated country. Today there is little 
visual evidence of destruction and the physical assets are at least 
as good as before the war and in many instances substantially 
better. The exception is housing.
 
The current aid program is made up of two types of activity. 
Non-project aid takes the form of bringing into Korea basic raw or 
semi-finished materials and food, the majority of which is sold to 
-3 - Ito 
the public for local currenoy. The proceeds of theme sales in local 
currency are used as counterpart funde. These funds then become 
subject to use in the project sector of the program as well as to 
the partial support of the Korean Army. 
The project sector of the program includes a wide range of 
activities and in many instances combines technical cooperation 
with economic development activities, using defense support funds 
for the latter activities. Projects range throughout the conven­
tional technical assistance field, including agriculture, education, 
health and sanitation, community development, housing and assist­
ance to security forces. In addition, both development and tech­
nical assistance is given to a wide range of public utilities such 
as the railwayp the commnication system, highways, harbor develop­
ment and power, as well as to selected industries. Certain basic 
industrial facilities have been financed by the United States. 
Also, dollars have been furnished, as loans repayable o the Korean 
Government in local currency, for the foreign exchange requirements 
of individuals who undertake the development of a given industrial 
enterprise. 
In the first several years after the Korean War the country 
suffered from serious inflation. However, by the end of 1957, as 
a result of substantial quantities of aid goods being pumped into 
the economy, as well as an effective currency and credit control 
program on the part of the Korean Government, prices had levelled 
off and were only slightly higher than they were at the end of 1955. 
The immediate outlook for continued stabiliation is good, pro­
vided the aid program continues at approximately its present level 
and the ROK Government maintains its present anti-inflation 
measures. If drastic inflation were to occur, it could easily lead
 
to widespread economic dislocation and the discontent that might
 
facilitate the growth of Comuist influence.
 
The aid program was studied by the Team with a view to
 
reducing the dependence of Korea on U.S. financing, not only because
 
of the burden to the taxpayer but also because of the inherent 
danger to U.S.-Korean relations. It is -herefoe recomended that 
those phases of the economic development program not directly aid 
immediately related to alleviating the foreign exchange situation 
be broadly confined to financing with technical assistance funds 
during the next several years. The Team believes that the present 
technical assistance program should be continued in the broad range 
of fields it now covers. This is essential, especially since Korea 
has had such a limited opportunity for technical development. It 
is recommended that defense support funds be eliminated from most 
of the programs of assistance to public utilities and public ser­
vicesawith the exception of power plants and operation of the 
railwayj. It is further recommended that, commensurate with Korean 
skills and capacity to absorb new development, defense support funds 
be made available in maximum amounts for projects which will either 
lead toward new export products or will reduce the need by local 
production for present import products, provided such projects are 
economically soundo
 
ICA has recently established procedures for administering 
the Development Loan Fund. The Team has studied the possibility of 
using such funds in Korea for economic development. It appears 
that it would be difficult to find uses in the direct U.S. interest 
for local currency paid to the United States for servicing such 
loansp in view of the already large accumulations of U.S.-owned 
local currency and the fact that conversion of Korean hwan into 
dollars on any substantial scale hardly seems a possibility in the 
foreseeable future. Such hwan could either be reloaned to the 
Government of Korea or held in idle balances. The problem, however, 
would tend to become accentuated with time. 
The Office of the Economic Coordinator (OW3, the aid mission 
in Korea) has projected a program through fiscal year 1963. A 
major assumption behind this projection has been a plan for export­
ing Korean high-quality rice and importing cheaper coarse grains 
such as wheat and barley (since no true surplus of rice exists) to
 
make up in calories for the rice exported. Such a program was 
actually carried out during the Japanese colonial period. 00 
estimates a foreign exchange saving of some $30 million under this 
plan, probably the most significant single way of developing a 
sizable amount of foreign exchange. The Team supports this proposal 
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and recommends it as a major means of alleviating the basic exchange 
problem. Other fields where foreign exchange earnings are most 
likely to occur are fishing, mining, industrial development, and 
direct dollar procurement by UoS-. agencies. 
The level of aid projected by OEC through 1963, including 
PL 480 sales, contemplates the following: $279 million for fiscal 
year 1958, $273 million for fiscal year 1959, $220 million for
 
fiscal year 1960, $181 million for fiscal year 1961, $149 million
 
for fiscal year 1962 and $130 million for fiscal year 1963. The
 
Team feels that some savings might be realized by the broad policy 
it recommends of confining to technical assistance all activities 
in the project sector not directly related to the earning or saving 
of foreign exchange. However, such savings may well be offset by
 
increasing expenditures for projects which develop foreign exchange 
savings. Since the phasing out of activities presently financed 
by defense support funds can most appropriately be carried out by
 
the operating organization, no attempt has been made to specify 
timing or to calculate savings.
 
The Team examined the basic policy of the United States. 
There may, as a purely historical exercise, be a possibility of re­
examining why ice find ourselves with our present commitments in
 
Korea but, given the position we have taken before the world, with­
drawal of our sppport from Korea would not be desirable. The
 
present aid program is pretty much what it takes to fulfill our
 
7PD
 
objective of assuring standards of essential'consumption, at least 
at the 1949-50 level, and to give such assistance as we can
 
to bring Korea as near as possible t6selft-Supporto
 
The problem of self-support is likely to become accentuated
 
in the future because of the relentles"increase in population
 
and 	the reduction in death rates through improved health and diet­
ary practices and through the unwillingness of the United States 
to accept the thought that famine and disease should be allowed to 
play their traditional role of the "automatic population control­
lero" 
I_/ 	 See Profram Accomolishments. Fiscal rear 1957, United Nations 
Command, Office of the Economic Coordinator for Korea, June 30, 
1957 (UNCLASSIFIED). 
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CHPTER I - UNITED STATES POLICY OBJECTIVES IN KOREA 
United States Interests and Commitments in Korea 
The Evaluation Team, after examining current U.S. policy and 
U.S. commitments in Koreaq concluded that the primary interest of
 
the United States in Korea is political. From the strategic point

of view, authorities differ on the necessity to the United States

under present conditions of retaining the Korean peninsula for the
 
forward defense of Japan and as a part of our Far Eastern defense
 
arrangements. In any event, the Team does not feel competent to
 
comment on this point. From the economic point of view it is evi­
dent that Korea produces very few raw materials or other products

which the United States requires nor does its foreign exchange posi­
tion permit it to make any substantial purchases of American goods.
It can therefore not be said that the economies of the two countries 
are in any real sense complementary.
 
At the same time, our present stake in Korea, which was
 
gained and held in a war costing over 54,OOC/ American lives, is
 
a very real oneg and our commitments are explicit.
 
These commitments are principally set forth in the Mutual
 
Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea
 
and the Joint Policy Declaration of the United Nations Command,

both dating from the immediate post-armistice period in 1953. By

the first of these documents the United States is committed to come
 
to Korea's defense in event of an armed attack on Korean territory.

The Joint Policy Declaration, to which all 16 members of the United
 
Nations Command in Korea subscribed, pledges them to respond promptly

and vigorously if there should be renewed Communist aggression in
Korea and warns such event it would inthat in an not be possible,
all probability. to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea. 
It will be clear from the existence of these commitments and
from our basic policy objectives (as discussed below) that the United
 
States is deeply involved in Korea. The Team in reviewing these
 
commitments and objectives found no reason to question their general

content. 
Unless the United States continues to provide support to
 
the Republic, the Communists are likely to extend their control over
 
the whole peninsula
, with repercussions of the most serious nature
 
upon the entire United States and Free World position. Korea has
 
i/ From 1957-World Almanac (including non-battle deaths).
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become so much a symbol of our determination to assist the nations
 
of Free Asia to defend themselves against Comunist aggression that
 
it would be highly unwise for us to withdraw our support from the
 
Republic. Moreover
. 
the success of our programs in South Korea, as
 
compared with the Communist effort in North Korea, will be closely
 
watched not only on both sides of the demarcation line in Korea but
 
-throughout the Far Easto
 
The Team is convinced that for the foreseeable future the
 
United States has no alternative but to continue to support the
 
Republic of Korea. 
It seems clear that South Korea cannot presently
 
exist without outside support of considerable magnitude. It fur­
ther seems clear that such support can only come from the United
 
States at the present time. This is the basic reason for our econo­
mic aid program
 
The foregoing means that Congress will have to face the neces­
sity of continuing military and economic programs in Korea of some
 
magnitude not for just a short period but, as will be developed in
 
this report, for a considerable period to come. The current magni­
tude of these programs is reflected by the fact that their total in
 
fiscal 1957 came to some $1.2 billion, of which $872 million went
 
into military and $332 million into economic aid programs respec­9 

tively As explained on page 19, the $872 million figure includes
 
$534 million for the cost of the two U.S. divisions in Korea0
 
U.So Objectives
 
UoSo political objectives in Korea, as given in the 1959
 
budget presentation of the Office of the Economic Coordinator, are
 
as follows:
 
"The ultimate objective of the United States in Korea is
 
the establishment by peaceful means of a united country,
 
friendly to the United States and the West in general, poli­
tically stable, and economically self-supporting. Until this
 
objective can be realized, the United States is endeavoring
 
to help the Republic of Korea build and maintain a position
 
of strength which will deter a renewal of Communist aggression
 
and which will creat ,conditions in which political stability
 
can be maintained.t" -

I_/ Source: OEC FY 1959 Program Budget Submnission, p. 2 (SECRET). 
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It should be clear from the foregoing that our basic objective
 
in Korea is the unification of the country by peaceful means. Uni­
fication is also the policy both of the Republic of Korea and of the
 
Communists in the North, although with very different objectives in
 
mind.,
 
All authorities whom the Team consulted were of the opinion

that there is no prospect that the unification of Korea can come
 
about in the foreseeable future, short of an over-all change in the 
situation between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. There are 
no indications that the Communists are disposed to agree to any

settlement of the Korean problem except on their own terms. From
 
time to time they advance proposals for a settlement, which generally
 
include the reduction of military forces on both sides of the demar­
cation line, the withdrawal of all foreign foress from the peninsula,
 
and elections under so-called "neutral" supervision. Both the Repub­
lic of Korea and the United States, however, have continued to regard
 
such proposals with the utmost suspicion. The same is true of the
 
recent announcement by the Chinese Communists that they were with-.
 
drawing their troops unilaterally. This is because any Communist
 
forces which might be withdrawn into China could at any time be brought 
back into the peninsula.
 
All authorities also stated that they had no reason to be­
lieve that an attack was imminent either by North Korea on South
 
Korea or vice versa. While President Syngman Rhee at times still
 
speaks of "marching north," such action would probably not have the 
support of either the President's military or his civilian advisers. 
Moreover, the Koreans have had it made plain to them that the United
 
States would not look with favor on any such action. In any event
 
the Korean Army alone would not be able to mount an all-out offensive 
against the North by reason of the fact that its supplies of POL and
 
other essential commodities are closely held by the United States
 
military authorities and rationed on a very short-term basis.
 
As far as the Communists are concerned, it would appear most
 
probable that an attack by them on South Korea, if it should come,
 
would only take place as a part of a global attack upon the Western 
position. In other words, the deterrent to such attack seems clearly 
to lie in the fact that the Communists undoubtedly appreciate that 
any conflict which might break out in the Korean peninsula would not 
remain localized, as it did in 1950. It therefore seems likely that
 
the stalemate in Korea will continue for the foreseeable future.
 
The economic objectives of the United States in Korea provide
 
the general framework within which the current ICA program is being 
"11­
carried out. They will not be discussed in detail at this point
 
since the report itself constitutes a commentary on them. A recent
 
publication of OEC stated these objectives in the following terms: 
"The role of United States assistance to the Republic 
of Korea is to help that country raise living standards to 
approximately 1949-50 levels, which the ROK should be able to 
maintain with minimal U.S. economic assistance; to expand 
the capital investment segment of the economy as rapidly as 
possible without jeopardizing economic stability, emphasizing 
projects that will contribute directly to the expansion of 
agriculture and industrial productivity; and to enable the 
ROK to assume responsibility for financing an increasing share 
of the costs of maintaining its armed forces." /
 
As indicated above, the Team sees no reason to recommend 
modification of the general policy objectives of the United States 
in Korea. Moreover, the Team found that on the whole these objec­
tives were well understood by American officials in both Washington 
and Seoulo This is certainly true at the policy level although, as 
will be brought out in this report, some American technicians 
still have a tendency to think more in terms of reconstructing a 
war-torn country even after the job has been virtually completed
than of developing a self-supporting economy. 
_/ Source: Program Accomplishments. Fiscal Year 1957, OEC, June 30, 
1957, p. 16 (UNCLASSIFIED). o 
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The Historical and-Cultural Settin 
The Country and Its People 
The strategic location of the Korean peninsulap in close
 
proximity to China, Japan and Russia, and the physical character of 
the country have determined the course of Korean history and the 
development of Korean national characteristics. On the one hand, 
Korea's location on the road between Japan and China has caused it
 
over the centuries to be invaded and subjected to devastation on
 
repeated occasions. On the other hand, the fact that Korea is a
 
peninsula9 as well as the fact that the topography of the country is
 
characterized by a series of mountain ridges, has contributed to the
 
isolation of the people and has made it possible for them to retain
 
their identity through the successive invasions to which they have
 
been subjected0
 
The Country
 
The terrain of Korea (both North and South) is extremely 
rugged, although in the southwestern portion of the peninsula the 
land flattens out into broad valleys and plains0 It is here that 
most of the agricultural. production, as well as the heaviest con­
centration of people, is centered0 Elsewhere the mountain ranges 
dominate the landscape, particularly in North Korea where they rise 
to a height of 9,000 feet0 The south and west coasts are heavily 
indented with inlets and have many islands, and the west coast is
 
characterized by extreme tides which are among the highest in the
 
world.
 
The climate is dry and bracing throughout most of the year0
 
Nearly all of the annual rainfall of approximately 40 inches falls
 
during the summer months when intensive storms are frequent.
 
The area of the Korean peninsula is approximately 85,000 
square miles, of which just over 37,000, or approximately 44 per 
cent, are in South Korea0 The total population of the peninsula is 
approximately 30 million, of which 22 million are in the South and 
8 million in the North0 As will be evident from these figures the 
population density is much heavier in the South than in the North, 
being 570 per square mile in the South and 170 in the North. The 
pressure of population on the land in the Republic of Korea is even 
more evident when one considers that only 23 per cent of the land 
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is cultivable, while approximately 70 per cent of the population is 
directly dependent on agriculture. South Korea is about the size 
and shape of Indiana but has as many farmers as the whole of the 
United States east of the Mississippi. The largest urban centers are 
Seoul, with approximately one and one-half million population, and 
Pusan, with approximately one million population. 
,The Pe e 
The Korean people are a distinct racial type, being the 
fusion of the many strains which have inhgLited the peninsula since 
prehistoric times. According to Hrdlicka, they "present one domi­
nant type which differs from any surrounding types and is not quite 
Mongolic." He adds: "One of its main original components approached
 
the white race." In such matters as language, dress and diet the
 
Koreans are also distinct from their neighbors. Between North and
 
South, however, there are virtually no differences in language or
 
other national characteristics. 
Early Historical Sketch
 
In assessing the Koreans today, it is important to remember 
that they have known real independence only since 1948 and briefly 
between 1895 and 1905. Throughout most of the country's history the 
dominant cultural influence has been that of China. 
Although the Koreans claim that their history goes back over 
4,000 years, the first historical reference to them dates from 194
 
B.C. when the Chinese first entered the peninsula (known to them as 
Chosen or the Land of the Morning Calm or, more correctly, Morning 
Freshness), and brought it under Chinese control. During the suc­
ceeding centuries the extent of Chinese control over Korea varied but 
Chinese cultural influences continued strong. A relationship grew 
up between the two countries based on the Confucian "elder brother ­
younger brother" concept and this set the pattern of their relations
 
until as recently as 18959 although Korea did not formally acknow­
ledge Chinese suzerainty until 1636. From that time until the latter 
part of the nineteenth century, Korea became a hermit kingdom with 
practically no contacts with the outside world.
 
In 1876 Korea's isolation ended when Japan persuaded it to
 
sign a commercial treaty. In 1882 the United States established
 
diplomatic and commercial relations with Korea and a number of
 
i/ 	 See "The Koreans" by Ales Hrdlicka, in The Culture of Korea,
 
Korean-American Cultural Association, Ed. Changsoon Kim, 1946.
 
European states did the same in the next few years. Korea now 
became a pawn in the growing struggle between Japan and China which 
culminated in the Sino-Japanese War. As a result of that war, 
China in 1895 relinquished all claims to Korea, which thus became 
nominally independent althcugh a strong Japanese influence rapidly 
developed0 The Japanese then discovered that Imperial Russia also
 
had designs on Korea. The Russo-Japanese War was fought largely on
 
the Korean issue, and upon its termination in 1905 the Japanese had
 
no difficulty in getting Korea to sign a treaty by which it became 
a protectorate of Japan0 In 1910 they annexed the country outright0
 
Japanese Rule 
During the 40 years that they ruled Korea, from 1905 to 1945, 
the Japanese exercised a very tight control over the country, which 
came eventually to play an important part in their "Greater East
 
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." The Japanese used Korea primarily as a
 
source of raw materials and food, mainly coal iron ore, lumber,

. 

fish and rice, and integrated it with Manchuria and Japan itself'
 
into a closely organized economic complex The Japanese developed
 
the country economically, building railroads, port facilities and
 
highways, and developing some industry, especially in the North where
 
there are considerable hydroelectric resources. Education was
 
greatly expanded, especially in the lower grades0 The Korean popula­
tion grew rapidly from an estimated 13 million in 1910 to over 24
 
million in 1940. The Japanese ruled with a heavy hand, repressing
 
the liberties of the Koreans and attempting to stamp out all resist­
ance0 They were unsuccessful in this, however, and the Koreans were
 
never totally subjugated0
 
Liberation
 
Upon the defeat of Japan in World War II, American and Soviet 
forces entered Korea and occupied the country with the dividing 
line at the 38th parallel, which was originally intended to do no 
more than designate the areas south or north of which, respectively, 
the Japanese forces in the peninsula would surrender to the United 
States or the Soviet Union but which became the basis of the divi­
sion of the country into two halves. Failing agreement between the
 
United States and the USSR as to the future regime for Korea, the
 
United Nations in 1947 appointed a commission to supervise elections
 
throughout the country with a view to the establishment of a unified
 
independent Korea. The Soviet Union, however, refused to allow the
 
commission to visit its zone, with the result that in 1948 elections
 
were held under UN supervision in the South only Syngman Rhee was
 
elected as the first President of the Republic of Korea and in
 
December of that year American military government came to an end0
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In June of 1949 the last American occupation troops were withdrawn. 
Meanwhile, the Comunists set up in the North a "Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea" which was recognized by the Communist 
bloc as the legitimate government of Korea. 
The Korean-War 
Following a period of uneasy tension, the North launched its 
attack across the 38th parallel on June 25, 1950, and the Korean 
War was on. The United Nations Command, comprising 14 nations in
 
addition to the United States and the Republic of Korea, was 
formed and the tide of battle ebbed back and forth across the penin­
sula until July 1951, when armistice negotiations began. 
Two years later, in July 19539 the armistice was signed, 
providing for a demarcation line which represents the present bound­
ary between North and South Korea. The line does not conform pre­
cisely to the 38th parallelp being north of it at the eastern side 
of the peninsula and south of it at the western. It was contemplated 
at the time of the armistice agreement that there would be a high­
level conference within three months to settle the Korean question 
but this has never taken place, owing to the Communist attitude. 
Post-War DeveloEMents
 
Since the end of the Korean War, the attention of the Korean 
Government has been to a considerable extent devoted to problems 
of reconstruction, in which the aid program has played the leading 
role, The period from 1953 to date has been marked by a steady
development of political and economic stability. Rhee, who had 
been re-elected President in 19529 was again elected in 1956. 
In the North, meanwhilep it appears that a process of recon­
struction has also been under way and that the regime's ties with 
the Communist bloc have been strengthened, although little detailed 
information is available regarding the situation in that half of 
the peninsula. 
National Character
 
The national characteristics of the Korean people are to a
 
very considerable extent the product of their history. From this
 
history it is clear thatp while jealously clinging to their
 
natiiial independence, they have nonetheless over the centuries been
 
almost always in a position of dependence on some foreign power.

Thio has caused them to be inexperienced in running their own affairs. 
Moreover, the dominant foreign influence over much of their history 
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has 	been that of Confucian China. This has had a number of draw­
backs, particularly as the Confucian way of life was already 
becoming sterile when the Koreans took it over some 1,000 years 
ago. Moreover, their absorption of Confucianism tended to distort 
some of its aspects, notably the excessive emphasis plac$l on
 
scholastic achievement to the detriment of manual laboro;- This 
is reflected today in the widespread need for management skills
 
and vocational training in Korea. As will be developed elsewhere
 
in this report, there are historical reasons, stemming from the
 
Japanese colonial period and the Communist invasion, which have con­
tributed to this need. An important factor, however, has been the
 
Confucian cultural background.
 
At the same time, the Korean people have many admirable
 
qualities. Their sturdiness and resilience have been amply demon­
strated in the past few years, when their national character was
 
subjectsd to the tremendous stresses of the Korean War. During
 
and 	since that war, as well as during the whole period of Japanese
 
rule, they have shown a remarkable degree of attachment to their 
national independence and a determination to preserve and streng­
then it.
 
The Koreans are people of imagination, spirit and courage. 
They possess good humor, industry, and remarkable manual dexterity. 
At certain pericds in the past their scientific and scholarly 
accomplishments have been remarkable. They are mentally alert 
and learn quickly when given an opportunity to acquire new skills. 
American military obsorvers consider the Korean soldier to be one
 
of the best in the world.
 
The 	Military Setting 
Although it was not within the Team's competence to make any 
assessment of the military situation in Korea, the connection
 
between our military and economic programs is so close that it is
 
believed the following summary of the military situation will
 
help to place the economic situation in its proper setting.
 
The basic fact is that at the present time the United Nations 
and Communist sides are each maintaining forces approximating 
7009000 men on either side of the demarcation line. Details regard­
ing the United Nations and Communist military strength are given 
_/ 	See Cornelius Osgood, The Koreans and Their Culture, Ronald 
Press Co., New York, 1951. 
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in Appendix A. It will be observed that, although the United 
Nations ground forces in Korea exceed the estimated Communist 
strength, the Communists have considerable air superiority, espe­
cially in jet aircraft. Moreover, the Communists are known to 
have large numbers of additional troops stationed across the border 
in China which could be quickly transferred to Korea. This, of 
course, would also be true of the troops which the Chinese Commu­
nists have recently announced they plan to withdraw from North Korea. 
Cost to the United States of Military Aid to Korea 
During the Korean War, and until July 1, 1955, the entire 
support of the Korean military establishment was provideoby the 
United States, at an estimated total cost of $2 billion°- In 1954,
 
the United States and Korea agreed that the United States would 
continue to contribute to the support of the Korean military estab­
lishment and that the maximum strength of that establishment would 
be about 7009000. During the 1955 fiscal year the United States
 
spent a total of $420 million for this purpose, from the Department 
of Defense budget.
 
The military assistance program to Korea, in its present 
form, financed with Matual Security Program funds, was inaugurated 
July I. 1955, Obligations totalled $379 million in the 1956 fiscal 
year and $338 million in 1957. In the current fiscal year the 
program is expected to reach $257 milion, exclusive of training 
costs or the cost of spare parts which are programmed on a world­
wide basis and not identifiable by country. 
In 1957 the contribution of the ROK Government to national. 
defense from its own revenues was the equivalent of $60 million, 
representing some 22 per cent of its budget. To this figure should 
be added approximately $49 million provided by the United States 
through the sale of surplus agricultural commodities for local cur­
rency. The total cost of the Korean defense establishment was 
therefore the equivalent of $447 million in 1957. 
With a view to trying to estimate the total cost to the
 
United States of the current military effort in Korea, the Team ob­
tained from the Controller of the U.S. Eighth Army a figure of
 
i/ Source: Bureau of the Budget. 
- at the rate of exchange used throughout this report, of 1,000 
hwan to the dollar. See page 34. 
r
 
$534 million for the total cost in fiscal 1957 of the two U.S. divi­sions in Korea, plus supporting units. This covers pay and allow­anc;es for troops and civilias, supplies and equipment (including
freight) and support costs.A 
 Adding this amount to that given
above for the cost of the Korean forces ($447 million) gives a
total of $981 million.
 
Whereas the foregoing figures would appear large, it shouldbe pointed out that the cost to the United States o! maintaining
a large American force in Korea would be substantially greater.
 
The total number of officers and men assigned to the vari­ous U.S. military assistance advisory groups in Korea is 1,398 at
the present time'. 
 Their cost is not included in the foregoing
figures., 
The ROK Army of 20 active and 10 reserve divisions is re­garded by American military authorities as a very good fighting
force. 
 It is the fourth largest army in the world and the second
largest in the Free World. 
Fquipment and training are almost
entirely of American origin 
 Most of the equipment, being World War
II or Korean War types, is now obsolete
 
It is U.S. policy that some reduction in Korean forces
should take place0 
 This has been under negotiation betweentwro governments in the past few months0 
the 
The U.S. objective has
been to obtain Korean agreement to cutting the army by 4 divisionsin the near future and eventually to cut it by another 6 divi­sions to a total of 100 Concurrently, the U.S. troops in the penin­sula are being provided with modern weapons. 
The Team was not able to find any indication that the reduc­tion contemplated for the near future will bring any saving in
American aid. On the contrary, 
 in view of the need of the ROK Armyfor modern equipment, especially to compensate for the loss offire-power resulting from reduced forces, as well as the need forraising army pay (the army is in fact planning an early increase),
the direct and indirect cost to the United States is not likely to
be less in the Immediate future, 
l_/ This figure sti.13 does not indicate the over-all cost to the
United States, as it refers only to U.S. ground troops in
Korea0 
 The Team was unable to obtain a figure for the cost of
the US, Air Force component in Korea but assumes it would
 
riot be 
 A,Le, compared to the cost of the two army divisions.
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There is also the problem of the absorption into the economy

of the man who would be demobilized under the proposed reduction.
 
It might be necessary, in view of the unemployment and underemploy­
ment now existing, for the Korean Government to undertake some
 
measures to relieve this situation. Presumably the Koreans would 
require assistance from the aid program for an activity of this 
sort, It may well turn out, therefore, that the short-term cost to 
the United States would be as great as keeping the men in question
under arms. At the same time, if the Korean Arny were maintained at 
its present strength, the cost to the United States would undoubtedly
rise because of the rising cost of equipment and the need for rais­
ing pay. 
The Political Settin,
 
Centralization of Government 
The Government of the Republic of Korea is a highly central­
ized one, with effective power being exercised by the executive 
branch, ioeo by the President. There was originally a constitu­
tional prorision for a Prime Minister but in 1954 an amendment was 
put through by President Rhee to abolish this post. The constitu­
tion provides for a bicameral legislature but the second, or upper,

house has never been established. Provincial governors are
 
appointed by the central government which closely supervises local 
government activitieso
 
2ZWng Rhea 
In addition to the foregoing provisions of an institutional
 
characterg the centralization of political power is enhanced by 
the fact that the Presidency is held by Syngman Rhee, whose per­
sonal influence is felt throughout the entire government. As the
 
leading fighter for Korean independence throughout the Korean War,
 
Rhee enjoys tremendous prestigeg although his popularity is not
 
as great as it was0 He continues to have a great hold on the masses 
of the peoplej, especially in the rural districts. At the same 
time, there is considerable criticism of him in the business com­
munity and among the better educated people0 He is a consummate 
politician who remains firmly in control of the Liberal Party, which
 
holds 132 out of 201 seats in the National Assembly. Through the
 
party machine, through the national police, and through the per­
sonal control exercised by his immediate entourage, Rhee still
 
manages to keep his finger in every aspect of Korean national lifeo
 
As an illustration of this may be cited the statement made to the
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Team by the head of the University of Minnesota group at Seoul
 
National University, that the President personally passes on the
 
names of all personnel from the University who go to the United
 
States for training.
 
The Problem of Succession
 
Although now aged 83, Rhee appears vigorous and is still
 
firmly in the saddle. There is evidence that he is delegating
 
more authority to subordinates and this may lead to a stronger role
 
for the Cabinet in the future, as well as greater participation by

Liberal Party leaders in the formulation of national policy At
 
the same time the continued dependence of the nation's entire poli­
tical life on one individual is a cause for concern,
 
The problem of how the transition to a successor regime,
 
in the event of Rhee's death or incapacity, could be achieved is a
 
very real one that may arise at any moment. It was the consensus
 
of those whom the Team consulted that the army will in all like­
lihood play a key role in determining the successor. Provided the
 
army leaders can agree and provided the change-over can be effected
 
quicklys it seems probable that the transition will take place

peacefully and that the Vice President, Dr. John Chang, will suc­
ceed to the Presidency even though he happens to be a member of
 
the opposition party On the other hand, if the process of transi­
tion is long-drawn-out, the opportunities for intrigue will be
 
very great and for legal succession proportionately less
 
Domestic Politics 
In spite of the thorough control which Syngman Rhee exer­
cises over the entire machinery of government at the present time,
 
the political situation in Korea has a number of aspects which
 
suggest that democratic tendencies may grow in the future. For
 
one thing
. 
there is remarkable freedom of the press and consider­
able criticism of the government is voiced daily in the National
 
Assembly as well as in the newspapers. The growth of a two-party
 
system in recent years has been another favorable development.

The election for the National Assembly which is taking place this
 
spring should provide evidence of the extent to which democratic
 
institutions have in fact taken root,,
 
There are two major parties in Korea, the Liberal Party,

which is Rhee's party, and the Democratic Party The Liberal and
 
Democratic Parties can best be described as essentially conserva­
tive in outlook and as differing more in personal loyalties and in
 
the fact that one is "in" and the other "out" than in any
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fundamental approach to the country's problems. 
The present Vice
 
President, Dr. John Chang, is 
a prominent member of the Democratic 
Party and was elected in 1956 over Rhee's running-mate. Since his 
election Rhee has kept him carefully in the background. 
Besides the 'twomain parties there has been a Progressive

Par-ty which. has had some support among students and intellectuals 
but which has just been banned by tbe Rhe government, and its
 
leader, Cho Pong-am, placed under .resto 
 This party has advocated
 
a plawne4 economy along socialist lines, has rejected both capi­
talism and Communism and has favored the peaceful unification of
 
Korea.
 
It was the opinion of some observers that if a perfectly free
 
election were to be held in Korea at the present time the Demo­
cratio, or, ohief opposition
, Party would win. Other observers were
 
not so sure, Gfal agreed, however, that in spite of the hopeful

democratic trends noted above, President Rhee and his Liberal Party

'will probably manage to manipulate the forthcoming election in
 
such a manner as to be returned to officej
 
A cause for concern in connection with this spring's elec­
tion is that attempts will undoubtedly be made, both by the
 
go.ernment and by the opposition, to involve the United States aid
 
program On the one hand, there will be a tendency for the Liberal
 
Party to seek to draw political capital from the accomplishments

of the program On the other hand, the United States will no doubt 
be accused by the Democrats of using aid funds to support the
 
government In power. American officials in Korea are of course
 
well aware of this danger.
 
At the present time the Korean Arxy does not appear to be 
a dominant factor in Korean politics although it does supply an
element of stability to the political scene and q as indicated above,
will probably, in alliance with some of the political leaders,
determine the successor to Rheeo The national police, a force of 
some 4,0,000. represents one of the principal sources of Rhee's
 
power,' and has in the past been openly used to control elections
 
in behalf'of the Liberal Party, especially in the rural areas0
 
Labor in Korea is not an effective force0 The Republic
does not have a highly developed labor movement and in any event 
all unions are under the direction of the Federation of Korean
Trado Unions, whose leadership is closely associated with the
governmentLand under its controli 
N,. 
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Communist Ipfluence 
Owing to the experiences which South Korea-underwent at the
 
time of the Korean War, there is a universal revulsion against
 
Communism throughout the Republic. The Communists are not permitted
 
to organize politically and have negligible popular support at
 
present. Efforts at subversion and infiltration from North Korea
 
have met with little quccess so far, although in recent months the
 
caliber of agents from the North seems to have improved. It is the
 
opinion of American police advisers that the security forces are
 
sufficient to cope with any attempts of this nature. According to
 
both American and Korean officials the passage of individuals in
 
either direction between North and South Korea is on an extremely
 
small scale. The North Koreans are carrying out a constant propa­
ganda campaign against the South by radio but the Team was informed
 
that this propaganda is having very little effect in spite of the.
 
fact that almost all South Koreans have family and other ties with
 
the North During 1957, for example, American officials estimate
 
that not aver 50 Korean soldiers defected to the North in spite of
 
inducements offered,
 
Some observers are of the opinion that the anti-Communist
 
attitude which is now so characteristic of South Korea may change
 
as memories of the Korean War grow dim. The success which the Com­
munists may achieve in rehabilitating the North Korean economy will
 
of course have a bearing on the attitude of people in the South on
 
this question. So will the success which the Rhee government, and
 
the aid program, may achieve in developing South Korea.
 
U S. Policy toward Rhee
 
From the point of view of the United States, we have no
 
alternative to continuing to work with Syngman Rhee There are many
 
things about Rhee's regime that can be criticized but no one can
 
impugn his patriotism or his anti-Communism or gainsay his hold
 
over South Korea. As already indicatedy the United States has a
 
big stake in Korea. [1t is therefore to our advantage not to with­
draw our support from Rhee's government, since there is no alterna­
tive that could provide stabilityi
 
This does not mean, of course, that we should not continue
 
hammeriVng away at our points of difference with Rhee in an effort
 
to bring him closer to our point of view on such matters as trading
 
with Japan or putting Korea's house in order economically. This,
 
in fact., is current American policy.
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It often seems that Syngman Rhee is able to pursue certain 
courses of action not wholly-commensurate with U.S. interests, despite 
the massive aid annually being given by the United States. Critics 
of the program in Korea have suggested that a good deal more quid Pro 
quo might be in order. The truth of the matter is that the U.S. 
interest in Korea and in the maintenance of the military establishment 
is such that Rhee holds considerably more bargaining power than 
might be apparent from a simple examination of the size of the aid 
expenditureo We not only have to learn to live with Rhee but it is 
very much in our own interest to get him to follow our line of think­
ing. Threats of withdrawal of aid are likely to be less impressive 
to him, since he is fully aware of our direct interest, than continu­
al pressure to accede to a given point of view. 
It should not be assumed from the foregoing recital of the 
facts of life either that Rhee is getting all he wants or that the 
Team thinks he should do so. The cut in economic aid funds in the 
current fiscal year and the present negotiations for a reduction in 
Korean military forces provide evidence that the United States can 
say "no" to Syngman Rhee on specific issueso 
North Koreg
 
In view of the obvious relation between our aid program in 
South Korea and the Communist program in North Korea, it may be 
useful to summarize below the following material regarding the 
situation in the North0 
Although accurate information on this subject is extremely 
difficult to obtain, it is clear that since World War II the 
Communists have been making a sustained effort to integrate North 
Korea economically with the Communist bloc0 It is to their 
advantage to do so in view of North Korea's important material re­
sources, particularly minerals and hydroelectric powero There 
have been frequent references in the Communist press and radio to 
a Three-Year Plan for North Korea, and more recently a Five-Year 
Plan., The extent to which these plans have been successful is not 
known, The Communists have recently announced, however, that 
pig,-irn production is now running at the rate of 1,000 tons per 
day, that fertilizer production at the Hungnam plant is at the rate 
of 3501000 tons per year. that the annual fish catch is twice that 
of South Korea, and that in recent years there has been steady pro­
gress in such fields as electric power production, textiles, steel 
and chemicals, The net increase in population is reported to be 
over 2 per cent.
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Like South Korea, the North suffered considerable war-time
 
devastation (in fact, more so) and its rehabilitation may be
 
presumed to be costing a considerable sum of money. It has been
 
announced in the Communist press that in the period 1954 to 1964
 
economic aid to North Korea will total the equivalent of $808.6
 
milliong made up as follows: China
, $325 millioni USSR, $250 mil­
lion; East Germany, $115 million, and others, $118.6 million.
 
Details are lacking but it is evident that the Communists regard

it as worthwhile to make a substantial investment in North Korea.
 
At the same time, it would appear, if these figures can be accepted,
that the rehabilitat~ion of the North is costing the Communists
 
less than the rehabilitation of the South is costing us, 
 The com­
parison, however, should not be pushed too far
 
In addition to the economic potential of North Korea the
Communists, of course, find the country useful for propaganda
 
purposes in their constant campaign to achieve the unification of
 
the Korean peninsula along Communist lines and the withdrawal
 
of American forces and American economic support from South Korea.
 
Yoreover, the North Korean regime is waging an aggressive

diplomatic campaign against South Korea in an attempt to secure dip­lomatic recognition by Japan and some of the Asian countries, 
As
 
regards Japan, the North Koreans are working through the large

Korean community of some 600,000 in Japan as well as various left­
wing Japanese organizations, Some commercial contacts have taken
 
place and a number of visits have been exchanged. For instance,

while the Team was in South Korea a group of five members of the
 
Japanese Parliament visited the North. 
It does not appear, however,

that there is any real prospect at this time of Japan's recog­
nizing the North Korean regime. There have also been commercial
feelers put out by the North Koreans to various other countries0
They have signed commercial agreements with semi-official trading

groups in Burma, Indonesia and India, and a North Korean cabinet
 
minister who attended the recent pro-Communist "People's Confer­
ence" in Cairo subsequently vis Led Syria and signed a trade and
 
cultural agreement with that c.ountryo
 
One of the factors which struck the Team most forcibly inits -v:isit to Korea was the paucity of any factual information as to 
what is going on In the North. This point was discussed with nume­
rous Korean and American officials and iL is difficult for the Team 
to believe that additional intelligence regarding the North would 
not be forthcoming if more intensive efforts 
-to obtain it were made.
It appears that the appropriate agencies of the U.S. Government are 
well aware of this situation but at the same time the Team cannot 
help calling attention to it. since it seems clear that there are a
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number of lessons which the United States could draw from the expe­
rience of the Communists in the North which might help us in our
 
South Korean programs.
 
Korea 0s International Relations 
Although it is our policy to reduce Korea's dependence on
the United States by encouraging its relations with other parts of
the Free World, progress on this score has been somewhat disappoint­ing. The Republic's foreign relations today are mainly with the
United States and a few like-minded countries in Asia although the
latter ties are growing. Korea has no relations of any kind with
the Communist bloc or any of the so-called neutral or uncommitted
 
countries.
 
RelAtions with Japan
 
The entire subject of Korean-Japanese relations is a complex
 
one which is highly charged with emotional overtones in view of
President Rhee's oft-expressed antipathy to the Japanese. 
Almost
 
all observers who have studied the situation have come to the con­
clusion that closer relations between the two countries are essen­
tial. 
Certainly from the economic standpoint it would appear that

the best prospects for an expansion of Korea's exports must come
from greater trade with Japan. 
 This is particularly true in the
 
case of rice, as will be developed in detail later in this reporto

It would also be helpful, from the standpoint of training, for

Koreans to be able to go to Japan freely, especially as most of
 
them aged 30 or above speak Japanese. For the moment however,
Korea maintains an official policy of discouraging trade with Japan

or the sending of Koreans there for training, although there is
 
some deviation from these policies in practice°
 
The difficulties in the way of closer relations between the
 
two countries are formidable. 
In the first place, although the
 
extreme anti.-Japanese attitude assumed by Syngman Rhee would appear

exaggeratedg there remains throughout the population a considerable
legacy of antipathy from the days of the Japanese occupation (and

even before) as well as a considerable feeling of inferiority on the
 
part of many Koreans because of evident Japanese progresso Some
Koreans even seem to fear that closer trade relations with Japan,

taking into account the relative inexperience of Korea, would open

the door to renewed Japanese economic penetration and political
domination. 
Others realize the advantages that would result from

closer contact. 
This is an area in which it is extremely difficult
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for an outsider to speak with precision. The Korean attitude toward
 
Japan cannot be stated in terms of black and white. There is a
 
considerable gray area. such as often characterizes national atti­
tudes in the case of two countries that have lived side by side for
 
centuries.
 
There is also the practical consideration that apart from
 
some rice and marine products there is very little that Japan would
 
especially wish to obtain from South Korea 
 The Japanese are not
 
particularly anxious to press the rice question, having in mind
 
their experience in 1954 when they were prepared to make a consider­
able purchase of Korean rice but when this fell thr.ough owing to
 
President Rhee's insistence on a wholly exorbitant price. On the
 
other hand, Japan is anxious to market processed goods in Korea and
 
for this reason would tend to purchase any item it could use if the
 
Koreans vroild in turn purchase Japanese manufactured goods
 
The recent talks between Korea and Japan had as their objec­
tive the obtaining of agreement on the release of certain prisoners

being detained by each side, as well as on the initiation of formal
 
negotiations respecting outstanding issues, including property

claims and the so-called "Rhee Line." The latter is a line 1,600

miles in length t.4hich extends from 20 to 200 miles out from the
 
South Korean coast, enclosing an area of roughly 145,000 square

miles. The line was originally promulgated by American military

authorities for military and security reasons during the post-World-

War period and subsequently extended arbitrarily by Rhee with a
 
view to Closing the area to Japanese fishermen. Such Japanese

fishing boats as have crossed the line have been subject to seizure
 
and their crews arrested. This has been a constant source of irri­
tation for Japan0
 
The United Stans has been pressing both Koreans and Japanese

to come to an agreement on all outstanding issues. Meanwhile,

diplomatic relations between the two countries remain on an extreme­
ly restricted basis. with Korea represented in Japan only by a
 
charge d'affaires and with no Japanese representative being per­
mitted to reside in Korea.
 
Rel tions with Other Asian Nations
 
The Republic of Korea's relations with the other countries
 
of Free Asia are slowly developing Korea has diplomatic relations
 
with the Government of the Republic of China, the Philippines, and
 
Viet-Nam. Visits of high-ranking officials have recently been
 
exchanged with the Chinese Nationalists and Viet-Nam, while Korea
 
and the Philippines have just announced the raising of their
 
-27­
respective diplomatic missions to Embassy level. As far as the 
remainder of Asia is concerned Korea has very few contacts. The 
Koreans are particularly critical of India's attitude in world 
affairs,
 
Korea's participation in regional organizations in the Far
 
East has been relatively slight although it is a member of the
 
United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE)o
 
Relations with United States
 
As might be expected in view of the current situation, it is
 
with the United States that Korea maintains the closest of its 
foreign relations. The Koreans have traditionally been friendly 
with Americansg whom they got to know through the work of U.S. mis­
sionaries, starting in the latter part of the nineteenth century.
 
Rhee himself spent a large part of his long exile in the continental
 
United States and in Hawaii. Since the end of World War II the
 
United States has played a very prominent role in Korean affairs
 
and this was of course intensified during the Korean War. In the
 
subsequent period the existence of the large American aid program
 
has given rise to the feeling on the part of many observers that the
 
Koreans may be developing too much of a sense of dependence on the
 
United States. Some even referred to the development of a "philo­
sophy of mendicancy" on the part of the Koreans. The Team, in fact,
 
saw some evidence that Korea was becoming too dependent on the
 
United States, as will be brought out elsewhere in this report,
 
The question has also been raised whether the large aid pro­
gram has created, or will create, a feeling of anti-Americanism
 
on the part of the Koreans. In this regard it is pointed out that
 
the giver of a gift often finds himself unconsciously in a position
 
which creates resentment on the part of the recipient The Team
 
queried many Koreans and Americans on this point. Their almost
 
unanimous view was that there is no perceptible anti-American feel­
ing at this time, although some thought that such feeling may well
 
develop in the future0
 
The Team was impressed by the good working relations exist­
ing between American and Korean officials especially at high levels, 
eog., in the Combined Economic Board (CEB) and its subsidiary 
con nittees A like situation was noted on the military side0 In 
fact, the Team found the state of Korean-American relations to be 
good, with a real appreciation on both sides of the value of main­
taining the relationship.
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Aside from problems arising out of the reduction in the level
of economic aid, and the question of the reduction in Korean
forces, the chief issue arising between the two countries in recent

months has been the question of a status of forces agreement,

This issue has become especially important to the Korean Government
 in view of the fact that the United States has negotiated such an
agreement wit' Japan. 
The Korean press, under official inspiration,
has played up news stories of incidents involving American service­
men and taken the line that such incidents could be avoided by the
negotiation of a status of forces agreement. The United States
military authorities maintain that the situation in Korea is one of
 
a suspended state of hostilities and that the Korean legal system

would not make it advisable to try American servicemen in Korean

courts. The Team understands that consideration is currently beinggiven in Washington to this entire subject, with a view to determin­ing whether there are any steps which could be taken in the direction 
of regula-._,zK.ing the status of our forces in Korea.
 
The Econ2oic SettiW 
_neBalance of Payments Gar 
The termination of hostilities in Korea left the peninsula
divided near the 38th parallel. More importantly, it left most of
the people (22 million) in the South with the principal resource
 
of agricultural land. 
 It likewise left relatively few people
(8 r.llion) north of the demarcation line with rich mineral
 
, power
and forest resources. 
The net result irn the South is a heavily

over-populated area with natural resources inadequate to support

even the present very low standard of living,
 
During the Japanese colonial period
, Korea was not only

united north and south 'but was a part of a larger trading area
including Manchuria and Japan. 
North Korea provided power for the

whole peninsula and minerals and forest products not only for
local consumption tobut for export Japan. Korea was alao requiredto export a part of its high-quality rice and to make up the 
calorie deficit (since rice was not in absolute surplus) by import­ing cheaper coarse grains such as barley, millet and wheat from
Manchuria. Because of these compulsory exports Korea under theJapanese was more nearly able to achieve a balance in its export­import requirements than at present, 
South Korea, in calendar year 1957, earned approximately
$61 million from exports and services and required $448 millionsome 
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of imports, almost all of which were financed from the U0 S0 aid 
program_/ If this gap in Korea's foreign exchange position is to 
be closedp aid must continue to be given in order to bring in neces­
sary supplies and equipment for the maintenance and development of
 
the econonyo
 
Pressure of Human on Natural Resources 
South Korea is poor in natural resources. The country is
 
predominantly agriculturalp with 70 per cent of the population
 
directly dependent upon the agricultural sector of the econonm.
 
Rice cultivation is dominant although there are other grains such
 
as barley, as well as a limited variety of vegetables (cabbage,
 
turnip, etc.). and some good fruit, notably apples and pears. Use­
ful forest products are largely confined to fuel. The country
 
lacks additional cultivable land; practically all of the acreage
 
which is suitable for cultivation is in use. The land has been 
intensively farmed for centuries and requires the constant appli­
cation of fertilizer. Insect pests and fungus diseases are preva­
leat.
 
The country contains some mineral resources such as anthra­
cite coal, tungsten, graphite, gold and iron ore but all of these
 
(with the exception of tungsten) are limited either in quantity or
 
in quality. South Korea lacks oil or bituminous coal and its
 
potentialities for hydroelectric power are not nearly so great as
 
are those in the North.
 
South Korean production of fisheries products has fallen
 
perceptibly since World War II0 The fishing industry, which had
 
been developed by the Japanese, suffered considerably on the with­
drawal of the Japanese as they took with them not only their most
 
skilled personnel but also a substantial part of the fishing fleet.
 
In addition to the lack of natural resources the economic
 
problem is complicated by the fact that the Korean population is
 
rising rapidly. The present net rate of increase is 1.8 per cent
 
per annum, which is greater than that of several other countries 
in Asia such as Indiap Indonesia or Viet-Nam. The rate is also 
greater than that of present-day Japan although the population den­
sity is somewhat less (570 persons per square mile in South Korea 
as compared with 620 in Japan)0 The rate of increase is by no 
means as great as in certain other countries, including some in 
Latin America but the land area of South Korea (37,000 square 
I/ See Appendix B. 
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miles) is small and almost fully developed. Over half of the popu­
lation is under 20 years of age. 
If there were any serious prospect

of unification the problem would not be so acute since the North 
has a population density of only 170 persons to the square mile.
 
The situation in the South has been aggravated by the flow of refu­
gees from the North totalling perhaps two million between 1945 and
 
1950 and another three to four million during the period of the
 
Korean War. As a result of this population pressure, as well as
 
dislocations arising from the Korean War9 
it is estimated that there
 
are over one million persons unemployed in the country and that a
 
sizable proportion of the population in the rural areas is under­
employed.
 
The Team was greatly impressed with the gravity of the Korean
 
population problem and believes that it should receive increasing
 
attention in the future. In view of Korea's relatively meager
 
prospects for industrial expansion, the ultimate solution must lie
 
either in population control or emigration or a combination of both.
 
The problem, moreover, is not simply one of the pressure of
 
a growing population on limited land and other natural resources.
 
The problem is compounded by the overwhelming need for managerial

skills and training on the part of the Koreans.
 
It is clear that Koreans have considerable native ability.

In agricultural techniques there is probably little which they have
 
to learn from the West in terms of their own agricultural pattern.

They are, however, woefully deficient today in both training and
 
experience in managerial and administrative techniques. This is the
 
result of three main causes: first, their Confucian cultural back­
ground with its emphasis on book learning rather than on manual or
 
technical skill; second, the deliberate policy of the Japanese in
 
keeping Koreans away from positions of executive or administrative
 
importance, both in government and i 3ustry5 and third, the kidnap­
ping by the Communists in 1950-51 of some 30*000 key technicians
 
from government and industry. 
As a result of these factors, the
 
Koreans are laboring under a tremendous handicap in developing their
 
commerce and industry and staffing governmental positions. The
 
need is particularly acute in the field of industrial management.
 
In developing their economy the Koreans are also handicapped

by the relative lack of industrial development to date0 Japanese

efforts to develop heavy industry in Korea were largely confined to
 
the North, and the industrialization of the South was mostly in the
 
field of cotton textile production. The latter represents the
 
largest single component in South Korean industry today and there is
 
also a variety of light consumer industries such as food processing,
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beverages, tobacco, rubber shoes, paper, plastics, metal products, 
and the like. More recently the Koreans have launched into a 
number of rather ambitious industrial fields, including iron and 
steel. As indicated above, however, the economy remains basically 
an agricultural one0 
Complications Arising out of the Korean War 
The economy of Korea has been drastically affected by the 
Korean War and its aftermath. The devastation of the country was 
severe. Estimates of total casualties run to over one million 
killed and of property damage upward of $3 billion. The railway, 
highways and bridges, ports and industries were severely crippled;
 
50 per cent of the classrooms and 75 per cent of the hospitals were 
destroyed or damaged. It is estimated that Seoul lost 85 per cent 
of its industry, transport and utilities and from 50 to 75 per cent 
of its buildings. In the light of this devastation, the rehabili­
tation of the Korean economy, in which the aid program has played 
an important part, has been remarkable. 
In addition to immediate problems of rehabilitation and
 
reconstruction, the war has brought with it a number of problems 
of a longer-range nature arising from the continued division of the
 
country One important consequence is that under present condi­
tions the Korean military establishment is out of keeping with
 
Korea~s resources and out of line by far with the size of the coun­
try. Moreover, South Korea has continued to be cut off from the
 
resources of the North, especially power. This has intensified
 
the economic isolation of the country which began with the dissolu­
tion at the end of World War II of the former Japanese-Manchurian-

Korean trading area.
 
An additional consequence of the Korean War has been the 
effect on the attitude of the people of South Korea and of foreign­
ers toward the future prospects of the country. This is parti­
cularly noticeable in the case of capital investment. With the 
peninsula divided by a demarcation line only about 30 miles from 
Seoul and with the possibility of a renewed Communist attack at any
 
time, most people are understandably reluctant to invest in South
 
Korea. Although there has been some investment on the part of
 
Koreans recently in building construction and in industry, the
 
types of investment which remain most attractive are those which 
permit quick profits and the maintenance of capital in a relatively 
liquid condition. This has led to a tendency to use capital for 
trade rather than industrial development. It has also led to a 
substantial flight of capital from the country and to a disinclina­
tion on the part of foreign capital to come into the country, The 
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problem of capital investment from abroad has been complicated by

the absence of an adequate foreign investment law. The Embassy and
 
OEC have for some time been pressing the Korean Government to enact
 
such legislation, and ICA has supplied an adviser to the government

to help it with the drafting of a law which it is hoped can be

enacted in the next few months. Following the passage of a satis­
factory law, it is anticipated that the Customary investment
 
guarantee agreement will be negotiated between Korea and the United
 
States, 
There have been no IERD or Export-Import Bank loans to
 
Korea.
 
The situation outlined above has been intensified by the
inflation which has prevailed since the Korean War. 
This period

has been marked by a tendency to think only of day-to-day problems,

to seek quick profits, and to look to the United States for massive
 
long-term economic support.
 
.Inflation and Stabilization 
Inflation has had a marked influence on the economy since

the cessation of hostilities after the Korean War. 
 From 1954 to
 
1955( according to the Seoul wholesale price index prices nearly

doubled. From September 1955 until October 1957, the maximum rise
in the wholesale index was to 132 in June 1957, using September

1955 as a base c' 100. By November 1957 the index had fallen again

to 111 and the outlook was toward Increasing stabilization. In
 
fact, the index stood at 110 in January 1958. A 10 per cent
 
increase in money supply in November was, partially at least, a

result of a large rice harvest ai.d of military stockpiling of food.

However, this haa not yet caused ary appreciable increase in prices.
 
A number of factors have contributed to the stabilization
 
in prices but the greatest and most. overwhelming factor has been
the massive infusion of goods into the Korean economy from the aid
 
program over the past several years. 
Without this contribution
 
of goods it is certain that the ec 'onomy could not 
have survived
cc.L.p,;eo This contilbution has a15o resulted ir an absorption of 
lo"LS currency, a portion of which has been placed in a frozen
 
account. The amount frozen Is proaertly 25 per, cent of the total
 
money supply, The Koreans, especially during the last eight months

of 1957, tooY effeciive measures in counteracting a tendenny
toward further inflation. Credits were reduced and money in cir­
culation was controlled. The result was a levellng off of the 
wholesale price index. 
The Koreans are 
very rightly proud of their accomplishment

in achieving stabilization and it is a tribute to the OEC staff
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that the Koreans feel that it is "their" stabilization program,
 
TeVf'.rtheless, special vigilance will be needed in the coming year
 
t:-1assure that present gains are maintained. At least two factors
 
dur.ng the past.year which contributed to stabilization cannot be
 
deperded upon to be operative in the coming year. Non-project
 
al1.tan ~ goods were pumped into the economy over and above the 
am,:.unts contained in the yearly budget as a result of the reduc-

In the financial pipeline. The other factor was the unusually 
.o.;C' rice harvest in 1957,t 
fhe Ex:.hg .ate 
At the present time, the rate of exchange for the Korean hwan 
is set at. 500 hwan to one U.S dollar. This rate was established
 
ny the Korean Government in August 19559 and it was also agr.eed be­
tween tno U,So Government and the ROK that it would be reconsidered
 
if the wholesale price index rose above 125 by December 1957, using
 
September 1955 as a base of 100, However, this did not occur
 
Few people agree on the evaluation of all aspects of tne 
ufflcial rate of exchange between the hwan and the dollar, The one 
poiut on,which most observers agree at present is that the 500­
tc=l rate is not a meaningful conversion rate for expressing values 
in terms of dollars, The free market rate of dollars approximated 
l000 hwan to $1 at the end of 1957. For convenience and because 
i 000 huan to $3 more nearly approximates real values, the Team 
r,as uased thvis conversion throughout this report to express values 
Ai dolars° At this rate, for examplep the value of Korean rice 
dprXiMates the price of rice in the world market. 
Lc."e is very substantial resistance on the part of the
 
KNreau Gcvernment to any change in the exchange rate0 This
 
r'6isita'c,-e is especially strong in the case of President Rhee -hc ,
 
etc, g othu things, feels that a change would be symbolic of a 
wakenlng of' the economy, Rhee 9s approach to this problem is alio 
.:iLuenc-td by the fact that the present rate of exchange for the 
JapanEse yen is 620 to the dollar, from which he apparently draws 
*,he vowiujlon -chat the hwan at 500:1 is a stronger currency. 
Among the many effects of the artificial rate of exchange 
.isthe amount of hwan produced as counterpart funds through the 
ale ocf t--tmmoditles supplied by the aid program, If the exc-hange 
rate wero -hanged to 1,000 to 1 this would double the amount of 
Wan produced. However, if the rate were changed, the total amount, 
of goods In the program would remain the same since these are 
oi,6-cula,,d in real amounts required by the economy rather than by 
teii-or n'an value, 
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Dollars for the import of non-project goods through commer­
cial channels are auctioned to the highest bidder and the amount 
offered by the bidder above the 500-to-i rate is taken up in 
Korean Government certificates. This, in effect, produces a mul­
tiple system of exchange rates since the demand for goods and 
therefore the bids for the dollars follow the trader's notion of
 
the anticipated profit he can take on a specific commodity. In
 
practice, bids range all the way from 500 to 1 to over 1,000 to 1.
 
While this system undoubtedly leaves much to be desired, it does 
have the effect of limiting to some extent the windfall profits,

i.eo, the exchange profits which would be incidental to a fixed 
500-to-I rate, and likewise has the tendency to withdraw more hwan
 
from circulation since the average bid is well above 500 to 1. 
Of some $215 million in goodTsold in 1957, $134 million moved
 
through commercial channelsoA/ 
It has been suggested that the 500-to-I artificial exchange 
rate tends to price Korean export goods out of world markets. 
However, traders can easily find a way around this deterrent by
 
simply exporting goods and taking dollar payments which in turn
 
can be used for other imports to be sold for hwano There also
 
exists the possibility of bartering, say rice for fertilizer, with
 
another country. Korea's principal problem in regard to exports
 
at the present time is not the rate of exchange but how to produce
 
sufficiently so that it can offer items for export.
 
The Team holds no brief for the maintenance of an artifi­
cial exchange rate of 500 to 1. However, various measures 
currently being employed by the Korean Government to circumvent
 
some of the more disadvantageous consequences of the rate make it
 
less of a serious problhm than it might otherwise be. In practice,

the rate seems to cause greatest inequities to U.S. Government,
 
including military, employees. Since these employees depend very
 
little on either Korean products or services, the hardship is not
 
oppressive0
 
Government in Business
 
All observers of the Korean economic scene have commented
 
on the extent to which the economic life of the country is con­
trolled by the government. At the present time the government owns
 
outright or controls through holding companies the railway, the
 
most important coal mines, and the power companies. The government
 
also operates shipping companies and grain warehouses although it
 
_/ Source: Korea Division, ICA/Wo
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is ostensibly in the process of turning the former over to private
 
hands.o
 
The continuation of this situation has several unfortunate
 
effectso The enterprises which are under government control are
 
generally not well run. They are overstaffed and the employees are
 
paid less than adequate wages. In addition, a situation arises
 
as for example, among the coal mines, the power companies and the
 
railway, where one government-owned enterprise is unable to pay
 
its bills to a second because a third in turn has not paid the first,
 
Furthermore, the rates charged by the government-owned utilities,
 
such as the railway and the power companies, are inadequate and fall
 
short of paying even for maintenance. The only exception is the
 
government-owned telecommunications network, which is running at a
 
profit.
 
The Team is convinced of the desirability of turning over
 
the gov07nment-operated industries and utilities to private manage­
ment bt realizes that progress in this direction will necessarily
 
be slow. Any such transfer is bound to run up against a number
 
of obatacles' both political and economic. At the same time, it
 
should be remembered that the textile industry, which was taken
 
over from the Japanese by the Korean Government after World War II, 
has now been turned over to private hands. To the extent that 
Lhe gcverzment-operated utilities can be made at least finan,: .ially 
self-sustainingg progress in the direction of turning them over to 
privat6 control can be expected. 
Lu Salaries and Inefficiency in Government
 
One of the chief problems in Korea is the low level of
 
government salaries, which range from that of the President of the
 
Republ-c, who earns approximately $75 per month, down to the 14
 
certs per month paid a Korean soldier. (These figures, of course,
 
refer'only to the salary itself and not to allowances and other
 
perquisites.) The middle and lower ranking members of the civil
 
service earn between $50 and $20 per month, although in addition
 
to their salaries they usually receive an allowance of rice which
 
may be equivalent in value to another $20. Contrary to the prac­
tice n some other countries where government salaries are low, in
 
Korea it is not customary for employees to hold several Jobs.
 
Obviously in this situation the temptations to pocket various illi­
ci. forms of income are almost insurmountable. To raise government
 
salaxies across the board, however, would have a sharp inflationary
 
effect if it were carried out in the near future.
 
- 36­
There is also the problem of inefficiency in government.

This stems largely from rapid turnover in the ministries as well as 
the relative lack of experienac of the Koreans in running their 
own affairs. Among the more serious weaknesses are lack of good 
management processes, deficiencies in budget practices and person­
nel management, and failure to collect revenues and taxes. The
Team was informed with regard to this last point, for example, that 
if the government would implement an effective tax collection
 
system the salaries of the 200,000 government employees could be
 
doubled with the additional revenue obtained. The Team was also
 
informed by American officials that one of the greatest problems

they face in their daily contacts with the Korean Government is the
 
sheer incompetence of many of their Korean counterparts. In the
 
Ministry of Agriculture, for example, all of the bureau chiefs, with
 
one exception, have no training and no previous experience in agri­
culture.
 
It should be added that observers have noted that this
 
situation is improving. There is less turnover in government de­
partments and there seems to be a 
growing efficiency at all levels.

Several persons said that the caliber of personnel dealing with 
economic matters in the government departments has improved notice­
ably. There are even signs that graft and corruption may be 
abating, although some corruption can be expected to remain so long 
as government salaries continue as low as they are. The recent
 
remark of a cabinet minister to an American Embassy official that
 
corruption in government is Korea's greatest problem shows that
 
there is an awareness of the situation in high places, This same
 
attitude was brought out in discussions of the matter with members
 
of the cabinet. 
In fact, the Team was told by the Minister of
 
Finance that the government expects to raise salaries after this
 
spring's election, This, he said, would be financed, in part at
 
least, by decreasing the number of employees,
 
Need for Data on Resources and for Plani-n
 
An additional problem in the economic sphere is the need
 
for complete and accurate data on Korea's natural resources, to
 
facilitate planning for the future by the Korean and American gov­
ernments, The Team understands that the Japanese made extensive
 
surveys of natural resources during the period when Korea was
 
their colony, They obviously had extensive plans for making Korea 
an integral part of their Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,

and in fact by World War II had made Korea economically a part of
 
a trading complex with Manchuria and the mother country. TheTeam was unable, however, to obtain either in Seoul or in Tokyo
accurate information regarding the nature or extent of such surveys
of Korean resources as the Japanese apparently made, 
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During and immediately after the Korean War a number of 
studies of the Korean economy were carrie4 out, notably the FAO 
Report (1952)_/, the Tasca Report (1953)2/ and the Nathan Report
 
(1954)2/, The first and third of these studies were done for the 
United Nations and the second for the United States Governmento 
They were carried out during a period when it was obviously diffi­
cult to obtain accurate data owing to wartime conditions, and in 
general they tended to be aver-optimistic as to the prospects for 
Korean recovery. Nathan, for example, predicted that by fiscal 
1958 the econon could become self-supporting at a cost in foreign 
aid totalling not over $1.2 billion in the 5-year period 1953-58. 
From time to time, ICA has had in mind sending a survey 
mission to Korea for the purpose of carrying out an over-all survey 
of the country's resources. This proposal has recently been 
revived and would appear to be a desirable one, since without 
such material on basic natural resources it is difficult to for­
mulate future economic programs with any degree of accuracy. 
Although, as will be discussed in Chapter V, OEC has developed a 
projection of the economy through 1963, this projection would
 
benefit from fuller data such as would come from an over-all survey.
 
In addition to the lack of complete data, there has been a
 
lack of any satisfactory long-range planning on the part of the
 
government. In March 1956 the Korean Government submitted to OBC
 
a so-called "long-range program" which purported to be a five-year 
development plan in justification of a proposed expenditure of 
$2.4 billion of foreign aid0 This so-called plan was examined by 
the Teams which entirely concurs in earlier criticisms that it is 
a wholly superficial document which does not go into sufficient 
detail as to Korea's requirements and which is apparently little 
more than a shopping list.
 
i/ "Report on Rehabilitation and Development of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries in South Korea (1952)," Food and Agri­
culture Organization of the United Nations, published by 
Columbia University Press, New York, 1954. 
2/ "Report of Special Representative of the President for Korean 
Economic Affairs (Henry Jo Tasca)," Government Printing 
Office, 1953. 
/ "An Economic Programne for Korean Reconstruction," prepared 
for the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency by Robert
 
R. Nathan Associates, Washington, D.C., 1954,
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It should be clear from the foregoing that the Team is 
impressed by the need both for a survey of resources and for a long­
range development plan. The Team also believes that it would be 
useful in this connection to make a search of the Japanese archives 
in Tokyo to determine what materials are available regarding
Korea's natural resources during the Japanese colonial period. 
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CHAPTER III - THE PROA 
General Criteria 	for Evaluation of the Program 
The Evaluation Team was impressed by both the size of the
 
U.S. responsibility in Korea and the cost to the U.S. Government of 
fulfilling this responsibilityo The U.S. aid program in Korea is 
larger than any other program in the world. It amounts to several 
times the entire program for Latin America, for example. Korea 
has many times been cited as the prime example of the foreign aid 
"handout." 	 At least one legislator has referred to the Koreans as 
The Team does not hold with such opinion and"bloodsuckers." 

believes that the cost of the Korean aid program can be measured
 
only in terms of its accomplishment in achieving U.S. objectives.
 
Measured in these terms, the program in Korea fully justifies the
 
cost0 Certain adjustments, however, are believed to be indicated
 
at this time0 These will be dealt with specifically when the pro­
gram is discussed0 The basic philosophy on which the recommenda­
tions are made relates all program activities, other than technical
 
assistance, to the gap between foreign exchange earnings and
 
foreign exchange requirements.
 
The specific policy which is suggested is as follows:
 
The Team feels that the overriding criterion for pro­
gramming a level of aid in Korea is the provision of
 
sufficient funds or materials to make up for the deficit in
 
foreign exchange based on an econouy which assures present
 
levels of consumption. During the past fiscal year essen­
tially this took the form of some $215 million in raw
 
materials, foodstuffs, and semi-finished products. These
 
materials are the so-called "saleables" and in essence fill
 
the gap between foreign exchange earnings and foreign
 
exchange requirements.
 
It is assumed that present levels of military aid to
 
the Korean forc'-a will be maintained.
 
Aid funds to the ROK econony, over and above minimum
 
requirements for the maintenance of a balanced foreign
 
exchange position, should be governed by two criteria:
 
(a) contribution of projects to foreign exchange earn­
ings or to a reduction in foreign exchange
 
requirements through increases in local produc­
tion, and
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(b) availability of technical skills in Korea for the 
effective and orderly prosecution of such projects. 
Within the above two limitations, the Team believes that 
the greater the aid, the more rapidly the move toward self­
support can be made. The more rapidly this move can be made,
the less will be the continuing financial burden on the United 
States and the continuance of a position of dependence on
 
the part of Korea. It is suggested, therefore, that maximum
 
aid levels commensurate with the above-mentioned criteria be 
established.
 
A broad technical assistance program, without reference 
to foreign exchange requirements and with funding only for 
personal services and for sufficient resources for very 
limited demonstrations, should be a part of the total U.S. 
program in order that Korea can continue to develop the 
neozssary skills for social and economic advancement and for 
the development and maintenance of a strong, democratic form
 
of government.
 
In essence the Team suggests the use of defense support funds 
(or whatever they may be called in the future) for projects which 
directly and immediately affect foreign exchange and technical 
assistance funds on meritorious projects whether they affect foreign
 
exchange or not.
 
It is recognized that there would be some deviation in 
application of this policy because of many exigencies. Some pro­jects might be so meritorious in themselves or so vital to the 
orderly and democratic development of the country that they might 
merit the use of defense support funds even though the activity
made no direct contribution of foreign exchange. As will be seen 
later in this report, recommendations are made to eliminate the 
use of defense support funds, which are used in addition to tech­
nical assistance funds, in many parts of the fields of agriculture,

health, education, public administration and community development.

No attempt has been made to make an analysis, project by project, 
in order to show the financial savings that would accrue from such
 
an elimination because the timing and the final appropriateness 
of phasing out certain activities can be done effectively only at 
the operating level. However, it is suggested that substantial 
adherence to the policy outlined above will be in the direct 
interest of both the United States and Korea. 
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History of the Pro~ram 
United States Government economic assistance to Korea is now 
in its 13th year. During this period the United States wil have 
spent over $2°5 billion for relief, rehabilitation and economic 
development in Korea, as indicated in the following table: 
I/
U.S. Obliations in Korea 
(in thousands of dollars)FY 
1945-48 American Military Government (AM]) 378,000 
1949-51 Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) 200,000
 
1951-53 Korean Civilian Assistance Comiand (KCAC) 427,000 
1950-56 U.S. contribution to United Nations Korean 
Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) 92,900 
1954) (International Cooperation Administration 182,037
 
1955) ( (ICA), including Foreign Operations 250,361
 
1956) ( Administration (FOA) 319,484 
1957) C 332,300 
Title I, PL 480, Sale of Surplus Commodities to 6/30/57 81,630Title 11"" " " 17,000 
1958 (est.) DS - 215,000 278,944 
TC - 5,600 
Adm - 1,344 
PL 480 - 57°000 
278,944_____ 
2,559,656
 
At the time of the termination of the American military 
government in South Korea in 1948, responsibility for economic aid 
was transferred from the Department of Defense to the Economic 
Cooperation Administration. An economic aid agreement, which out­
lined the basis for economic assistance, was signed with the ROK on 
December 10, 1948. During the Korean War the United States initi­
ated a civilian relief program (CRIK), first through the United 
Nations Civil Assistance to Korea (UNCACK), then through KCAC. The 
KCAC funds were supplemented by allocations from ECA and from 
regular military funds. 
On December 1, 1950, the United Nations established UNKRA,
 
to which the United States contributed 66 per cent of the budget.
 
Source: Program Accomplishments. Fiscal Year 1957, OEC, June 30, 
1957. , 
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These funds were used for relief and rehabilitation activities.
 
Since these funds have now been almost completely spent, the United
 
Nations has de',ided to terminate UNKRA as of June 30, 1958. 
An agreement on economic coordination was signed by the
 
Republic of Korea and the United States on May 24, 1952. This
 
agreement established the basic framework within which the current 
ICA program has been carried out. 
On August 7, 1953, by U.S. Presidential Order, there was 
established the Office of the Economic Coordinator under the
 
United Nations Command (as will be explained in further detail in 
Chapter IV). This Office at first served as a planning and 
coordinating body responsible for the development of an integrated 
economic assistance program to the Republic of Korea.
 
At the beginning of OEC activities, there already were
 
several operating agencies under U.S. Army and United Nations com­
mand. These agencies were used by OEC as the operating arm of the 
program, although OEC had a small planning and directive staff of 
its own. 
The Economic Coordinator was the chief representative in 
Korea of the Foreign Operations Administration (later the Inter­
national Cooperation Administration). With the establishment of 
OEC, $200 million for relief and rehabilitation were transferred 
from the Department of Defense to FOA and administered by the latter 
agency. 
Since fiscal year 1955 the reconstruction program for the
 
Republic of Korea has been financed as a part of the mutual secu­
rity program. Until late in calendar year 1955 a considerable 
number of technicians were provided by the Army. In addition, 
UNKRA, in its particular fields of responsibility, supplied many
 
of the technicians required. KCAC itself was abolished in July
 
1956 with the transfer of its residual responsibilities to OECo
 
Although still under the jurisdiction of the United Nations Com­
mand, OEC is currently a U.S,-financed civilian organization
 
similar to United States Operations Missions in other countries 
of the world,
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The Present Protam 
The fiscal year 1957 marked a turning point in the aid 
the end of that year, all phases of reconstruc­program in Korea. By 
with the majortion from war damage were essentially completed, 
Levels of production had reached pre-warexception of housing. 1956, owing largely to alevels by 1955. Although they dropped in 
they were up again in 1957 and had surpassed pre­poor rice crop9 

war levels.
 
Appendix C shows a listing of all current (fiscal 1958) 
projects and their funding from defense support and from technical 
assistance funds, as well as a financial projection of projects,
 
where applicable9 to 1963. Financially, the projects fall into
 
three classes: (1) projects funded solely from def6ase support
 
(2) projects funded solely from technical assistance funds,
funds, 
and (3) projects jointly funded from defense support and technical
 
As will be seen, most of the recommendations in the
assistance. 

project sector of the program relate to the suggested funding.
 
The following table shows expenditures for the past fiscal
 
year by field of activity:
 
Project Sector of Korean Program by Field of1ctivity -

Fiscal Year 1957: Dollar Oblieations1
 
(inthousands of dollars)
 
Defense Technical 
Field of Activity S Cooperation aTotal 
Agriculture and Natural 
Resources $6,929.4 $1,017.8 $7,947.2 
Mining and Minerals 
Power 
Communications 
Industry 
Transportation 
Health and Sanitation 
4,247.0 
3,034o8 
1,024.6 
28,547.7 
45,326.8 
5,204.8 
---
199.2 
349.0 
143.5 
148.6 
164.0 
4,247.0 
3,234°0 
1,373.6 
28,691.2 
45,475.4 
5,368.8 
Education 
Public Administration 
4,100o0 
1,273.0 
1,645.4 
525.2 
5,745.4 
1,798.2 
Community Development, Social 
Welfare and Housing 
General and Miscellaneous 
8,290.4 
2.864.5 
--
1.307.3 
8,290.4 
4,171.8 
TOTAL $110,843.0 $5,500.0 $116,343.0 
_/ Source: OEC "Program Status Report," July 1957. 
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The succeeding discussion will describe the project phase of
 
the program by broad fields of activity. These fields follow the
 
civisional organization of the OEC program which falls into 
two broad phases: Technical Assistance and the activities of the Office
 
of the Rehabilitation Engineer.
 
Technical Assistance
 
AgricIlture and Natural Resources (FY 1957 appropriation: $7,947,000) 
The land in South Korea is its greatest single natural re­
source. In keeping with practices in other parts of the Far East,

the land is intensively worked and the cultivated acreage is approach­
ing maximum development. Most of the intensively cultivated acre­
age is in rice paddies. A large share of the water resources has
 
already been developed either for irrigation or for power, and the
 
potentiality of developing new water resources for the subjugation of 
irrigated lands is, relatively speaking, limited. Dry land immedi­
ately adjacent to the rice paddies, the so-called uplands, is 
likewise intensively developed for selected grain crops and vege­
tables requiring less moisture and more natural drainage than the
 
rice paddies themselves. Hillside lands are denuded of most vegeta­
tion, except in limited areas where forest control measures are in
 
effect, and all forest products9 including litter, are harvested for
 
fuel. Animals are tethered near the farms and there is virtually
 
no open grazing. An intensive reforestation program has been
 
under way for several years. The size of the problem, however, is
 
so great that only the surface has been scratched so far. Although

there is some possibility of reforestation and the cultivation of
 
grass on the steep hillsides as an alternate to the present hap­
hazard use of these land resources for fuel, such change-over is
 
likely to come about gradually, with long-term education and substi­
tute fuel sources being prerequisite factors0
 
In short, the land resource base in Korea cannot be greatly

expanded; additional production must come from more intensive use
 
of present acreage and this intensification is likely to come about
 
largely through the use of greater amounts of conmercial ferti­
lizer and improved seed varieties. Presently commercial fertilizer
 
must come from foreign sources, thereby creating problems of
 
foreign exchange.
 
A substantial share of the aid budget in agriculture and
 
natural resources has in the past gone to irrigation development,

mostly to the construction of reservoirs, This program follows
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essentially the same pattern as the one started by the Japanese
 
during the colonial period.
 
There is presently no irrigation engineer on the staff of 
OEC nor has there been one during the last half of calendar 1957. 
For a year prior to that time, there was only one irrigation engi­
neer on the staff and he was on loan from another agency. Some 210 
projects, both large and small,(above and below 700 acres), are in 
varying stages of completion. A On the average, projects are about 
50 per cent complete. The total expenditure for these proeot when 
completed will amount to the equivalent of $140 million° 2/ 
There is ample evidence that the Koreans are fully capable 
of constructing dams, especially clay-core, earth-fill dams which 
are the ones prevalent throughout the country. Techniques for 
the construction of these dams were introduced by the Japanese 
during the colonial period. Reportedly there have been no failures 
of dams through faulty design or construction. However, economic 
evaluations of the various reservoir projects, assessing ade­
quately the benefits and the costs, were not available 
No silt or water studies have been made of streams which are 
being impounded although it is clear that silt is a serious prob­
lem, As a guide to reservoir construction, lands to be subjugated 
are calculated on the basis of about one acre-foot of water per
 
acre and no reserves are made for silt storage No power installa­
tions have been made in connection with the reservoirs constructed
 
under the OEC program but in any event they would be useful only 
seasonally. 
The irrigation program would tehd to increase agricultural 
production, especially the production of rice. Insofar as it is
 
effective this would contribute to foreign exchange by allowing 
greater exports of rice However, it would seem highly desirable 
to get a thorough economic assessment of the program. 
RECOMMENDATION NO. 1: 
It is recommended that immediate steps be taken to assign to 
OEC one or more U.S. technicians experienced in making 
economic evaluations of irrigation programs, in order to
 
determine the feasibility of the present projects
 
I Source: Agriculture Division, OEC, Seoul. 
2 Source: Report by M. H0 French, OEC, December 4, 1957. 
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The Agricultural College at Suwon near Seoul, a part of
 
Seoul National University under the Ministry of Education, is
 
approaching completion of construction. Although the present 
struc­
tures are in a sense a "reconstruction," some buildings are new, 
larger and more elaborate than the original ones which were
 
damaged or destroyed. Dormitories have been constructed to accom­
modate four students to a room, with steam heat in each room. 
The
 
dining hall is circular, with a large interior patio to be used
 
as a lounge. The corridors of the dormitories have soundproofing.

The buildings would do crdit to any agricultural institution in
 
the United States. In Korea, they are well beyond local standards
 
of adequacy.
 
The Agricultural College is not designed to graduate stu­
dents for work 
 on farms. Its graduates will be "too highly educated" 
to work the land with their own hands. About one-half of the
 
graduates will go into the general teaching profession. Some
 
other part of the remainder will go into government service con­
nected in one way or another with agriculture, and some will go
 
into commerce,
 
The Agricultural College is under the direction of the Mini­
stry of Education. The reconstruction and equipping of the school
 
have been under the direction of the University of Minnesota, a
 
contractor of ICA, in collaboration with thia Ministry,
 
The Institute of Agriculture at Suwon (which is under the
 
Ministry of Agriculture) was, like the Agricultural College,
heavily damaged during the Korean War. 
 It is being reconstructed
 
and equipped with ICA funds but etrt ally this is a restoration job 
 It has been equipped by ICA w-tth very modern scientific and
 
other laboratory equipment. There are no ICA technicians assigned

permanently to the Institute althc.u.Jn OEC plaz, to make such an 
assi gnmerA, 
Thexe is need for agy;1IcuLtz,' 'caear h in Korea, especi­
ally ;n the field of app-led resei:.. Rize and other crops
suffer from b.eth insect pests and f,ngus dlseases, A serious 
dlsease. or pest infestatlon in *,"e-, tot subject to control, would 
ll ea:iy wrecK the econoq, A17.h1ugh Lhe physical plant of the 
InsL.itut& of Agrit.ulture is approaching adequAte rehabilitation as 
to buildings ard equlpment, mu.,h :nloru intensive training of Koreans 
In al.1 cp,t: of apptled research is needed 
A6 noted above the Agriul-tu.a C-:ilege is under the direc­
tion of the Ministry of Education nrd the Institute of Agriculture
is under the Ministry of Agricultixe, ?oth these activities are 
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closely related, are complementary in nature, and could jointly use 
teachers and research workers. Each organization has its own 
administrative division. The two institutions are about a kilo­
meter apart.
 
RECOMMENDATION NO 2:0 
It is recomnended that OEC urge the Korean Government to 
combine the Suwon Agricultural College and the Institute of 
Agriculture in the interest of econony and more effective 
use of limited resourceso
 
Agricultural credit has been a perennial problem for the
 
Korean farmer. As a result of careful and extensive studies by
OEC technicians involving several years, two basic laws had been 
drafted and were passed early in 1957, one for the establishment 
of an agricultural bank and one for the establishment of coopera­
tives. The bank law became inoperative by failurg of the government
to implement it within 90 days as required by legislation. A pilot
project for making short-term agricultural production loans at 7 per
cent interest through cooperatives has nevertheless been established. 
The amount of money available for these loans is the equivalent of
 
$4 million, The total agricultural credit requirements have been 
estimated by an ICA mission as the equivalent of $40 to $50 million. 
The amount of money available under the loan program mentioned above, 
regardless of the success of the operation, can have little influ­
ence on meeting the need for agricultural credit. By and large, 
the Korean farmer continues to look to the local money lender for 
his financing.
 
The program includes plans for reorganizing and revitalizing

the Korean agricultural extension service. Under the extension
 
program, there have been organized over 7OO 4-H clubs in Korea
 
and this activity has been widely acclaimed throughout the Republic.
 
Some work has been carried out in the livestock and the 
veterinary field. Poultry production has been greatly increased 
r the Introduction of kerosene-operated incubators. Assistance 
has been given in the local preparation of vaccines. 
The projected program of OEC includes expenditures of defense 
support funds in such fields as agricultural research and extension, 
soil conservation and irrigation development. 
1/ A Proposal for Imvroving Agricultural Credit in Korea, by Edwin
 
C. Johnson, Maurice Wieting and George B. Blair, September 1955. 
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i ECOMMENDATION NO. 3: 
It is recommended that future agricultural projects be funded 
largely from technical cooperation funds and that only those
 
projects which relate directly to improvement of the foreign 
exchange position be funded with defense support funds. 
Among the former would be agricultural extension, for example, 
as distinct from the control of disease and insects which
 
might vitally affect rice production, a potential export 
product.
 
Fisheries
 
A program of improvement in the fisheries industry is now 
being conducted in collaboration with the Korean Bureau of Fisher­
ies. The fisheries activities have taken the form of financial 
assistance to ocean fishermen in order to permit them to repair and 
to modernize their fishing fleet and equipment. The program also 
includes some assistance to the Marine Laboratory in Pusan and to 
v:he operation and maintenance of a small school for teaching 
fishermen the use of marine diesel equipment. 
Most Korean fishermen are organized under a system of
 
guilds which is a carry-over of the Japanese colonial administra­
tion. For a variety of reasons, including lack of assistance by
 
the Korean Fisheries Bureau, the guilds are not serving the needs
 
of the fishermen adequately. Buyers have gotten together and
 
forced prices down and the guild managers, through whom the catch
 
is sold, have apparently been unable to combat this effort. Short­
age of funds prevents the guilds from financing fishermen's need
 
for materials and gear.
 
The greatest single hindrance to the fishing industry in
 
Korea seems to be the policy of the Korean Government toward the
 
fishing industry and more especially toward the fishing guilds.
 
According to estimates of OEC technicians the fisherman pays out
 
to the government in the form of taxes, and to government officials
 
in the form of gratuities, approximately 28 per cent of the whole­
sale selling price of fish at the time the catch is landed on the
 
docks in Korea This system, together with the present highly
 
fluctuating market price of fish, prevents reasonable maintenance
 
and normal replacement of many ships and much equipment, reduces
 
reasonable income for the fishermen, and has in fact caused many
 
fishermen to lay up their boats and equipment, Only a marked
 
change and a vigorous prosecution of a program to stimulate more
 
fishing can bring this industry out of its present state. The
 
- 49­
00 %.,. 
willingness of the Korean Government to reduce taxes and alleviate 
the necessity for paying gratuities will play an important part 
in the success of the program. 
Presently most fishing is to supply the local market, as 
fish is the principal source of animal protein in the Korean dieto 
An interesting possibility lies in fishing for the export market. 
Outstanding examples of potential export fish are shrimp and tuna, 
inasmuch as the world price of these two marine products offers 
significantly higher returns than for the fish currently being
exploited for the local market. Shrimp are known to exist in 
Korean waters and OEC experts feel that commercial exploitation
 
is altogether feasible. This valuable marine product however,
,

has not yet been exported from Korea, in other than trial shipments,
 
because of lack of equipment and experience. Future exploitation

of shrimp will entail a program of technical assistance to fisher­
men in order to teach them modern practices of catching shrimp by 
trawling, as well as some financial assistance to acquire appro­
nriate boats and equipment,
 
Koreans have traditionally done their fishing in waters
 
close to home. Commercial fishing for tuna requires appropriate
 
equipment and a willingness to sail away from Korean waters into
 
world-wide fishing areas, One Korean boat recently returned to 
Puian from East Indian waters, after a three months' expedition
 
seeking deep-sea tuna, with a catch of some 60 tons of commercial
 
tuna. This catch was not sufficient to cover the costs of the
 
expedl tlon but approximately 100 tons would have been sufficient 
to do so, OEC experts feel that there will be no difficulty in 
expeditions of this sort becoming commercially feasible and with 
catches well beyond the break-even point.
 
The above-cited expedition was in effect an experimental
 
one and the crew and captain were inexperienced in this type of
 
fishing, It is significant that the owner of the boat, who is
 
bearing the expense of the undertaking, is both enthusiastic and 
willing to send the boat on another such expedition. The fisher­
men in the area of Pusan are enthusiastic and feel that world-wide
 
tuna fishing offers a very real possibility for a profitable

undertaking which may provide a very necessary item of export.
 
The Koreans have traditionally gathered from adjacent 
waters commercial seaweed9 agar-agar and similar marine products.
A significant portion of these products is for export and the 
exploitation of such products offers a very interesting and 
important activity which will contribute to the Korean econony. 
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Every effort should be made to encourage the Koreans to
 
reorganize the fishing guilds in order to make them useful stimu­
lants for the fishing industry. Sharp reductions in taxes and
 
gratuities will be necessary if the fishing industry is to develop
 
its fullest potentiality. Action by the Korean Government would
 
seem to be the only solution to this problem. OEC has in fact
 
been pressing the Korean Government to reorganize the fishing
 
guilds in order to make them more effective in stimulating the
 
fishing industry.
 
RECOMNDATION NO,:
 
If the necessary action is taken by the Korean Government in
 
regard to the guilds, it is recommended that defense support
 
funds, in addition to technical assistance funds, be em­
ployed for assisting fishermen in acquiring boats and equip­
ment, with particular emphasis on proposals which develop
 
fishing for the export market.
 
The facilities for preservation and storage of marine pro­
ducts in Korea are anything but adequate. However, since most of
 
the fishing is for local markets and since local markets have no
 
refrigeration facilities, the problem is not as critical as it
 
might otherwise be. This is because fish spoils more rapidly once
 
it has been under refrigeration, when it is brought back to normal
 
temperature, than it does when it has not been under refrigeration.
 
In the absence of refrigeration facilities in retail outlets,
 
fresh fish simply has to be rushed to the consumer as rapidly as
 
possible.
 
The present system of drying fish is the most feasible
 
method of preservation for meeting the needs of the vast majority
 
of the Korean population where transport and facilities for storage
 
preclude the handling of perishable products. In population cen­
ters near the coast, for the time being at least, the program will
 
of necessity be one of better organization against spoilage rather
 
than improvement of facilities,
 
If the Koreans go into a program of fishing for the export
 
market, present facilities will be wholly inadequate and new and
 
more modern ones will be needed. Such facilities will be essential
 
since the export market is very critical in the matter of quality,
 
and quality can be maintained only with adequate refrigeration
 
facilities,
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RECO4IDATION NO. 5: 
It is recommended that defense support funds, as well as 
technical assistance funds, be used to assist in the construc­
tion of modern refrigeration equipment for preparing and 
holding marine products when commercial fishing for export 
is assured. 
Health and Sanitation (FY 1957 appropriation: $5,369,000) 
Immediately after the Korean War the public health program 
was one of an emergency nature, centering around wide-scale inocu­
lation programs to prevent outbreaks of epidemics, and around 
reconstruction of water supplies, hospitals and other medical
 
facilities damaged or destroyed by war. Thanks in large part to
 
this program, no extensive epidemics have occurred. Indeed, the 
incidence of such diseases as typhoid, smallpox and diphtheria
 
has been no higher than in the United .Stateso
 
The present public health program is moving away from the
 
emergency and rehabilitation phases toward a technical assistance
 
program emphasizing the organization and establishment of health
 
centers, improvement of water supplies, especially public wells,
 
control of disposal of human wastes, especially through construc­
tion of sanitary privies, and public health education.
 
Many water supply systems, including water treatment plants 
that were damaged during the war, are still not completely recon­
structedo In addition, several of the larger towns in the Republic 
have increased in population as a result of the influx of refugees 
and a general population drift toward urban centers. Water supply 
activities have been projected through 1963 by OEC but these pro­
jections are largely in terms of basic health requirements rather 
than repair of war=damaged systems. 
The health and sanitation program also includes assistance 
in the control of diseases, especially tuberculosis, leprosy and 
venereal diseases, three of the most widespread and damaging 
diseases in Korea. 
In the past the program has included assistance in the
 
physical improvement of hospitals and other institutions contri­
buting to public health, such as the Seoul National University
 
Dental College, the Police Hospital, a T.Bo sanitarium, and a hos­
pital for mental health. The future program does not contemplate
 
assistance to such institutions.
 
Perhaps the greatest single problem in health is the lack of 
trained physicians, especially in the rural area. Such medical
 
treatment as occurs is left largely to the herb doctors. Since it 
is unlikely that the economy can support the doctors needed to 
attend the rural population, the best solution would seem to be
 
enlargement and intensification of a program of health centers.
 
An inescapable consequence of a successful health program 
is the increase in population. Such increase accentuates the 
pressure of population on an already inadequate resource base. It 
is hard to justify substantial sums of money in an aid program 
going to this type of activity in Korea. It is perfectly true in 
general that a healthy population is a more productive population 
but, with the unemployment and underemployment as serious as they 
are in Korea, certain activities using defense support funds could 
be deferred for several years and the savings thus realized applied 
to projects more directly affecting productivity, especially as 
productivity might relate to foreign exchange savings. 
The future program in health and sanitation contemplates 
substantial expenditures of defense support funds for disease con­
trol, water works rehabilitation, city drainage, and improvement 
and construction of wells and sanitation facilities.
 
RECOMMENDATION NO. 6:
 
It is recommended that the health program be continued with
 
technical assistance funds only. This would mean substantial
 
reduction in financial support to such activities as dis­
ease control, water works rehabilitation, city drainages and
 
construction of wells and sanitation facilities.
 
ut (FY 1957 appropriation: $597459000)
 
The education program is concentrated in the following major
 
areas: primary and secondary teacher training, professional and
 
higher education, vocational education and classroom construction.
 
A program of assistance to Seoul National University in a
 
variety of professional fields has been carried out by a contract
 
with the University of Minnesota. OEC has contributed material
 
and financial assistance in the reconstruction of a number of build­
ings and the supply of equipment and teaching materials, but
 
Minnesota has supervised the program. In addition, Minnesota has,
 
through fiscal 1957, sent 25 teachers to Seoul University for
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short-t:'m assignments and has likewise sent 103 Korean teachers
 
from Seoul University to the University of Minnesota for training.
 
A teacher-training program in primary and secondary educa­
tion is being carried out through a contract with Peabody College
of Nashvilleq Tennessee. The program is concentrating on work
 
with normal schools and special attention is being given to text­book and curriculum revision as well as to the establishment of a
 
program in library science.
 
The OEC program in vocational education includes financial 
and material assistance for the establishment of shops as well as

the construction of buildings. Special attention is being given
to the Plyongtlaek comprehensive high school where 13 classrooms 
are being constructed. A general shop building is being added in 
order to make this a complete pilot school.
 
Vocational education in Korea, in keeping with other parts
of the Far East, is faced with the deep-seated prejudice deriving
from the Confucian notion of the scholar as a man whose dignity
would be damaged by the use of his hands. In a country where rapid

industrialization is particularly needed, this obsolete notion is
especially inappropriate. This notion does exist in Korea and, to
 
add to the dilemma9 the Japanese during the colonial period pressed

for more vocational education. This effort was interpreted by the
 
Koreans as just another Japanese trick for holding Koreans to infe­
rior status. Despite these hLidicaps, as has already been demon­
strated by the present program, OEC technicians feel that an effect­
ive vocational education program can be undertaken. 
The principal uses of defense support funds projected in
 
the future by OEC in the field of education are for projects in the
 
improvement of teacher training, vocational education, and assist­
ance in higher education. With the exception of vocational educa­
tion the above activities do not make a direct and immediate
 
contribution to foreign exchange savings.
 
RECOMMENDATION NOo 7: 
The continued uge of defense support funds is recommended in
 
educational activities that have both an immediate and a
 
direct influence on foreign exchange Such activities would
 
include, for example, the training of marine diesel mechanics
 
because of the immediate and direct effect on the fishing

industry which has a substantial potential for producing export
products The recommendation would imply, likewise, not using

defense support funds for such activities as classroom construc­
tion
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Community Development° Social Welfare and Housing (FY 1957 appropria­
tion: $8,290,000)
 
The Community Development, Social Welfare and Housing Divi­
sion is something of an administrative catch-all. It includes
 
financing of the ocean freight and checking of plans of the several
 
voluntary relief agencies, notably National Catholic Welfare,
 
Church World Service, and CARE, which are responsible for 99 per
 
cent of the imports for distribution to the needy. The Division is
 
carrying out what is left of the program for the assimilation of
 
refugees. It gives some assistance to the various welfare agencies
 
of the Korean Government. It is assisting Koreans in carrying out
 
a program of housing reconstruction as well as activities in housing
 
research and development. Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
 
it is just beginning to organize a community development program. 
Housing in urban areas is still one of the critical problems 
in Korea. OEC has a program being carried out in Seoul for what 
is described as low- and moderate-cost housing. During fiscal year 
1957 this project was approved for more than $2 million in defense 
support funds as well as $3 million in counterpart funds. These 
funds were made available to the Korean Reconstruction Bank, which 
bank made loans to individuals for constructing housing.
 
As the dollar appropriation would indicate, this project
 
uses substantial foreign exchange, principally in the form of lumber,
 
cement and steel0 The houses now being constructed are estimated
 
to cost nearly 2 million hwan, or $29000, each0 Although $2,000
 
might seem cheap in the United States, it represents housing for
 
the white-collar worker in Korea, Even though housing in Seoul and
 
other larger towns is still deficient as a result of the war, it
 
was hard for the Team to see the validity of using substantial
 
amounts of aid funds to help that segment of the Korean population
 
most able to help themselves0 
Of much more interest from the point of view of national 
welfare is the pattern followed in the so-called Miari assimilation 
project. This is essentially a housing project for war refugees 
who were stranded in Seoul0 Some 1,000 families were selected and 
a site near Seoul was chosen. With less than $100 worth of material 
per unit of housing provided by OEC, principally lumber and cement, 
l000 units of three rooms each were constructed by the refugees 
themselves with their own labor Begun early in 1957 and scheduled 
for completion in December 1957, the project was essentially com­
plete in October and families had begun moving in as early as 
August0 The Team was informed that this pattern of aid is being
 
used in a number of projects throughout the Republic0 
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The Miari project is suggestive of the enormous capacity for 
self-help of the Koreans if they are given even a minimum of
 
assistance. The housing problem in the urban centers could be 
greatly alleviated by the enlargement of these self-help programs. 
Although the self-help housing project does not contribute
 
to improvement in the foreign exchange gap it, as clearly as any
 
other project seen by the Team, shows how a very small dollar
 
expenditure can be made to yield very large benefits.
 
The present housing program includes a project of research
 
and development of the use of native materials in construction.
 
It is believed that this is an important project since it can easily
 
lead to the substitution at least in part, of such materials for 
cement and steel, both of which presently require foreign exchange. 
The projeoted program contemplates small amounts of defense support
 
funds for this activity. 
RECOMMENDATION NO, 8: 
It is recommended that no further defense support funds be 
used on the "low- and moderate-cost" housing project In
 
keeping with the objective of assisting Korea to reach and
 
maintain essential standards of living comparable with those 
of 1949-50, it is further recommended that defense support 
funds continue to be used for a self-help housing program
 
for refugees. It is also recommended that defense support 
funds continue to be used for the project to develop the use 
of native materials for construction 
The economy of Korea is not able to support many of the normal 
public services commonly available to peoples throughout the world. 
In the rural areas the average farmer wants nothing more than to be 
let alone, to be free from the tax collector and the government 
inspector, to be given an opportunity to farm his land. He has 
little concern with ideologies0 He is deeply attached to his family, 
his community, and his lando He is an expert farmer and produces 
yields of rice that are comparable with the highest in the world 
despite many years of taking the same crop from the same piece of 
land He is adept in the use of both organic and commercial ferti­
lizerso He is a prodigious worker0 In short, the rural Korean, 
within the limits of the resources available to him, is a relatively 
self-sufficient man. 
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Wiin '.he support of the ROK Government OEC has projected a
plan for community development in which certain services will be

available for training voluntary workers in the community. It has
 
also projected a revitalization of an agricultural extension ser­
vice patterned somewhat along the lines of such a service in the
United States, as mentioned on page 48. An education system with
 
rural school teachers has existed since Japanese colonial times.
 
The public health service has certain workers who reach out into
 
the rural areas teaching better public health practices. However,
 
all of these servicesq because of their paucity, with the possible

exception of education, have little impact on the rural Korean.
 
They ara simply scattered much too thinly to be of great signifi­
cance,
 
Given the present development of the Korean economq it is
 
doubtful if public services in health, education and agriculture

should be projected much beyond their present levels. 
The develop­
ment of an agricultural extension service' no matter how unambitious,
 
may be premature at the present level of economic development in

Korea. It would appearg however, that the development of a small,

modest and simple community development program may be a substitute
 
for such services as the agricultural extension and the public

health workers. This would be especially true if, as presently

contemplated, it were predicated on voluntary village workers with
 
some help from a few Korean technicians, paid by the Korean Govern­
ment, but working on a go-wide (county) basis,
 
RECOMMENDATION NO, 9:
 
It is recommended that a program of community development,

including the use of voluntary workers at the village level,

be undertaken with technical assistance funds,
 
Public Admiistration (FY 1957 appropriation: $1,7989000) 
Most underdeveloped countries have poorly paid, graft-ridden

and politically oriented public servants. 
In the case of Korea a
little something has been added. The Japanese never had allowed

Koreans to assume positions of high responsibility. In addition,

during the Korean War, some 30,000 professionals and public servants
 
were kidnapped and taken North.
 
The public administration program of OEC has for the most
 
part been operative only in a program with the police force, 
This
 program has included financial assistance in modernizing the
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communications system and equipping the police force with transpor­
tation and fire-fighting equipment. It in scheduled for completion 
by the end of 1958. 
During 1957 a study of the major tax laws was made by a 
tax consultant of OEo A number of recommendations were made by
the consultant and are presently under consideration by the Korean 
Government. There has also been a program to improve the statis­
tical work of the Ministry of Reconstruction.
 
There is contemplated a contract with Washington UnivereLty

for the establishment of a school of business administration at
 
Yonsei and at Seoul National Universities. Although not as yet
 
implemented. the University of Minnesota contract was amended to 
give assistance to Seoul National University in the establishment 
of a new school of public administration. Both these activities 
will meet an urgent need in training Koreans. 
The Korean Government is also urgently in need of technical 
assistance in practically all fields of public administration. 
The OEC program will be expanded, especially after a public admini­
stration survey, presently planned, is completed. 
Probably no single program can contribute more to future 
stability and to sound econoriic development than an effective public
administration program As in most other countries, assistance in 
the whole field of public administration is a delicate matter. 
Until recently, the Korean Government has felt little need for and 
has viewed with suspicion any assistance in improving its own 
structure of public service. More recently, however, there has 
been some tendency to view such efforts with less suspicion. A 
number of OEC tochnicians feel that the time has arrived when it 
will be possible to initiate a more vigorous public administration 
program. 
RECOMMENDATION NO, 10: 
It is recommended that an expanded public administration 
program be initiated in all those fields of public administra­
tion and business administration in which the Koreans show
 
real interest in obtaining help. Such a program normally 
need not require the use of defense support funds but if such 
funds were essential to the success of the program the Team 
would be inclined to agree that this would be an exception to 
the general approach recommended in this report. 
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One 	of the most important phases of the technical assistance
 
program is the sending abroad of Korean technicians for training.

Since the inception of the program, 354 1/ trainees have been sent
 
abroad directly under the auspices of ICA. 
For 	the most part,

technicians have been sent to the United States.
 
From two points of view the training of Koreans in Japan

would be much more effective technically and very much less expen­
sive than sending trainees to the United States. 
Most Koreans of
 
30 or more years of age speak Japanese. Japan would be especially

useful in the training of Koreans in all phases of industrial
 
development, However. the past history of Korea, as a colony of
 
Japan. and present political considerations preclude the use of
 
Japan as a training ground on any significant scale.
 
Other places where certain types of training might be ob­
tained are the Philippines and Hawaii9 and some trainees have been
 
sent to both these places. The results are encouraging. However.

the 	major geographic area for training will probably continue to
 
be the United States since both the Philippines and Hawaii have
 
limited facilities. Hawaii's geographic location also makes its
 
usefulness limited as, for example, in the field of agriculture.
 
OEC is making a study of returned trainees to determine whether
 
or not they were using to advantage the training received The
 
results of this survey were not available at the time of writing this
 
report. 
The general impression of most OEC technicians is that
 
those who return to Korea are going into activities for which their
 
training fits them. 
For 	example, the Team was informed that all of
the 	participants sent abroad under the education program who have
 
returned are practicing their profession. There appears, however,

to be a developing problem concerning trainees. Many who are sent
 
to the United States understandably wish to remain and some appear
 
to be finding ways and means of doing so,
 
It would seem that the 354 trainees sent abroad would be a
 
very small number in comparison with the total number needed in
 
Korea. Presently the greatest single barrier to sending more
 
trainees abroad is the lack of a command of English, With the in­
creasing and intense interest in the study of English, more and more
 
Koreans should be becoming equipped to go abroad for training.
 
i_/ 	Source: ICA/W, Training Development Staff (does not include
 
Koreans selected for training by the University of Minnesota
 
atd 	t))e Fechtel Company). 
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Office of the Rehabiliktation mineer 
A major share of the physical reconstruction work financed 
by ICA in Korea has been supervised by the Office of the Rehabi­
litation Engineer. This is a section of OC reporting directly to 
the Economic Coordinator. 
In view of the fact that reconstruction of the country is 
now virtually complete, the name of the office is somewhat 
inappropriate. This same inappropriateness is apparent in the co­
tinued existence of a Ministry of Reconstruction in the Korean 
Government, Actually, both the Office of the Rehabilitation Engi­
neer and the Ministry of Reconstruction are performing primarily
economic development functions. Although the terminology in itself 
is unimportant, the continuation of the "reconstruction" approach

in the minds of a number of the technicians is a deterrent to 
realistic planning and operations The Team believes the time has
 
come to consider that the initial phase of the ICA program has 
been completeo The program in Korea in the future should be one 
of technical assistance and selected economic development. Although 
this concept is fully appreciated at the directive level of OC, 
not all personnel who have worked throughout the period of recon­
struction seem fully aware of this important change in approach. 
Discussion with the several division chiefs and other mem­
bers of the Office of the Rehabilitation Engineer leads to the 
impression that there is need for a clearer understanding of the 
financial assistance rendered by ICA for the maintenance of normal 
public utility services. Because ICA has financed the construc­
tion or improvement of a number of facilities, there seems to be 
an unconscious tendency on the part of some personnel to assume 
that ICA has the responsibility for their maintenance and operation.
The Team has the impression, in some instances at least, that there 
is an attitude of defeatism on the part of certain technicians, 
some tendency to feel that if we do not do it, it will not get 
done. This leads to the lack of an effective, on-the-job training
 
program by these technicians.
 
In the rush of the reconstruction program it is understand­
able that a large share of construction was undertaken with 
imported steel and cement, both items constituting a drain on 
foreign exchange but ones which are easy to use and which speed
 
up construction. With the reconstruction phase of the program
 
virtually completed, there is need for careful exploration in the
 
use of construction materials which can be obtained within the 
country, As mentioned above, OC has already initiated such a 
-60- UNCIASW: ,
 
program through the "Housing Research and Development" project to
 
explore such possibilities in one field of construction.
 
Substantial quantities of bituminous coal have been intro­
duced for the operation of locomotives and, in some instances, 
to supply fuel for thermal plants. Korea has apparently extensive, 
though unproved, reserves of anthracite coal which has certain 
disadvantages as to quality, principally because of high ash content. 
However, the OEC coal specialist, as well as the coal specialist
from Smith, Hinchman & Grylls, a contract service of OEC, main­
tains that Korean anthracite, properly mined, properly cleaned, and 
properly graded can be used successfully in locomotives. Some 
modification of grates on present coal-burning locomotives would be 
necessary. Nevertheless, ICA is financing a dieselization program

for locomotives, in part to save foreign exchange. Diesels do use
 
less foreign exchange if the assumption is made that the alterna­
tive is imported bituminous coal, since the dollar value of the
 
latter is much higher per locomotive-kilometer. If, however, local
 
anthracite can be used effectively, reconsideration of the remain­
ing portion of the dieselization program should be undertaken. 
Immediate steps should be taken to determine definitively the possi­
bility of using local anthracite. Since anthracite reserves are 
not precisely known, it is equally essential that a definitive
 
survey of reserves be undertaken as soon as possible. Such sur­a 
vey is included in the present program. 
RECOMMEDATION NO, 11:
 
Although certain efforts to use Korean anthracite have been
 
made in the past, it is recommended that a new trial on a
 
sufficiently large scale; with proper mining, cleaning and
 
grading, be undertaken by OEC in order to determine defini­
tively the feasibility of using local coal in locomotives.
 
Power plants, the railway, telephone and telegraph systems,

the ports, and airlines are all owned and operated by the Korean
 
Government. As in many other eountries, government operation of 
such utilities has many weaknesses, including employees' being

paid less than adequate wages, failure to collect revenues for ser­
vices to other government agencies, and loss of the direct use of
 
revenue5 to the public treasury by the utility involved, with a
 
consequent lack of concern for vigorous collection.
 
The problem of rates for public utilities is an especially

serious one in Korea, With the exception of the telephone and
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telegraph system, the utilities are not collecting sufficient 
revenues to cover costs of operation and maintenance, let alone 
amortization of the investmento Part of the reason for this situ­
ation is the inflation Korea has suffered over the past several
 
years which has prevented rate increases from keeping pace with
 
rising costs. Howeverp there is a general reluctance on the part
 
of the Korean Government to face reality on the rate problem because
 
of the political implications. An additional factor which mili­
tates against the early solution of this problem is a law which
 
authorizes only the Korean National Assembly to set all rates,
 
thereby making an essentially technical decision subject to poli­
tical pressures. Finally, the past practice of the aid program
 
in meeting deficits in operation and maintenance tends to build 
inertia. However, ORC is fully aware of this problem and continues 
to press for an early solution,
 
Power (FY 1957 appropriation: $39234,000)
 
Prerequisite to any effective rehabilitation in Korea was
 
the development of power for industry. Formerly 85 per cent of the
 
power used in South Korea was generated in North Korea.
 
ICA has financed the construction of three new thermal
 
plants in the South2 has financed the reconstruction of the hydro­
electric plant at Hwachon and has financed the rehabilitation of
 
the steam plant at Yongwol This has given a total of 140,000
 
additional kilowatts to the South Korean power system. On the
 
basis of the anticipated requirements, another additional 110,000
 
kilowatts will be required by 1960. Two additional power plants
 
have been proposed by OEC in the long-range program. 
Rehabilitation of old plants and construction of new plants 
were undertaken by ICA and the Korean Government through the use 
of US. contractors. The Pacific Bechtel Construction Company, 
which was responsible for the construction of the three thermal
 
plants, was outstandingly successful in keeping to construction 
schedules and in training Korean operators to take over the plants 
after completion of construction. The reconstruction of the Hwachon 
hydroelectric plant by the Morrison Knudsen Company, on the other 
hand, failed to provide the necessary leadership in training Koreans 
for the operation of the plant although the physical construction 
of the plant was wholly adequate. 
As in the case of all other, Korean Government-operated 
public utilities, with the exception of the telephone and tele­
graph system present rates are inadequate. However. an equally
 
important factor for bringing in necessary revenue is the policing 
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of the power line system in order to reduce power losses from ille­
gal line tapping. The average line loss from all sources is 35
 
to 40 per cent in Korea. OKC technicians feel this can be brought
 
down to at least 25 per cent with proper policing. So-called 
normal losses in more developed countries range from 15 to 18 per
 
cent.
 
The Team does not feel that Korea can be expcted to carry

the burden of additional power development without some financial
 
assistance from the aid program. Since industrial development is
 
directly dependent on power development and since industrial develop­
ment is one of the several hopes for closing the foreign exchange 
gap in the economy, it would seem wise to continue financing thc 
needed power development.
 
RECOM M DATION NO 12: 
The Team supports present OEC plans for using defense support 
funds for the construction of two new power plants. 
Communications (FY 1957 appropriation: $1,374,000) 
OEC has spent approximately $17 million on a communications
 
program, largely to bring to pre-war levels some 40,000 telephone 
installations and to increase installations to 75,000. In addi­
tion the program has included technical assistance in all phases 
of telephone and telegraph operation and maintenance. This work
 
was undertaken by some nine retired members of the Bell Telephone 
System in the United States under contract to ICA. Despite the age 
of some of these former members of the Bell System, the program 
appears to have been especially successful in treining Koreans. 
The telecommunications system presently earns sufficient
 
foreign exchange through services paid in dollars to take care of 
replacement of spare parts and acquisition of new equipment.
However, under present regulations both the dollar and hwan earn­
ings revert to the Korean treasury. 
RECOMMENDATION NO. 13:
 
Since both foreign exchange earnings and hwan earnings are 
sufficient to support the maintenance and development of the 
telecommunications system, it is recommended that Korea 
finance this activity from its own budget. It is suggested 
thtt ICA continue its technical assistance program in this field. 
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The largest single industrial project undertaken by ICA in
 
Korea is the nitrogenous fertilizer plant at Chong-ju which is
 
being built for the Korean Government and which will cost approxi­
mately $40 million, according to latest estimates, when completed.
 
When it is remembered that Korea is currently importing $50 million 
annually in nitrogenous fertilizer the importance of local produc­
tion of this product will be appreciated. The present plant is 
designed to produce about one-third of the annual requirement and 
the estimated production cost is calculated to be below the im­
ported cost, The plant will use Korean anthracite coal for power 
and petroleum as the raw material for producing fertilizer. 
The thing that strikes the Team as the most serious problem 
in regard to the fertilizer plant is the complexity of the opera­
tion and the need for highly trained and experienced personnel to 
operate and run the plant efficiently. It must be obvious that a 
potentially dangerous and highly costly plant such as this one
 
cannot be left to anyone but highly trained , experienced and very
 
well paidA employees0 Only well paid employees will have a vital
 
economic stake in the effective and profitable operation of this 
important industrial installation. If the staffing and training
 
of personnel to operate the plant are left to the normal processes
 
of government, the chances of a safe and successful operation are
 
far from hopeful, 
Present plans call for the letting of a management contract
 
to a responsible United States firm to operate the plant over
 
the next several years. A primary responsibility of the firm will
 
be to train adequately Korean nationals for their own replacement.
 
A second plant has been planned by OEC in the 1959 program 
to take care of additional Korean requirements for nitrogenous 
fertilizer. Initiation of construction has not been authorized.
 
An alternative proposal by a West German firm is presently before 
the Korean Government0 This proposal entails the financing,
 
construe-tion and operation of a fertilizer plant financed on a
 
loan ba: The German proposal includes using Korean anthracite 
coal not only as a source of fuel but also as a source of raw 
materlal for conversion to nitrates. The proposed plant is of 
comparable capacity to the one being built by ICA and the esti­
mated cost is $23 million. 
No attempt was made by the Team to examine exhaustively 
this ptoposal both because the Team was not competent to do so and 
because details of the proposal were not available It is perhaps 
significant that the plant financed by ICA was originally estimated
 
to cost some $23 million. The proposal by the German firm does
 
have the advantage of using local resources for both fuel and raw
 
material, thereby being less of a drain on foreign exchange.
 
Since there is concern and even some doubt, about how suc­, 

cessful will be the operation of the fertilizer plant, there is
 
real question as to whether an additional planit should be built
 
prior to the completion and operation of the first plant. 
RECOMMENDATION NO, 14:
 
It is recommended that construction of any additional ferti­
lizer plants be deferred until such time as there is 
sufficiently active Korean participation in the management 
of the plant presently under construction to indicate the 
ability of Koreans to take the whole responsibility for
 
management,
 
Assistance by OC to the private sector of the economy in 
Korea has been by making loans to individual firms. The normal 
process is for the borrower to submit a proposal whLch is
 
reviewed by the Combined Economic Board, a joint Korean-American
 
planning board. If approved, OEC furnishes the necessary dollars
 
for foreign exchange requirements, and the local currency
 
requirements are furnished through Korean channels, usually from
 
counterpart funds.
 
The borrower is required to show evidence of the availa­
bility of operating capital to carry out the proposed project. He 
must deposit at least 20 per cent of his total dollar and local 
currency requirements at the time the loan is approved. He pays
back in hwan interest and principal to a revolving fund in the 
Korean Reconstruction Bank for both the dollar and hwan require­
ments. There is thus created a revolving fund which is used for
 
similar loans also subject to approval by the CEB.
 
The 500-to-i rate of exchange represents in effect a sub­
sidy for the industrialist as far as his foreign exchange 
requirements are concerned since this rate is substantially below 
the free exchange of hwan for dollars. Although there undoubt­
edly has been some tendency on the part of Koreans to apply for
 
foreign exchange in order to purchase equipment with a view to
 
resale
, 
no evidence of widespread practices of this sort was encoun­
tered. 
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OEC distinguishes between two types of industrial loans. 
One is the medium and large type of loan. the dollar requirements 
of which are in excess of $50,000. The second is a loan for dollar 
requirements below $50,000. 
At the time of the visit of the Evaluation Team there were
 
some 84 projects in the medium and large category that had been
 
approved for financing by ICA9lphe dollar requirements of which 
amounted to about $80 million°- The industrial projects financed 
by these loans were in varying.tages of completion, only 13 pro­
jects being in full operationo1 /
 
The medium and large projects, carried out through the 
private sector of the econonV, have a certain amount of built-in 
safeguard against unwise undertakings. In the first place,
private businessmen are apt to protect their own interests some­
what better than public servants can, acting on their behalf,
 
In the second place, the requirement of an advance deposit of
 
20 per cent of the total cost of the project tends to eliminate
 
unrealistic and frivolous proposals,
 
In the rush of getting a program of assistance to industri­
al firms a good many short-cuts have had to be taken, Review of 
loan proposals, as far as OEC is concerned, has not been effect­
ive, owing to insufficient numbers and lack of trained personnel,
Review on the ROK side has largely been a paper examination In 
addition Korean personnel, often paid less than a living salary, 
have undoubtedly been subject to pressures of favoritism, While
 
nio evidence of response to such pressures was discovered, the 
combination of lack of adequate U.S. personnel and pressures on 
Korean personnel leaves much to be desired. 
OEC had decided last fall to call a halt to new loan appli­
cations above $50,000 until a systematic and thorough review 
had been made of all existing projects. A high-level committee, 
chaired by the Deputy Economic Coordinator, was established to 
review each project on an individual basis. The process of re­
view was continuing at the time of the departure of the Team, 
RECOMMENDATION NO, 15: 
As OEC recognizes, the immediate enlargement of the staff of 
UoS.-trained technicians for the technical review of all
 
1,/ 	 Source: Program AccomnligIhments. Fiscal Year 1957, OEC, June 30, 
1957. 
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loan applications is urgently needed. 
This staff should be
 
so constituted as to be useful not only in review of loan
 
applications but also in training Koreans in review tech­
niques.
 
Up to the present time, OEC has had no organized effort for
 
training within Korea in the fields of industrial development and
 
industrial management. 
Visits to various industrial establishments
 
bhow clearly that Koreans are outstanding in manual skills and in
 
industriousness but their appreciation of modern manegement prao­
tices, from the level of the foreman to the plant manager, is
 
rudimentary. lntroduction of modern machinery will create some
 
problems but the Team feels that the Koreans will acquire the neces­
sary mechanical skills rapidly if they are given an adequate

opportunity for training 
 Training in the field of management,

however, is likely to be slower and more halting in view of the
 
lack of experience of Koreans in this field throughout the Japanese

occupation and in view of the short period of time they have had
 
to assume such responsibility under the Republic
 
Because of the problem of the foreign exchange deficit the
 
Team gave special consideration to the role that industrial develop­
ment might play in alleviating this problem.
 
No attempt was made to examine in detail the types of indus­
trial development which would lead to the local processing of
 
goods presently imported or to industries that might be developed

for processing goods for export in the world market. 
In general,

Korea does not seem to have any special situations in regard to
 
raw materials which would put it in a favorable position for
 
developing industries that would be competitive in world markets.
 
An exception might be the ceramic industry because clays especially

adapted to this industry are available in Korea. Some of these
 
are presently being exported to Japan. 
Korea has, of course, large

reservoirs of incompletely employed labor. The wages paid to
 
labor make it cheap in comparison with Western standards but they
 
are not significantly different from those in other parts of the
 
Orient, Lacking the background of experience for organizing the
 
use of this labor and of experience in marketing, Korea would find
 
it difficult to develop products which might compete with those 
produced in such countries as Japan and India. Gradually a certain 
amount of this type of industry might be developed but it would
 
probably offer no early solution to the present problem of the
 
foreign exchange deficit.
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A much more fruitful possibility would seem to lie in the
 
production of goods in Korea9 especially those goods with a high
 
labor component, for the local market. Special emphasis should be
 
given to those goods presently imported from abroad. If the public
 
were not to suffer higher prices for goods locally produced, care
 
would have to be exercised to see that only economically sound
 
projects were approved. Priority should be given to the production
 
of goods with low foreign exchange requirements for raw material.
 
OEC is presently financing a number of such industries through its
 
medium and large industrial program.
 
RECOMMENDATION NO, 16: 
It is recommended that the medium and large industrial loan
 
program, including the use of defense support funds, be 
expanded9 with special emphasis on industries designed to
 
achieve foreign exchange savings through local production of
 
products presently imported. To a substantial extent 
increase in these loans will depend on additional training
 
of Koreans, which would be facilitated by the assignment
 
of additional U.S. technicians0
 
In certain other parts of the world, notably Europe, ICA has
 
established what are called "productivity centers" or "industrial
 
development centers," While it is difficult to generalize about
 
these activitiso they are all designed to promote industrial
 
development, sometimes through government channels and sometimes
 
through private channels. 
OEC is presently giving consideration to the establishment 
of an industrial development center patterned somewhat after the
 
center in the Philippines, with emphasis on organization for giving 
technical services to industry, In other parts of the world, 
where technical development is somewhat more advanced, centers 
have given emphasis on training through such activities as seminars, 
training courses, in-plant studies and plant demonstrations, In 
Korea there is great need for both technical services and training. 
RECOMMENDATION NO, 17:
 
The Team recommends the early establishment of an industrial
 
training and development center with the use of both tech­
nical cooperation funds and defense support funds, as needed.
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Transportation (FY 1957 appropriation: $459475.,000) 
The Japanese provided Korea with a good north-south railway 
system which remains the major element in the country's trans­
portation network. The line from Seoul to Pusan is double-tracked. 
The road network is less good but is adequate for most require­
ments of the civilian economy. Korea possesses one fairly good
 
international airport near Seoul which forms the headquarters for 
a domestic airline linking several of the principal centers of
 
population.
 
The activities of the Transportation Division include
 
assistance to the Korean National Railway, the ports and harbors,
 
civil aviation activities, and provision of equipment for ship­
yards in order to improve the coastal fleet.
 
The Korean National Railway heavily damaged during the 
Korean War, has been restored to full operation, and widespread 
improvements have been made in most phases of operation by the 
replace;Vnt of old equipment with modern equipment About $160 
million /in U.So aid funds have been spent in the program. Some 
$60 million alone have been spent for coal to operate the railway 
system.2 
Outstanding among the improvements has been the dieseli­
zation of locomotives, reducing locomotive per-kilometer cost from 
$1.10 to 35 cents. The dieselization phase of the program has 
been undertaken partly to reduce foreign exchange by substituting 
diesel fuel for bituminous coal. This program may, however, be 
subject to re-examination, as was discussed on page 61.
 
Additional activities have included the acquisition of
 
rolling stock and improvement in the operation and equipment of 
repair shops. Approximately 120 miles of new track have been 
constructed, chiefly to connect the coal fields of the east coast
 
to the Seoul-Inchon area.
 
The Korean National Railway has a foreign exchange require­
ment for operation and maintenance of about $11 million annually. 
Some $10 million will also be needed for replacement of equipment. 
Therefore the total foreign exchange requirement amounts to 
$21 million The railway produces $4 million in dollar revenue 
from United Nations forcq, leaving a deficit in foreign exchange 
of $17 million annually. 4/ 
I/ Source: OEC Transportation Division. 
2/ Source: OEC "Program Status Report," July 1957. 
2iguxi supplied by OEC Transportation Division. 
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RICONIIDAT]ON NO. 18: 
Since the Korean Government clearly cannot seet its foreign 
exchange requirement for the operation and improvement of the 
railway from present revenues, it is recomended that defense 
support funds continue to be used for maintenance and essen­
tial development. OEC should continue to press the Korean
 
Government for increased rates in order that the railway may 
earn revenues sufficient at least to cover costs of operation
 
and the hwan equivalent of costs of development.
 
Substantial assistance to ports and harbors has been given
 
by providing dredges to the Korean Government and technical
 
assistance in their operation. While harbors could be greatly
improved, they are adequate to move present tonnages and will 
continue to be so if the Korean Government maintains the present
harbor development. It is believed that peak loads in the 
present major harbors of Korea were reached in the year 1957 and 
that in the immediate future there will be no increase in ton­
nages. It does not seem likely that much more improvement will 
be needed. 
A program for iiustalling equipping and operating an instru­
ment landing system at the K-14 International Airport near Seoul 
has been undertaken by ICA with the assistance of the U.S. Civil
 
Aeronautics Administration. This installation is considered by
 
the U.So military forces to be essential to their own needs.
 
Public Works (FY 1957 appropriation: $4,900,000) 
The principal task of the Public Works Division since the 
termination of the war has been the financing and assistance in 
the reconstruction of major bridges and the main highways. More 
than a thousand bridges, damaged during the war, have not been 
reconstructed but these are mostly small bridges and many of them 
in the secondary road system. 
Some 300 miles of paved road are still being reccstructed. 
The paving is with asphalt a material which has to be imported. 
OC technicians feel that the ROK will be able to maintain 
its primary road system but that the secondary road system will 
probably be neglected through lack of maintenance over the next 10 
to 15 years. 
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In the past the Public Works Division has undertaken both 
downstream flood control and rehabilitation of public water works 
damaged during the war. No funds have been allocated for flood 
control after fiscal year 1957 and water supply work is being 
carried out under the Division of Health and Sanitation. 
The program also has provided considerable financial and 
technical assistance for the construction and repair of Korean 
Government buildings. 
RECOMMENDATION NO 19: 
The Team recommends the phasing out of funding through the 
use of defense support funds of a program of highway 
construction. Defense support should be concentrated on 
dollar requirements for materials and equipment neede3 
for maintenance of the present road system. 
Mining (FY 1957 appropriation: $4,2479000) 
The principal concern of the Mining Division has been with 
coal0 The coal occurring in South Korea is an anthracite with 
a relatively high ash content0 Through efforts of the Division, 
mining techniques have been improved and the heavily damaged 
mines which were put out of commission when the Japanese withdrew 
have been restored; production has gone steadily up. One of the
 
serious deterrents to improved production is the practice of the
 
ROK Government of directing shipments of coal from government­
operated mines to other go"ernment agencieso The Dae Han Coal
 
Company, a ROK Government corporation, at the time of the visit 
of the Team had accounts receivable from other ROK Government
 
agencies in the amount of the equivalent of nearly $2 million.
 
At the same time the company lacked operating and development capi­
tal Proven coal reserves are not yet fully known in existing 
mines. However, a drilling survey has been started and proven 
reserves data should be available in the near future.
 
Other minerals occurring in South Korea include tungsten,
 
graphite, iron and gold0 None constitutes a significant export
 
at the present time but tungsten has in the past been an important
 
earner of foreign exchange0 The United States, the principal
 
consumer, hns ceased to stockpile tungsten.
 
An initial sutVeY W' *tudy the feasibility of further mine­
ral ey-ploration was unde-taken under OEC auspices during fiscal 1957. 
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The ROK mining law as it presently exists is a barrier to 
foreign exploitation of minerals. There is some interest on the 
part of Korea in changing the law to encourage foreign investors but 
little has been done to date. OEC plans to have a technician study 
the law and make recom endations for improvement. 
RECOMMENDATION NO, 20: 
The Team supports the OEC plan for exploration work in mine­
rals in order to stimulate further activities in mining and 
recommends that, if needed, defense support funds be used 
as well as technical assistance funds. It also supports 
OBC's intention to examine present laws governing mining with 
a view to revision which will encourage the attraction of 
foreign capital.
 
Related Problems and Recommendations 
The Accumulation of Goods in Ports 
One of the most recurrent criticisms of the program in Korea 
has been directed at the accumulation of goods in the customs 
houses and warehouses in the ports of Pusan and Inchon. Some part 
of these goods goes back to the UNKRA program over which the 
Economic Coordinator did not exercise detailed control. In other 
cases, goods ordered by private businessmen have not been claimed 
and no action has been taken by the ROK Government to dispose of the 
goods by public auctiono Again. some goods have been ordered by 
Korean businessmen for which little or no need presently exists in 
the country. Finally, faulty systems of record keeping by the ROK 
Government add to the general confusion. 
This problem of accumulation of goods in the ports was one 
to which OEC was giving special attention at the time of the visit 
of the Team. A special committee was established and directed to 
make a study of ways and means of moving the goods and to prepare 
monthly reports of progress. 
Concentrated efforts on the part of the ROK Government and 
OEC have resulted in a decrease of goods in warehouses from a 
total of 49000 metric tons in September 1957 to 21.500 metric 
tons in November 1957. The latest OEC progress report on this
 
activity indicates that this problem is well on its way to being
 
solved.
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Possibil.ity of UsIng Surplus and Obsolete Eauipment 
In the past, large quantities of surplus materials and equip­
ment from the military in Korea have been used in the program. 
At the present time apparently there are not sizable quantities 
of material and equipment surplus to the needs of the military. 
The Team was struck by the high quality of the equipment 
and the fact that virtually all of it used in the aid program is 
new. The question arises as to whether or not used equipment 
might not adequately fill the need of the program in some instances. 
Similarly, obsolete equipment might also be of service. For 
example, the Team was informed that the new instrument landing 
installation at the L-14 International Airport near Seoul was of 
the latest type and had all now equipment. The possibility arises 
that some equipment, now obsolete in certain parts of the United 
States but in good working condition, might be useful in Korea. 
Although OEC seems to have taken good advantage of equip­
ment and supplies surplus to military needs in Korea, there has 
been little attempt to acquire military surpluses on a world-wide 
basis. ICA is presently better organized to assist in the location 
of military surpluses than formerly and certain regions are find­
ing such surpluses from world-wide sources useful.
 
RECOMMDATION NO. 21:
 
It is recommended that OEO explore the possibility of using
 
obsolete equipment in the program in Korea as well as surplus
 
military equipment acquired on a world-wide basis. 
9.AI. (FY 1957 appropriation: $2,000,000) 
Shortly after the termination of hostilities in the Korean 
War there were large numbers of U.S. soldiers stationed throughout 
heavily populated areas. As in other parts of the world, there 
developed a program that is called the Armed Forces Assistance to 
Korea (AFAK). Essentially this took the form of voluntary cash 
contribution by U.S. soldiers, with some contribution by the aid 
program, to create a fund for the purchase of building materials 
used to assist Koreans in building schools, churches and public 
buildings. The U.S. Arr provided technical supervision of construc­
tion and Korean residents supplied labor and local material. The 
Team was told that this program had enormously good effects on the 
morale of the U.S. troops and greatly strengthened the relationship 
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between the troops and local residents. Mhoy useful and necessary 
buildings were constructed sip a lasting monument to good rela­
tions between foreign military troops and a civil population. 
Last fiscal year, the aid program contributed $2 million
 
to the AFAK program, most of which was devoted to the construction
 
of schools. The present situation appears to be substantially
 
different from the situation just a44p the Korean War. There are
 
fewer U.S. troops in the area. The troops are concentrated near 
the demilitarized zone and have much less contact with local 
inhabitants than formerly. Very little contribution is now made 
to the program by the U.S. troops. Much of the supervision of
 
construction is being carried out by Korean troops. Certain mis­
sionaries have recommended that no more churches be constructed 
under this program and state that mome pcom4ties have over­
extended themselves on church construction and are finding it hard 
to meet maintenance problem.
 
The present programj, consisting largely of classroom con­
struction, is not an integral part of the 00 education program
 
and its objective is, of course, quite different from the OEC
 
objective.
 
The Team was unable to evaluate adequately the beneficial 
effects of the AFAK program on the morale of U.S. troops and its 
relationship to the improvement of relations between U.S. troops 
and local residents. For that reason it has no specific recom­
mendation to offer. However, it suggests that the military authori­
ties and the OEC authorities might Well reappraise this program to 
ascertain whether the beneficial effects to U.S. troops and their 
relationship to Koreans presently Justify expenditures. 
Korean Government Orfanization for Certain Activities 
At present most of the public utilities and larger industrial 
activities in Korea are operated by one or another ministry of 
government. A few, such as the Dae Han Coal Company, are organized 
as government corporations. The complacency concerning public 
servants' taking bribes, combined with the recognised practice of 
paying less than living wages, militates against efficient opera­
tion of government services.
 
It does not appear feasible at this time to attract private 
capital and private management to acquire and operate such public 
utilities in Korea as the railway, power plants, the telecommunica­
tions system, or even the coal mines. A part, at least, of the 
reason lies in present government control of rates for utilities.
 
7.4
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In addition, large accumulations of capital which would be needed
 
to acquire the enterprises do not exist at the present time.
 
However, with proper rate adjustment and assurance of freedom from 
stifling government control there may be a possibility in the 
future of transferring such activities to the private sector of 
the economy.
 
Given the necessity for public operation of such activities 
at the present time, the question of appropriate governmental 
organization arises. When it comes to the operation of such plants
 
as the Pusan Iron Works, the Dae Han open hearth furnace and 
rolling mills at Inchon, and eventually the new fertilizer plant,
 
the problem of organization becomes especially acute because of
 
the complexity of these operations, the size of the enterprises,
 
and their essentially profit-making character.
 
In other parts of the world, technical assistance programs
 
and economic development activities have been organized around 
what are called in Spanish servicio, or services. Typically these 
are internal divisions of a normal ministry of government but are 
legally established by international contract between the United
 
States Government and the local government. This arrangement, on 
the one hand, gives general policy control to the local government 
through the responsible minister but, since the contract typically 
specifies a Uuited States representative as operating head of the 
service, some of the evils such as political influence, inefficiency 
and graft can be avoided, Usually the cnntract specifies that 
operations will be conducted in accordance with rules and regula­
tions (not necessarily following either U.S. or local government
 
practices) jointly adopted by the two appropriate representatives
 
of each government. Typically also, operations are conducted with 
a fund to which each government contributes. In fact, the joint 
funding is the very essence of the arrangement. 
The Team studied the possibility of the use of the servicio
 
as one means of lifting certain operations (especially public
 
utilities and industries) out of the restrictions of typical Korean
 
governmental operation. The principal benefit of such a proposal
 
would seem to be to insulate operations against political influence 
and to allow flexibility in operating procedures, including the 
possibility of paying higher wages. Houever, the same objective 
of reasonable wages, flexibility and freedom from political influ­
ence could be accomplished by the use of a government corporation 
established under one or more politically independent boards of 
directors, Such an approach already has some precedent in Korea. 
For the public utility and industrial operations of the government 
the public corporation would seem more appropriate than the 
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servic o, especially since, in a real sense, there is no joint fund­
ing of the activities. However, the Team does feel that the Koreans 
should establish more independent operations for utilities and 
industries now being conducted as parts of regular government ser­
vices, especially such activities as the railway, telephone and
 
telegraph system, the power plants, the Pusan Iron Works, the Dae 
Han open hearth furnace and rolling mill, the flat glass plant and 
similar government-owned enterprises. It seems especially important 
to get early and efficient organization in the case of these 
revenue-producing services.
 
It has been suggested that widespread increase in Korean 
Government pay scales would contribute to inflationary pressures 
unless other measures are taken concurrently to offset such a 
tendency. A gradual change-over to public corporations, taking 
industrial plants and power plants as first pilot operations pri­
marily because they have relatively fewer employees, would seem 
to be a wise precautionary measure. This approach would suggest 
leaving such operations as the railway and communications for
 
future consideration because of the large numbers of employees 
involved. 
Population Problem 
In Chapter II the opinion was expressed that the ultimate 
solution to the Korean population problem should be sought both in 
population control and in emigration. This question was discussed
 
with both Koreans and Americans and it was found that an under­
standing of the gravity of the problem is increasing. This was 
true, for example, of a number of cabinet ministers. 
As far as population control is concerned, the Team did not 
find that this would encounter any widespread opposition in Korea
 
on religious grounds except among the relatively few Koreans of
 
Catholic faith Moreover, most Korean women would welcome an 
opportunity to obtain reliable information regarding ways of limit­
ing their families. The Team talked with a Korean social worker 
who is organizing mothers' clubs for the purpose of giving infor­
mation to Korean women on a number of household and family problems, 
including child care, home economics and similar activities. She 
would like to enlist the support of the aid program in financing 
the provision to these clubs of both planned parenthood information 
and contraceptive materials. The Team is fully aware of the policy

considerations which would preclude the provision by ICA of either
 
information or materials of this sort, in spite of what the Team
 
regards as the clear desirability of doing so in the case of Korea
 
within the appropriate framework of religious sanction. However, it
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might be possible for the OEC Community Development Division to pro­
vide financial assistance to the mothers' education program in
 
general, such assistance to be earmarked for child care or some 
other specific activity of the program exclusive of planned parent­
hood. The Koreans would then be free to finance the latter activity 
from their own resources. The Community Development Division 
already has social welfare and child care programs which could be 
adapted to this purpose. 
Little thought has been given by either Koreans or Americans
 
to the possibility of emigration. One reason for this, as far as 
the Koreans are concerned, is that so long as there remains a possi­
bility of unification g no matter how remote, there is a possibility
 
of siphoning off some of the surplus population into the less
 
crowded North. Nevertheless, the Team believes that this is a sub­
ject which should be thoroughly explored. The pressure of popula­
tion on natural resources in Korea is bound to increase in the next
 
few years as the population continues to rise. Even if the Koreans
 
adopt measures of population control, it will be some years before
 
these make any impact on the problem.
 
RECOMMENDATION NO. 22:
 
It is recommended that consideration be given by the U.S. and 
ROK Governments to making a study of the population problem
 
with a view to developing outlets, possibly in Latin America,' 
for Korean agricultural workers. It is also recommended 
that financial assistance be provided
, through the OEC Commu­
nity Development Division, to the mothers' education program.
 
Development Loan Fund 
The Team studied the possibility of the use of the Development 
Loan Fund (DLF) to carry out some aspects of economic development

in Korea. It seems clear that Korea could not repay loans in any 
currency other than hwan at the present stage of the development of
 
its economy without enlarging an already critical gap in its foreign 
exchange earnings and requirements. Assuming, therefore, that any
loans made to Korea would be repayable in hwan, certain problems 
would arise. The program has already generated substantial quanti­
ties of hwan in U S. ownership. Up to now the Korean Army has been 
able to use large amounts of such currency, With the tendency toward
 
reduction in forces there will be a decrease in the demand for these
 
hwan. Only very limited quantities of hwan can be used for direct
 
U.S. requirements in Korea,, It would seem, therefore, that use of
 
the DLF for loans will tend to exaggerate what is already a potential 
problem. In this situation large amounts of U.S.-owned bwan would 
probably have to be reloaned to the Korean Government for further 
internal use in economic development of the country. It would 
therefore seem that there would be very little substantial differ­
ence, as far as expenditures by the U.S. are concerned, in financ­
ing activities with DLF funds or with defense support funds.
 
Provided the decision is made to reloan (or hold in idle balances) 
hwan, paid to the DLF for interest and principal charges, to the 
Korean Government for further use in economic development, the DL? 
might be useful in helping Korea in its economic development. 
Aricultural Surplus 
The use of the agricultural surpluses of the United States 
in the past several years has been an effective part of the aid 
program. Fortunately many of the products needed by the econonv of 
Korea were in surplus in the United States. This past year, 
however, found the United States looking for markets for rice and 
Korea with a bumper crop of rice, a part of which OUC has been 
urging Korea to export in order to earn foreign exchange. For a 
while it looked as though certain U.S. interests would insist on 
giving aid to Korea in the form of grants of rice. At the present 
writing, this proposal appears to be dormant. Had the United 
States, in its anxiety to dispose of rice, insisted on Korea's 
receiving a part of its grant aid in rice, a major element on which 
the aid program has been projected to relieve Korean dependence 
on the United States would have been at stake. This example serves 
to illustrate possibilities of conflict between disposal of sur­
pluses and the need of the aid program in Korea. 
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CHAPTER IV - ADMINISTRATIVE AND ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
 
Mission Oreanization 
The present organization of the OEC staff, as shown in 
Appendix D, includes three broad functional divisions besides the 
usual staff divisions. There are some 350 American positions on 
the staff at present, as noted in the table shown as Appendix E.
 
The functional divisions are the Office of the Assistant Economic
 
Coordinator for Program Planning and Economic Policy, the Office
 
of the Rehabilitation Engineer, and the Office of the Assistant
 
Economic Coordinator for Technical Cooperation. Planning for all
 
activities resides in the Office of Program Planning and Economic
 
Policy, as the name would imply. The Rehabilitation Engineer is 
responsible for major construction activities and assistance in 
the operation of the public utilities, as well as such training and
 
technical assistance activities as pertain to these efforts. This
 
Office also includes mining and industrial activities. The Tech­
nical Cooperation Office is concerned with the conventional fields
 
of healthq agriculture, education, and public administration, as
 
well as a Division of Community Development which includes activi­
ties in the fields of housing and social welfare.
 
This organizational structure does not appear to require 
any particular discussion on the part of the Team, except that for 
reasons discussed in Chapter III it would seem desirable to change 
the name "Rehabilitation Engineer" to "Chief Engineer" and to give 
recognition to the growing importance of industrial development by 
building up the staff of the Industry Division under that Office. 
The one factor which struck the Team about the personnel
 
organization of OEC was the concentration of personnel in Seoul.
 
There are very probably a number of historical reasons why this is
 
true0 Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how technicians in the
 
Office of the Rehabilitation Engineer and in the Office of Tech­
nical Cooperation could be fully effective by operating out of
 
Seoul as a geographical base,,
 
Certainly, accommodations and living conditions outside
 
Seoul are well below standards to which U.S, technicians are accus­
tomed, Appropriate educational facilities for children are almost
 
non-existent. Any attempt to station families in various areas
 
throughout Korea would, as a practical matter, have to entail pro­
vision of minimum requirements for living, including appropriate
 
health measures, In most instances it would not be prauticable to
 
establish appropriate edurcational facilities, This problem for
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'1 	 families with children would have to be met at the time of recruit­
ment, with the understanding that the responsibility for educa­
tional facilities would lie with the parents. The added effective­
ness of being able to station a reasonable proportion of technicians 
away from the capital would seem to offset the added cost of 
providing minimum facilities for living. 
OEO has been giving consideration to various ways and means 
of bringing about a decentralization of the staff in Korea. While 
these plans had not crystallized fully at the time of the Team's 
visit, beyond the establishment of a skeleton staff at Pusan, it 
seems that any proposal which would have the effect of taking tech­
nicians out of the capital and bringing them into closer contact 
with people throughout the country would be advisable. Similar 
plans are in effect for other American government agencies in Korea. 
Not only are officers and men of the MUaGs stationed throughout 
the country but USIA has three local branches (at Pusan, Kwangju 
and Taegu). The Department of State is understood to be thinking 
of opening a consulate at Pusan. 
It might be argued that in a country the size of Korea it 
should be possible to work effectively out of Seoul. In practice, 
however, there is always a tendency in cases of this sort for 
technicians stationed in a capital not to travel and come into 
contact with local people as much as when they are stationed away 
from the capital. 
Recruitment 
Recruitment of personnel for Korea has never exceeded 80 
per cent of the established ceiling. Given the rate of turnover of 
personnel and the difficulty of recruitaent, it seem unlikely 
that personnel actually at work at any given time will ever exceed 
80 per cent. Every effort should therefore be made to promote 
recruitment as much as possible. If the recommendations of this 
report are accepted it may well be that reductions in personnel in
 
such stafls as the Agriculture and Transportation Divisions will 
permit augmenting other staffs. 
Americans in Korea
 
The ICA employees form so small a portion of the total 
number of Americans in Korea that their presence is not obtrusive. 
At the time of the Team's visit, there were approximately 270 
employees in OEC as compared with over 60,000 American military
 
personnel (most of whom of course are stationed at the front) and
 
120 employees in the Embassy and in related activities, including
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USIA. The foregoing figures do not include dependents. In addi­
tion, it is estimated that there are some 965 non-official Americans 
(including dependents) in the country, of whom the majority are
 
missionaries.
 
During the past year the tour of service for OEC personnel
 
has been put on a regular two-year basis and employees have been
 
authorized to have their dependents join them in Korea, provided
 
housing is available. Four new dormitory-type residential halls
 
and some 50 houses have been constructed and, with the completion
 
anticipated for this spring of an additional 57 houses, it is
 
expected that all employees of the staff who wish to have their
 
dependents in Korea will be able to do so. The construction of
 
this housing and of the OEC club where many of the employoes take
 
their meals has been a tremendous boost to morale. The Economic
 
Coordinator said that, with the completion of the employee housing
 
program this spring, morale of ICA employees in Korea should be as 
good as that obtaining elsewhere in the Far East0 
The OEC housing, while very comfortable and a great improve­
ment over previous accommodations, is located either at the U.S. 
Army post at Seoul or in a separate compound nearby. This has 
advantages from the standpoint of security against theft (avery 
real problem in Korea) but has disadvantages as far as relations 
of the staff with the local population are concerned. Although 
members of the staff conceded this in conversation with the Team, 
only a handful, about 5, mainly those with Korean wives, have 
chosen to live "on the economy." The associations of the remainder 
with Koreans are limited and so is their knowledge of &orean 
culture and history, although OEC is seeking to improve this situa­
tion by organizing sightseeing t rs and occasional lectures0 
As far as language study is conce.-ned, a very small number of 
employees, amounting to 6 or 7. are currently studying Korean. 
Admittedly this is a difficult language which is useful only in 
this one country but it does appear that more effort could be made 
by members of the staff to study it In view of the widespread 
use of English in Korea and the difficulty and limited usefulness 
of the Korean language, it is not the Team's suggestion that all 
members of OEC should attempt to become proficient in Korean, 
From the standpoint of relations with the Koreans, however, it 
would appear worthwhile for all members of the staff to be able to 
say a few words of Korean as well as to know something about Korea 
and its history, 
At the time of the Team's arrival, the office quarters
 
occupied by OC were also in the army compound but the disadvantage
 
of attempting to transact business with Korean officials in these
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circumstances caused the Economic Coordinator in November to move 
his office and those of his principal subordinates downtown into 
quarters where Koreans could be admitted without passing the 
scrutiny of MPs. The Team feels that this move, in spite of some 
discomforts that were caused, should prove distinctly advantageous 
from the point of view of improving relations between Koreans 
and Americans.
 
Integratio 
The question of the integration of OEC and the Economic 
Section of the Embassy does not arise at this time. Owing to the 
lsxge size of the aid program in Korea and the consequent size of 
the aid mission, the Team does not see how any useful purpose 
could be served by merging OEC with the Embassy. The matter could 
hardly come up in any event until the question of a Country Team 
i3 settled (see below). 
Contractors 
Appendix F shows the contractors now operating in Korea,
 
the fields in which they give services, and the amounts of the
 
respective contracts. There has been extensive use of U.S. con­
tractors in Korea, especially in some of the larger construction
 
activities. There are likewise presently current two university
 
contracts with Minnesota and Peabody. In January 1957, a contract 
was negotiated with an engineering concern called Smith, Hinchman 
& Grylls to render technical services to OEC in a variety of tech­
nical fields.
 
It is doubtful if the OEC program could be operated without
 
the use of contractors. However, the effectiveness of the use
 
of contractors varies. The University of Minnesota, for example,
 
does not seem to function effectively as a part of the OEC organi­
zation, while Peabody College functions very well The reason
0 

for Minnesota's failure to function fas an effective part of OEC
 
is, in all probability, historical. When the contract was origi­
nally signed, the Washington office of ICA gave assurance to a
 
number of the land-grant colleges that they would be given substan­
tial freedom of action in carrying out programs In a number of 
areas throughout the world, situations of conflict developed between 
the regular ICA organization and the representatives of the land­
grant colleges. In the case of Korea the representative of Minne­
sota did not clearly recognize his responsibility to the Education 
Division and his need of functioning as an integral part of this 
Division. The head of the Education Division confirmed that he has 
little association with the Minnesota group. It is not planned 
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that the Minnesota contract will be renewed, inasmuch as the present
 
program will be completed by the time the contract expires. It
 
appears to the Team, however
, 
that it would be desirable for OEC
 
to make a study to determine L' more effective organizational
 
arrangements can be made with a view to further use of this con­
tractor.
 
The new contract with Smith, Hinchman & Grylls fills a needed 
gap. In many individual fields it has not been possible to recruit 
technical personnel through U.S. Government channels. Thus, for 
example, no OEC personnel were competent to evaluate the facilities 
of the Pusan Iron Works. Smith, Hinchman & Grylls is undertaking 
such an evaluation and has been able to recruit the necessary per­
sonnel. The Team feels this type of contract, which will bring to 
the program technicians not otherwise available, is essential and
 
likely to become more important as the industrialization program
 
grows in importance.
 
As brought out earlier, the contractors for the thermal
 
plants and for the Hwachon hydroelectric plant were not equally
 
effective in training Koreans for operation of the several facili­
ties for which they were responsible for construction.
 
In discussing the contract question with members of OEC,
 
the Team was told that one serious deterrent to the operation of
 
the program in Korea had been the delay in Washington negotiation
 
and approval of contracts. The Team made an attempt to verify 
this assertion while in Seoul but the files of OEC were so incom­
plete that simple factual data as to when a request for a contract
 
was made by the field and when it was finally approved by Washing­
ton could not be ascertained. On returning to Washington the Team
 
pursued this matter with ICA/W and there is given below a table 
showing the 
this subject
information 
. 
available from the Washington files on 
Name of 
Contract 
Date of Receipt 
by ICA/W of PIO 
or PA 
Date of Re-
ceipt by Con-
tract Office 
Date of Sig­
nature of 
the Contract 
McGraw-Hydrocarbon 6/15/54 not available 7/15/55
 
Minnesota 6/24/54 (issued) not available 10/28/54
 
Morrison-Knudsen 6/10/54 not available 7/31/55
 
Utah Construction 2/25/57 12/28/56 5/24/57
 
Pacific Far East 4/25/55 3/28/56 6/ 6/57
 
Philco 4/25/56 not available 6/12/56
 
Smith, H. & G. not available 7/18/56 1/18/57
 
Peabody 8/21/56 (issued) not available 8/26/56
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In the case of two of these contracts (Minnesota and Peabody) 
the relevant PIO was issued in Washington rather than in the 
field, so the data appearing in the table are not really meaning­
ful. In the remaining cases it will be observed that the lag 
between the receipt of the PIO or PA by Washington and the signa­
ture of the contract varies from a month and a half to over two 
years, Delays as long as two years are of course insupportable but 
a delay of a month and a half is certainly reasonable. 
The 	Team has no general comment to make regarding the use
 
of contractors in Korea. It believes this is an indispensable
 
device for operating programs in Korea but its effectiveness can
 
be determined only in specific cases.
 
Absence of Country Team
 
In Korea the organizational relationship of OEC with the 
Embassy and USIA, like many other things, is unique. There is no 
Country Team. The aid program is administered by an Economic 
Coordinator who9 as explained above1 is the principal representa­
tive in Korea of ICA but is responsible to the Commander in Chief, 
United Nations Command. The Economic Coordinator carries the 
rank of Minister and is appointed by the Director of ICA, subject 
to the approval of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 
Defense and the UN Commander in Chief. The preqyse relationship 
between OEC and the Embassy is nowhere definedo-1 Normal commu­
nications between OEC and ICA/W go through military channels, 
although clearance by the military authorities is not required for 
such messages0 In additionp some messages of more than routine 
character, involving coordination with the Embassy in the field 
or the Department of State in Washington, are sent through the 
Department 's channels. 
At the time that OEC was set up, there was apparently con­
siderable logic in placing this activity under the Conander in 
Chief in view of the state of suspended hostilities obtaining in
 
Korea immediately after the armistice and in view of the fact that 
the Army was carrying out a number of activities in the field of
 
relief and rehabilitation. Also it was an active theater of mili­
tary operations and the best means of giving the necessary authority
 
and facilities to the Economic Coordinator was to have him derive
 
these from the top military commander, speaking as a staff officer
 
in his name. With the passage of four and one-half years, however,
 
I/ 	 See Appendix G for Presidential Directive of August 7, 1953 
setting up OECo 
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it has been argued by a number of observers that the retention of 
the aid program under military control is no longer appropriate. 
There is still a state of suspended hostilities in Korea but it
 
is difficult to argue that, as a practical fact, Korea is any more 
of a war zone, for example, than West Germany. The military
 
authorities themselves have begun to recognize this in various
 
ways, notably by permitting dependents of the MAAG personnel to
 
reside in Korea.
 
It is the view of the Department of State, of ICA/W and of 
the Embassy that the time has come to normalize ICA-Embassy
 
relationships in Korea and establish a Country Team. This sub­
ject is now being discussed in Washington and it is understood
 
that the Pentagon, which has up to the present time resisted the
 
establishment of a Country Team, will probably agree so long as
 
the MAAGs in Korea are retained under military control° The pre­
cise division of responsibilities has still to be worked out.
 
The Team feels that these proposed arrangements have merit but
 
would emphasize that a point of more importance than the organiza­
tional arrangement is the fact that the present system is working

remarkably well. The Ambassador, the Commanding General and the
 
Economic Coordinator have evolved a most effective working basis.
 
Contacts at lower levels also appear to be very good and there
 
is satisfactory exchange of information. Some officials in dis­
cussing the matter. in fact, took the position that there already
 
was a Country Team in spirit while others stated that they did
 
not feel its absence. The Team therefore believes that the ques­
tion of the nature of the organizational set-up is a secondary one.
 
Relations of OEC with Embassy
 
The Team found a good working relationship at all levels
 
between personnel of OEC and the Embassy. In this regard it is 
evident that the example set by the Ambassador and the Economic 
Coordinator has been followed by the members of their respective 
staffs. The head of the Embassy's economic section devotes a
 
great deal of his time to liaison with OEC and clearly has a good
 
grasp of the objectives and the operating details of the aid
 
program,
 
Relatiogs with USIA
 
An unusual situation obtains in Korea whereby three members 
of the staff of USIA are permanently stationed in OEC head­
quarters in order principally to deal with problems having to do 
with information regarding the aid program. In addition, the head 
of USIA told the Team that approximately 20 per cent of the 
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devoted to the aid program. Relationsover-all work of his staff is 

between 010 and USIA appeared to be very good.
 
There appears to be adequate coordination between the ICA 
participants program and the Department of State's exchange-of­
persons program which is administered by the Embassy. Regular 
two programsmeetings are held to discuss matters arising under the 
and the Team was informed that there is no duplication or lack of 
liaison. 
Relations with Private Orgaizations 
The Team held interviews with both 	American businessmen and 
number of suggestionsmissionaries in Seoul. Both groups had a 
to make regarding the aid program and both seemed to feel, especi­
ally in the case of the U.S. businessmen, that they were not 
enjoying sufficiently close contacts with OEC. The businessmen 
were particularly critical of OEC, claiming that it was not sup­
porting private American enterprise in Korea. Their chief com­
plaint is against the system of bidding and insistence on the 
acceptance of lowest bids which does not always conform to the pro­
ducts which they represent. The Team is not impressed with the
 
arguments advanced by the businessmen, who in any event appear to
 
be primarily traders. It does not 	appear that this group has
 
much to contribute in the way of constructive comment regarding
 
the aid program9 although OC might find it worthwhile to consult 
some of the more knowledgeable of them from time to time.
 
As far as the American missionaries are concerned, they had 
some helpful comments to make with regard to some details, par­
ticularly the lack of close contact between OC personnel and 
Koreans, the need for decentralization of 'be OEC organization, 
and the operation of the AFAK program. 
From the foregoing itwould seem that, while the relations
 
of OEC with private interests (both American and Korean) are 
relatively slight, this fact is not of much importance at the 
present time in view of the particular circumstances prevailing 
in that country.
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CHAPTER V - ACCOMPLISMETS OF PROGRAM AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 
In Chapter III of this report the Evaluation Team hasattempted to describe the present program and to show how that pro­
gram is coping with the basic economic problems of the country as 
outlined in Chapter II. The Team has also given g in Chapter III,
its recommendations regarding specific aspects programof the and 
certain related problems. 
In the present chapter9 after touching

on the accomplishments of the program to date and on levels of aid,

the Team will discuss Korea's future economic prospects in the
 
light of certain specific proposals which have been put forward
 
with a view to increasing the country's export potential.
 
Accomplishments of the Program 
The initial and most fundamental accomplishment of the aid program in Korea has been the physical restoration of the war-torn 
country to an active, though not self-supporting economy with,little physical evidence of war damage. 
 By the end of 1957 the
 
rehabilitation job in Korea was essentially completed9 with the
 
major exception of housing reconstruction.
 
It seems to the Team that this accomplishment of the pro­
gram in bringing virtually complete restoration to Korea in a
period of four years is striking. Unquestionably a few ill­
advised activities were undertaken, Some of these have been men­tioned elsewhere in this report9 
and are an inevitable consequence

of a vigorous crash program to bring Korea physically back to
 
normal. The Team feels that minor shortcomings should not be
 
allowed to obscure a major accomplishment which assures the con­
tinuance of Korea as an integral part of the Free World.
 
Furthermore, the reconstruotion of Korea and the maintenance
 
of its economy as a going concern, albeit with substantial outside
 
assistance, have had repercussicrs well beyond the U.S. fulfillment
 
of its undertaking. The existence of the aid program9 
together
with the U.S. military commitment to the UN Command in Korea, serves

clear and unequivocal notice to the Communist world that the United
 
States is in Korea and intends to remain there as long as need
 
exists. 
 It.likewise is a clear demonstration to the world at large,

and particularly the Far Eastern nations on the periphery of the
Communist world, that the United States faces up to its conmiitments
 
and to its moral obligations.
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Aid Levels 
As brought out in Chapter III, the Evaluation Team feels 
that many fields of aid effort should as soon as possible operate 
with technical assistance funds only. The Team's recommendations 
are not based on saving money perse but on getting a maximum 
return from defense support funds in a direct contribution to the 
narrowing of the foreign exchange gap, especially over the next 
several years. This approach would seem to be logical not only in 
order to reduce future levels of aid but also, from the Korean 
point of view, to reduce financial dependence on the United States. 
Dependence on the United States in the long run, the Team believes, 
can become a serious barrier to the relationship between the two 
countries. 
The aid level projected for fiscal year 1958 is probably
 
adequate for meeting the major objectives because of the backlog
 
of funds in the financial pipeline in the project sector of the 
program, which amounted to $146o5 million as of June 30, 1957. _ 
However, increased appropriations in the project sector of the 
program may be indicated in the succeeding several years, especi­
ally for projects contributing to alleviation of the foreign 
exchange problem. Progress in these projects, assuming the availa­
bility of funds, should depend largely upon the ability of indivi­
dual Korean enterprises to bring to such activities the necessary 
training and experience0 
Mention has already been made of the projection prepared by 
OEC with a view to estimating the magnitude of Korea's foreign 
exchange deficit over the next few years. This projection shows
 
a continuing net deficit, which by 1963 is estimated at $117 
million, representing the size of the saleables component (com­
prising non-project assistance and PL 480) in the aid program. 
The $117 million would be over and above the provision of techni­
cal assistance and project assistance for economic development, 
estimated by OEC at a level of $4 million and $8 million, respec­
tively, for fiscal year 1963. 
When adequate statistics are available the projection of 
economic trends is at best an uncertain undertaking. In Korea, 
where statistics and factual data are limited, the projection of 
production of the entire Korean econonm is an exercise of taxing 
proportions. In 1953-54 Mr. Robert R. Nathan attempted to project 
the trend of production in the Korean cconomy and concluded that, 
2/ Office of Statistics and Reports, ICA/W. 
2EC
 
with a substantial aid program foreign exchange earnings would9 

approximate foreign exchange requirements in 1958. It was clear
 
at the time of writing the present report that Mr. Nathan's forecast
 
was several hundred million dollars per year in error, although a
 
substantial aid program had been carried 
on.
 
The Team does not consider itself competent to make a precise

projection of the rate of growth of the economy and feels that
 
the OEC projection is probably as good as can be made. 
Whether
 
the exchange gap will be $100 million or $200 million in 1963 is
9
in one sensep not important. What seems important to the Team is
 
that there is substantial likelihood of Korea's not being able in
 
1963 and for some time in the future to earn its foreign exchange

requirements, and the clear implication is that the U.S. will there­
fore have to continue its aid program indefinitely, or at least 
until there is a major change in the world situation. 
Future Prospects 
There are given below the comnents of the Team with respect

to certain estimates prepared by OEC in an attempt to forecast
 
Korea's export position over the next few years. Some of these
 
estimates are reflected in the 1959 program presentation of OEC 
and some were furnished separately to the Evaluation Team. 
In the field of agriculture. the Team has examined the pro­
posals of OEC for exporting rice and importing coarse grains to
 
replace the rice0 Specifically. these proposals call for gradually

increasing imports of wheat and barley to some 
500,000 tons annually

by fiscal year 1963, at a cost of $33.2 million, and for exporting

450,000 tons of rice by that time to earn a gross of $63.6 million,
 
or a net of $30.4 million, The Team believes that this offers a
 
feasible course of action for Korea to pursue but points out that
 
the most likely market for Korean rice, Japan, may entail internal
 
political repercussions, especially in view of the difficulty that
 
was experienced when the Japanese forced a similar arrangement on
 
the Korean public during the colonial period0
 
Marine Producta 
The Team has also examined the proposals of OEC for increas­
ing Korean fisheries exports over- the next three to five years to, 
say, $14 or $15 million per annum. This would be done by concen­
trating on high-priced items such as tuna and shrimp as well as
 
seaweed and other marine products. These proposals appear to the
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Team to be feasible but it would add that the amount of foreign ex­
change which could be earned is relatively small and that there are
 
certain remedial measures which the Korean Government should first
 
take to assist the fishing industry, as explained in Chapter III
 
Minerals
 
Although the Team believes that there are some prospects
 
for expanding Korean exports of minerals, more information is re­
quired regarding Korea's basic mineral resources before the export
 
potential can be accurately assessed. The Team has already sug­
gested (page 72) that further exploration with respect to these
 
resources be carried out in accordance with the existing plan of OEC.
 
Tungsten and graphite might offer some possibilities but the imme­
diate outlook is not hopeful because of depressed world prices. It
 
may also be that Korea could export anthracite coal, possibly in
 
exchange for bituminous coal or other products from Japan, provided
 
the current survey being undertaken of Korea's coal reserves indi­
cates that these are sufficient to permit export. Certainly immedi­
ate steps should be taken (as suggested in Chapter III) to ascertain
 
if Korean anthracite coal can be used in locomotives to replace
 
imported bituminous coal. The Team concludes that until additional
 
information is available regarding all of the country's mineral re­
sources, it is impossible to be more precise with regard to potential
 
exports.
 
Industries
 
Considerable stress in this report has been laid on stimu­
lating a program of industrial developmento The Team believes,
 
however, that there are few processed items that can be produced in
 
Korea which can become competitive products for export. For the
 
most part, Korea has few basic raw materials in sufficient quantity
 
and quality to allow this development. The development of specialty
 
items with large components of labor cost, which is the commonly
 
suggested panacea for underemployed populations, would not seem
 
promising in view of competition from such experienced countries as
 
Japan and India, although certain limited products, such as ceramics
 
and certain handicraft products, may be developed for export in the
 
future. Meanwhile most of the industrial development should be
 
oriented toward the local market. Special emphasis should be given
 
to the production of products presently imported, especially to
 
those items having relatively high labor cost components. Even though
 
many such products may be dependent in part on the importation of
 
some raw materials, encouragement should be given to their production
 
when it is economically feasible and when there is a net saving in
 
foreign exchange.
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Purchase of Goods and Services for Dollars 
The Korean Government has been pressing for the privilege
of selling all products and services to the United States for pay­
ment in dollars rather than in hwan. As a matter of world-wide 
policy the United States has insisted on payment for services and
 
goods in local currency. 
In Korea this policy has been modified
 
to allow payment for certain services in U.S. currency, especially
for such public utility services as power and railway transporta­
tion. The payment for such services by the United States in
 
dollars, rather than hwan, gives the ROK Governmept valuable,

urgently needed foreign exchange. Furthermore, certain purchases,

especially by the U.S. military, could be advantageously made in
Korea from the point of view of cost. Notable among these would
 
be uniforms and shoes 
for the Korean Army. However, there are 
certain manifest,disadvantages to modification of a policy of local

purchase for dollar currency. In the case of Korea, such a change

would remove one of the principal incentives for the Koreans to

reconsider their position of resistance to changing the exchange
 
rate. While, as 
this report has attempted to show, any additional 
earnings of foreign exchange by Korea (and such dollar receipts
would be very much a case in point) are of primary importance,

there would be no automatic assurance that dollars so earned wouldbe put to a use which would tend to reduce aid funds now being
pumped into the econonm. The incentive of selling goods and ser­
vices to the armed forces by the private sector of the economy
would, in part at least, be to obtain scarce dollars for use in
 
profitable foreign trade.
 
On the other hand, Korea, largely through the unwillingness

of its government to make its present exchange rate more realistic,

is losing the opportunity of manufacturing and selling goods

presently acquired 
by the U.S. Government elsewhere, as well as

the opportunity of selling services which would earn foreign
 
exchange. 
It seems to the Team that this dilemma can only be solved

either by (a) insistence on a change in the exchange rate or, fail­
ing that, (b) sale of goods and services for dollars which would be 
subject to use by Joint approval of the U.S. and the ROK Governments 
in order to assure their use for essential imports, 
Conclusion
 
It should be clear that the goal of completely closing the
dollar gap in the foreign exchange of Korea can be achieved only

with outside assistance. Realistically, this assistance must come
from the United States. If the recommendations contained in this
 
report are followed, it is probable that there may e"entually be a
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substantial reduction in the requirement for U.S. assistance. How­
ever, it is equally probable that moms assistance will be needed 
as long as Korea remains a divided country, with the second largest 
army in the Free World, and as long as present world conditions 
obtain. The rapidly increasing population in an area the size of 
Indianap with the number of farmers equal to those of the United 
States east of the Mississippi, will tend to accentuate and com­
plicate an already difficult problem. 
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APPIWDIX A
 
Military Strength in KoreaV
 
United Nationg Command Forces
 
Ground Forces
 
Republic of Korea 

United States 

Other UN 

TOTAL 

Air Forcea
 
Republic of Korea 

United States 
Republic of Korea 

United States 

Gommuniot Forces
 
Groud Forces 
North Korean 

Chinese Communist 
TOTAL 
Air Force 
North Korean 

North Korean 
660,0009/
 
60,000 
5,900/
 
725,900 
225 aircraft, including 84 jets, 16,325 men.
 
1 fighter-bomber wing with 27 squadrons. 
71 ships, including 62 combat types,
 
17,000 men.
 
U.S. naval forces in the Western Pacific
 
are available for deployment to Korea if
 
needed.
 
350,000
 
290,000 (Large numbers of Chinese troops 
are also available in nearby areas for 
rapid introduction into Korea.)
 
640,000 
750 aircraft including at least 455 Jets,
 
17,000-20,000 men. 
At least 40 airfields,

626 aircraft within immediate supporting

distance including 596 jets,
 
About 100 small craft; 6-12 PT boats 
and other small armed craft
 
7,000 men 
i/ Source: Department of State, 
Inciudes 25,000 marines. 
.*aue 5,400 Turks and 270 Thais; remainder in British, French, Greek
and Ethiopian liaison detachments. 
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BAAiUGE OF PEAW2
 
(In millions of dollars)
 
Exports (FoB) 
Imports (CIF) 
Trade balance 
Non-monetary gold movemants 
Foreign travel 
Transportation & insurance 
Investment income 

Gov't, not included elsewhere 

Other services & remittances 

Balance on goods and
 
services 
MSP 
PL 480 - Title I 
PL 480 - Titles II & III 
CRIK and U.S. Army 
UNKRA 
Total grants 

/ From 0C Fr 1959 roar= 
24.0 
-248.0 
-224.0 
-1.0 
1.0 

31.0 

15.0 

-173.0 
82.0 
36.0 

15.0 

133.0 

SUbhsion, 
17.6 
-338.9 
-321.3 
0.1 

-1.3 
0.8 
1.2 

36.7 
3.0 

-280.8 
205.9 
12.0 

19.9
 
29.4 

267.2 

Oct. 8, 
61957 (est.) 
25.2 23.0
 
-378.2 -"?.5
 
-353.0 -424.5
 
0.1 0.1
 
-0.9 -0.5 
1.0 1.2 
1.1 1.2 
28.4 32.0
 
4.1 3.0
 
-319.2 -387.5 
271.1 317.0 
6.0 50.0
 
14.0 14.0
 
21.5 20.0
 
312.6 401.0
 
1957
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UAUEW~~IPOA 
'Page 1 of 3 
lFUML UMin 198 AND1959. 80c7MaCT YME YO D0M1U 8PPOBT AIMT3CdMcL COOXRw l~ uN 
(In Thouands of Dollars) 
No. Project Title Sour*o1.o2I ada gy19" L.o CO.flmyClls:z T,,S Iquit. flails: 1958Lao. Currz'eyIn S Zquiv. Dolls: PT 7-oLo. Cu"rrenyIn S Nqulv. Dolls_-: & 11Tbob uant,La. cure.ncy,In S Iq i. Doflar L,,,o. C rrencyI S,Ii r5.. Total. 
386 
t0o 
Asrlmgtenval bsearob an 
Uxtension Developmnt 
To 
D 
393.4 
1@403-
-
-
275 
930-
-406 
- 1,600 
- 3,574.4 
1,333.4 
- -
217 
214 
215 
Land and Water Use 
Livestock Imro 
Crop oil IproyTemnt 
TOM 
TO 
Do 
TOTAL 
To 
TOTAL 
TO 
no 
1,796.8 
346.3 
M.5 
977.8 
334.4 
187.6 
-
210 
-
-
391.5 
1219 
-
-
1,205 
162 
-
162 
53 
-
53 
58 
600 
1.606.3 
-
2,595 
-
-
94.5 
-
-
-
406 
189 
1.900 
2.089 
70 
"321) 
70 
70 
600 
25.8 
-
-
5.600 
-
25 
-
1,600 
760 
4,750 
5,510 
280 
-
280 
280 
1,02.500 
1,500 
-
14,100 
-
75 
5.,007.8 
1,377.3 
7,361.5 
8,73.8 
403 
324.4 
727.. 
595.6 
3,342.1 
22,656.5 
-
323.5 
8,349.9 
-
-
31,395.3 
1,050.9 
431. 
439 
Cop Disease, Insect Control 
Agricutural Co-oprativs and 
Rural Credit Development 
TOTAL 
To 
DO 
TOTAL 
TO 
no 
187.5 
61.4 
6L.4 
. 
654.3 
-
-
-
-
-
658 
58 
220 
278 
88 
-
50 
-
-
50 
-
670 
70 
220 
290 
88 
540 
-
-
125 
* 
-
1,580 
280 
-
20 
340 
-
1,130 
-
75 
-
-
3,095.6 
4S9.4 
440 
929.4 
51. 
654.3 
1.720 
o 
-
250 
-
4.815.6 
1,179.4 
281 
455 
459 
TOTAL 6 3 * 88 4,000 88 50 340 175 1,170.3 4,225lisheries D~elp t TO Be 
- 227 
- 900 1,185 .Do 3,M1.7 el - 280 " 900 4,574.7 
TOTAL 3,313.7 139 715.5 507 625 1,800 1.900 5,759.7 3,240.5 
Smal Industris Drelopmt To 
- 25 
-
- 25no 1,500 
- 2,000 2,000 5,500 11,000 
TOTAL 1,800 
- 2,025 900 2,000 225 5,500 2,375 11,02l 5 3,500
Med Industry Deelopmet To 96 
- " 
- 96 
no 13,400 
- 2,780 
- 2,000 18,180
TOUL 16,400 96 1.049.5 2,780 2,000 2,000 500 18,276 3,549.6 
Source of Dtsa 7" 1957 and Prior - Dolls Obligations fro -Progra Status Beport (..uly 1957).Local Currency Oounterazart fd, relesed as of Tuns 30, 1957 from 'Counterpasrt Requlrements of ICA Finanoed Projects - U.S. yr 1954-l 1957".IT 1958 I1imtlet and NT 1959 Iltimates Dolls: - From 1T 1959 Program Budget Submission dated October 8, 1957. Local urrenoy eastimtedrequiremnt. from ,CounterpartBeilrenenta of Ic& Financed Projects, etc. N! 1960 end Subsequent Xxtivatee - Dollar and Dolla NXqivalemtfVOomol LoMn AM le 
5,395.3 
9,000.3 
-
14,55 
21,866.6 
NOWA Locel currec releases and estimates cireaG In Goas equIvalenta computed an 1.000 Sen- 41 Exchange Rate. 
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__ 
pus4 z of 
_ 
3 
__ 
_ 
(Im.Thousands or Dollars) 
P10j.
No. 
P~oJ.Source 
Projec Title or FuA, 
7T/195"9 and Pi:1or" iIT1958 
I1oo' vurno Loc. CurencyDollar In $ Equ. Dollar In Eq. Dollar 
IT 3!959 
Loc. 0urmiIn $lquiv. 
1f 1960 & Subsequent 
Loo. CurrencyDollar In # Zquiv. Dollar 
g~ 
Loc. OurremaoyIn $ Zqlv. Total 
278/9
404/6 Eighway and Bidge Conhtruotion TO 
Do 7.6a6 
- 278 
750 
52 
2.000 
-
-
100 
6.500 
-
" 
430 
16.936 
-
240 IMS Support 
TOTAL 
TO 
D3 
7,686 
75,693.4 
2,545.7 
-
-
1,028 
20 
145 
3,293 
-
2.052 
14 
165 
1.007 
-
-
6.600 
60 
660 
4,290 
-
17,366 
94 
76,623.4 
11,095. 28,461.7 
267 CAL Operation Iproremat 
TOTAL 
TO 
IN 
75,653.4 
145.1 
132.4 
-
-
165 
85 
100 
-
-
179 
63 
200 
-
-
720 
672 
400 
* 
-
-
76,717.4 
965.11 
832.4 
76,717.4 
491 Dibese Cont o1 
TOTAL 
TO 
no 
2".5 
* 
1,254 
74.5 189 
71 
650 
106 
-
-
263 
us 
400 
100 
-
-
1,072 
522 
900 
180 
-
-
1797.9 
709 
3.204 
460.5 
-
2.358 
249 Water Work Bababllitation 
TOTAL 
TO 
1,254 
- -
721 
31 
60 516 
13 
15 
-
1,422 
36 
43 ­
-
3,913 
80 
118 4.031 
-
D8 2,865.1 650 400 - 2,750 6,665.1 
- -
\ 405 City Drainage Iz-vmlt 
TOTAL 
TO 
CS 
2,865.1 
-
1,685 
2,254.4 
-
-
681 
13 
250 
1,073 
-
. 
413 
7 
200 
795.7 
-
-
2,786 
18 
1,500 
1,375 
-
6,745.1 
38 
3,635 
5,498.1 
-
12,243.8 
TOTAL 1,685 2,325 263 1,095 207 714 '.518 750 3,673 4,884 8,557 
251 Construction of Wells adSanitation FlaclitiesTO 
8 109.4 
- 20 
500 
-
30 
500 
365 
240 
-
-
41 
2,449.4 
- -
265 Vocational Education 
TOTAL 
TO 
28 
1,209.4 
856.6 
800 
238 
-
-
520 
413 
50D 
234.8 
-
530 
310 
500 
100 
-
-
605 
1,193 
1,00 
50 
-
-
2,864.4 
2,772.6 
2,800 
622.8 
-
. 
3,467.3 
260 Iproverant of Teacher Training 
TOTAL 
TO 
no 
1,656.6 
978.4 
500 
80 
-
-
913 
293 
849 
196.8 
-
-
810 
570 
500 
100 
-
-
2,193 
1,661 
1,400 
200 
* 
-
5,572.6 
3,502.4 
3,249 
576.8 
-
6,149.4 
. 
. 
TOTAL 1,478.4 22 1,142 281 1.070 103.5 3,061 1,775 6,951.4 ,18 .5 8,93.9 
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NOFuds 
Soure 
Of 
Pr 1959 and Prior 
LOc. CU.ZTU1Oy
Dollar In 6 quly. D0ll1-
if 1958 
Loc. Coiency
In XZuiv. 
Fr 1959 
Loa. CurLrencya
Dollar In 6Eu. 
IT 1960 & Sbequent 
Lc, Currenc 
nr In 6 ir Dollar 
otal 
Lo rrency 
in $ Equiv. Total 
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Tanog-ito 
n8 
274.7 
-
252 
Z00 
328 
-
1.070 
150 
-
1,924.7 
350 
270 Flettlemnt and Aasimilation 
TOTAL 
To 
no 
274.7 
1,328-5 
452 
i1 
240 
4.6 328 
20 
IT 
12 1.220 
20 
-
1 2,274.7 
58 
1,568.5 
17.6 2,292.3 
TOTAL 1,328.5 81.6 258 1.405 20 50 20 50 1,626.5 1,.56.6 3,213.1 
446 Some Cottage Indxtz7 Devealoapt To 
D9 
-
SO0O 
- 4 
240 
* 
-
60 
252 
-475 
52 688 
1,467-
TTAL 500 28 109 312 50 1,057 2,155 159 2.314 
459 Cos. Development - Pilot Project To 
- 194 
- 170 
- 500 864 
S - 95 - 47 - 40 182 
407 Welfare Inatitution Babablitation 
TOM 
TO 
28 
--
155 
-
-
289 
62 
-
155 
-
217 
120 
26 
123 
-
-
540 
402 
30 
505 
-
1,046 
5S4 
211 
783 
-
1,829 
-
449 Bouing Baearh and DeValopinnt 
TM 
To 
D8 
155 
50.8 
- 62 
57 
75 
3 
-
146 
75 
7 5 
147.5 
-
-
432 
300 
125 
305 795 
432 
325.8 
48M3.5 
-­
-
1,278.5 
211 Port ad Rarbor Rebabilitation 
TOTAL 
70 
D8 
50.8 
181.4 
1,389.8 
25 
-
-
132 
-
137 
25 
-
-
150 
-
300 
50 
-
-
425 
-
930 
63 
-
757.8 
181.4 
2,756.8 
163 
-
-
920.8 
-
- Hibr ZUdatlon 
TOM 
To 
D o 
1,571.2 
-
893.3 137 
. 
-
3,991.8 
. 
-
300 
300 
2,000 
-
930 
337 
800-
300 
-
2,98.2 
37 
1,100 
15,224.8 
-
-
18,163 
-
- Secondary duacation 
TOTAL 
To 
Do 
-
300 
-
goo 
250 
-
1,137 
348 
650 
750 
-
1,437 
3 
850 
1,000 
-
-
2,437 
-
-
TOM 
-
- 200 998 650 1,198 850 2.048 
TO0 22,.99&9 
DS 171,879.7 
G TOAL 194308.6 
11S 
-r,'J 
FISCAL 1958.m AND 1959. PlWZC'" 181.3WW F.C nlZ8 SMJpORT p 
(In Tbousands of Dollars) 
No. Project Title F1n M rP 5S719 5 0 Dollar IT 1 59In jIly. Dollar Zn ScZquv. Dollar in $33qui v. T f 1 6 TotalDollar In * quv. ~ Icc.. COX. Dollar In $ .quir. TotalWoc Cu7rr-oncyurr 
al Irrigation Derelopmmt 5356.9 9,228.6 00 8787.6 
-
-
- 5.856.9coal 18016.2 23.873.1 
75 24 2,000 900 
Otbma. 1We 
5,050 1,630 7,125 2.574 9,699mt;uzig 
- 100 19 2,000 250 2.900 750 5,000 1.019220 Reabblttation Tong Val 6.0192.283 600 1.734 500 301 
- 3.33 2,033 5.418221 Aebabilitation Tranemaealon 2,841.5 700 100 
- 490 1,800 162 5,341.5 752 6,093.5
22 imbabilitatom of ChL'ongwyong Di andW'dro Plant 2,000 . 200 210
336 leotlric Power Distribution System 1,500 
- 190 
- 2,200 400 3.600
300 70 1,000 25 400 55 3.200
- Fertlizer Plant Tie In 150 3,350 
" 

- 100 25 
-
-
- 100 25 115
- Therml Plant 
" 
 * 2.000 25 6,000 250 
- 8.000* pro Gen. Pl 275 8,275 
-
-
-
- 8,000 
 1,250 22.000
131/2 2.000 30,000 3,250 33.2W0Fertilizer Plant construction 21,126.5 2,000 5,000 1,178.5 
-
-
- 26.116.5 3,178.5 29.305
 
414 Fertilizer Plant Ihag 1,000 
­
- .5 1.000 75Bad Fertilizer Plant 3,000 150 5.000 225.5 5.2M.5
-
" 

- 9.000 500 21,000273/3W Diesel Looomtive 1,250 30.00014,380 1,70 31.7504,000 24 3,000 5 1,600 2.5 22,980
" Fertilizer Plant Lime 31.5 23,011.5 1,555 
-
-
- 150 1,555 1.500 3.05533 nk Cara 4,320.5 54.4 500 10419 
24 ° I,60.5 88.4 4,908.9Incaon Port Sebablitation 997.3 

- 863 412 
-
- 1,860.3Mean Port Uloading 412 2.272.3 
-
- 300 100 
-
- 300 100
252 400Public ]Hmltb Facility Imrovemnt 1,323.3 121.3 600 250 100 
 75 200 
 9.5 2,223.3433 Police Hospital IWrovemt 455.8 2,679.125 
­ 20 1.5 20 
 40 
­ 105
259 Improvement to M 1.5 106.5Operating Facilities 8, 708 1,047.3 500 802.8 
- 287.5 
-263 Classroom construction 9.208 2,177.6 11.,385M62,135.2 417.8 500 231.8 
­
-
-4 2,635.2 649.6National Police Modem 3,284.8843.2 
­ 1,130 980 1.9 3,000 4 5,953.2411 Transportation Chanre 5.9 5.959.1(ol. Agencies) 2,1200 615.5 1,000 884.5 700 600 2,500 2,000 6,400
457 Milk Feeding Sppors 111 4.100 10,500 
- 111 239.5 
-
-448 Housing Construction terials - 222 239.5 461.52,055.6 
 2,084 1,560 
 1,500 2,000

Devlopnt D= Bl4g. 
5,000 3,750 10,639.6 7,10 17,949.6ate.rals Plant 
-
- 400 100 800
-
150 1,200 250 1,4504,000 
 1500 
- 1.000 
- 4,000 
- 10,500 
- 10,500 
"1907 1348.TO= 24.23m 16,743.7 37.200 7,310.4 73.290 13.433 21,0 50.972 290Source of Data- IT 1957 and Prior - Dollar Obligationa from "Program Status Report* (.uly1957).Local Currncy Caounterpat funda relmeaed as of on 30. 1957 from 'Counterpart RequlremtaIf 198 Estimate@ of ICA Financed Projectsand Ff 1959 r4timtee Dollar - From IT - U.S. IT 1954-IT 1957'.1959 Program Budget Cobzission dated Octoberrequremets from 'Counterpart Requirements of ICA 8. 1957. Local NMc estimatedFinanced Projects, etc. 1! 1960 and Subsequent lEstimtes 
- Dolla and Dollar Xquivalent 
­from 00 Long Bone Plan.
 
N022. Local 
 currcy releases and estimates expressed in dollar equivalents computed on 1,000 Hamo IL Exchange Sete.UNIISSM~
 
ZSCAL MA 198 AND 19K.- P'0B0 FU1X D U= 12M Z[ECAL cO m'nBi ]R 
(In Tabo,-,u of Dollar) 
Pro.Lo. 
No. Praject Title 
I: 19 
Dollar 
Pr 1958 
Lo. Ourrmm 
Dol lqalv. t* qI qi v 
I 1959 
Lo. Curey 
Dollar In $ quir. 
IT 1960 & bow 
Loc. Cuzrreny 
Dollea In $ Equlv. Dolar 
Lao. 
In 
Tota 
Crrinoy 
Zquv. '-Otal 
428 Airicultuel Statistics IlpMrovmt 90.1 - 13 25 35 12.5 35 12.5 173.1 50 22.1 
424 AgricutrZq neertag Deveopment 
- * 019 35 1.2.5 8D 35 155 66.5 901.5 
- M g end 0.aloioez. P a 
- - '78 o 76 2'.5 280 25434 2.5 461.5 
*06 Oannationa Techne Ical int 70mm3 - 155 18 46 6.5 750 36 1.953 60.5 3,013.5 
X30 Power ftsta Operation Zmprovemt X34 an32 - 205 - 550 - 1.211 1,21 
I ndustrial Developmnt Center 
- - 364 20 380 12.5 1.900 175 2,694 207.5 2,901.5 
295 Hrremn -aIZAft 348 -- 15.7 124 4 375 12 74? 31.7 775.? 
863 Marine Transportation Improvemn 39.8 0 - 30 - 80 - 159.5 - 159.5 
436 M Dental College Ioloaemmnt 180 - me 4.5 26 - 78 - 280 4.5 284.5 
430 Nuling Zdnoatlon 14 - 193 6.5 178 6.5 535 16.5 920 29.5 949.5 
\0 Health 2dnoatlon 
- - 80 1 100 1.5 180 2.5 182.5 
- Teahnical Assistanoe In Publi -oAa . . 
- 165 - 435 4 600 4 604 
* Lang Rac 74conodo Con. *15 L2 - -
- - 125 - 125 
413 IMzo sint
Personnel Goermt ManagemntAdministrtion mad 151 3 183 5.1 168 - 750 - 1.182 8.1 1,190.1 
420 Public A6.iauntratlon Darvoy 100 3 7 50 6 100 3 250 18 268 
438 Inrovsent of Technioal InforationSerulce 497.4 - 91 129 326 20 568 23 1,482.4 172 1,654.4 
- Dan. Anudo-Viu.al 
- - 98 3 82 3 89 3 269 9 278 
282 Engineezrng Abvor Serviesa (sm) 
- - 500 67 550 62 3,000 300 4,050 429 4,479 
TOMA j JA M 2,846 14. 9,-, 646.5 16.845 1,12D.3 17,965,3 
Sour.e of Data, IT 1957 and Prior - Dollar Obligation r 'Pogr Status eport' ($uly 1957).
Local COrroM oumterpart foods released am of Tune 30, 1957 flro *Counterpart Requiremets of ICL Flnanced Projects - U.S. 1W 1954-IT 19M7. 
Fr 1988 ZftjmtN and 7T 1959 ,ata tss Dollar - rom IT 1959 Program Badget u mision dated October 8, 1957. Local currenoy estimtad 
requre ents t Counterpar Requiremets of IrL ?Inmned Projecta, etc. 7T 1960 and Dabeaqmnt Zetinates - DoUsr end Doll-r Bqtlvalent -
fl m CO lag M s Plange 
.n. 
3078. Local currency relmes ad ectlntaes eeaoed in follar eqgmenta coptd on 1.000 Been SL. Dan Rate. 
the­=th 
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AXICAN POSITIONS IN FISCAL YEAR 199 010 fSthn G PATTUS 
(Exclldes Contract Personnel) 
Administrative Funds .1 
Office of the Economic Coordinator 4
 
Legal Adviser 2
 
Eecutive Office 24
 
Assistant Economic Coordinator for Program 19
 
Controller 27
 
rogrm2 Funds73 
CEB Secretariat 4 
Executive Office 8
 
Assistant Economic Coordinator for Program 15 
Office of the Rehabilitation Engineer 9 
Power Division 10
 
Communications Division 4
 
Public Works Division n
 
Industrial Development Division 13
 
Mining Division 4
 
Transportation Division 49
 
Assistant Economic Coordinator for Technical 
Assistance 3
 
Training Division 4
 
Communications Media Division 8
 
Public Administration Division
 
Education Division 16
 
Public Health Division 15
 
Community Development Division 19
 
Agriculture Division 52
 
Area Offices 6
 
Total: 349
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APPENDIX 	F
 
MAJOR CONRACTORS IN KOREA 
(in effect during Team visit) 
1o MoGraw-Hydrocarbon 	 $ 30,550,000 
Sub-contracts: Texaco Development Co.
 
Vulcan Copper and Supply Co. 
Construction of urea fertilizer plant 
2. University of Minnesota 	 4,105,6OO 
Teacher 	training of Seoul University 
faculty members in fields of agriculture, 
engineering, medicine, law and public 
administration 
3. 	 Morrison Knudsen Company 8,979,600 
Rehabilitation of Hwachon Dam 
4. 	Utah Construction Company 190,000 
Test drilling of the Hambeek coalfield 
5. 	 Pacific Far East Lines 190,000 
Maritime training 
6. Philco Corporation 	 300,000
 
Rehabilitation and development of
 
communications system
 
7. 	Smith, Hinchman & Grylls 39500,000 
Engineering surveys and studies 
8. 	George Peabody College for Teachers 176,000 
Teacher training in education 
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APPDIX G 
MMMLNDUM ON THE UNITED STATES ORGANIZATION Fg ECONOIC AID
 
ACTIVITIES IN KOREa
 
August 7, 1953. 
1. The development and supervision in. the field of an integrated 
program of economic aid as a basis for Korean relief, rehabilita~oa, 
and stabilization is a responsibility of the Couander-in-Chief of, 
the United Nations Command (CINCUNC) until such date as the Unified. 
Command may determines During this period, CINCUNC will be responsible. 
for the coordination of military activities with the economic aid 
operations of the United States Government in Korea, those of the 
United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, and donations from volun­
tary agencies, and he will, in turn, assure the coordination of the 
foregoing activities with the activities of the Government of the 
Republic of Korea pursuant to existing or fUture agreements (It is 
understood that during this period a significant portion of the program. 
will be provided through the utilization of services and facilities 
of United States military units.) With reference to UNKRA, the super­
vision or coordination referred to above and in 4(a) below shall be 
consistent with any agreement or understanding between the Agent 
General of UNKRA and the Unified Command. 
2. An Economic Coordinator will be established on the staff of 
CINCUNC in Korea, as his senior economic staff member. 
30 The Economic Coordinator, who will carry the personal rank 
of Minister, will be appointed by the Director of the Foreign Opera­
tions Administration, subject to the approval of the Secretary of State,
the Secretary of Defense, and CINCUNC. The salary of the Economic 
Coordinator will be paid by the Foreign Operations Administration. 
4o In the execution of his responsibility, CINCUNC will look to 
the Economic Coordinator as his economic advisor, and will delegate 
to the Economic Coordinator functions including but not limited to 
the following: 
a. Development and supervision of integrated programs of 
relief, rehabilitation, and stabilization, and coordination 
between military and civilian assistance programs. 
b. Representation of CINCUNC on international or joint
 
bodies dealing with Korean economic matters. 
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c. Representation of CINCUNC in consultations and negotia­
tions with UNKRA and other appropriate United Nations bodies. 
d. Representation of CINCUNC and, as may be agreed, the
 
UNMRA in consultations and negotiations with the Republic of
 
Korea on economic matters.
 
e. Development of United States proposals for economic 
stabilization, including those which may be necessary conditions 
to the provision of expanded United States aid to Korea. 
f. Collaboration with the Republic of Korea in the imple­
mentation of agreed stabilization measures. 
g. Development and negotiation of policies for controlling
the use of local currency in all aid programs, including priori­
ties and allocations of such currency for the various projects 
and operating agencies, and the sale of local currency -- genera­
ting commodities. 
h. Development, jointly with appropriate military staffs, 
of an agreed allocation plan for the use of available transport 
facilities0 
i. Coordination of the procurement channels and delivery 
schedules for the various commodities and projects (It is
 
understood that all procurement, funds allocation and expendi­
ture, project and contractual methods inherent in appropriations 
language or procedures of the various United States and inter­
national agencies will apply as prescribed0 )
 
J. Development of policies for the payment of all United
 
States -­ad United Nations local employees, and for any non­
monetary assistance given them
 
5° The Foreign Operations Administration is designated as the 
agency of principal interest within the Unified Command for Korean 
relief, rehabilitation and stabilization, and is assigned the develop­
ment and direction in Washington of Korean relief, rehabilitation, 
and stabilization policy and programs, subject to the responsibilities 
of other departments and agencies as set forth in the President's
 
letter of June 1 1953. Consistent with paragraph 6, below, FOA also 
will operate FOA-financed activities under its current instrumentali­
ties and procedures, 
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6. The Economic Coordinator will be the representative of the 
Foreign Operations Administration for projects undertaken by that 
agency in Korea. He will have: (1) the legal responsibility of 
assuring performance of operations in accordance with the provisions 
of the Mutual Security Act; and (2) authority to make achinistrative 
determinations normally required by FOA of its field representatives. 
7. The Foreign Operations Administration will have communi­
cations with the Economic Coordinator, using Unified Comand channels, 
except that CINCUNC may comment on any such message. 
8. The responsibilities of the Secretary of State and the 
Director of the Foreign Operations Administration regarding UNKRA 
and its assistance program shall be those set forth in sections 2 and 
4 (c) of Executive Order No, 10458, of June 1, 1953, as amended. 
9. The Economic Coordinator, in carrying out his responsibili­
ties, shall have full authority to deploy Foreign Operations Admini­
stration and Department of Defense staff, and persons made available by 
UNKRA, in a manner designed to avoid duplication in the planning or
 
operation of economic assistance program. 
APPROVED: 
Department of State /s/ John Foster Dulles 
Department of the Treasury /s G. M. Humphrey 
Department of Defense /s/ C. E. Wilson 
Foreign Operations Administration /a/Harold Z. Stassen 
APPROVED:
 
/s/ D. E. (August 7, 1953) 
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X)ANDUM 
To: Mr. J. H. Smith, Jr. Date: May 7, 1958 
Director 
From: C. Tyler Wood, AD/E 
Subject: Korea Evaluation Report 
Dr. D. A. FitzGerald, Mr. John Ohly, Mr. William FitzGerald, r. Edwin 
Arnold, and Dr. Raymond Moyer, after a quick review, have indicated they see no
objection to further distribution of the Korea Evaluation Report within ICA, to 
a few people in State and to the ICA Mission Director. I recommend that the 
following additional distribution now be made:
 
Mr. Edwin Arnold 4 copies

Mr. William FitzGerald 3 copies 
Mr. Walter Schaefer 1 copy
 
Dr. Raymond Meyer 2 copies
 
ICA Mission Director 3 copies (to be sent by Dr. Moyer) 
I suggest postponing the distribution of copies of the report to State
until Dr. FitzGerald and I have had an opportunity to talk with you about dis­
cussing the changes in distribution with Mr. Dillon. 
This limited distribution of the report will of necessity change the

character of the review to be undertaken by the Regional Director in the prepara­
tion of a Plan of Action for your consideration. I suggest that this Plan of
 
Action be developed without consultation except, where necessary, on an informal
 
basis with the Departments of State and Defense and that the Plan of Action
 
recommend to you the necessary steps for the agency to take regarding either
 
State or Defense in order that it may be put into effect. The Regional Director
 
will need comments from the field in order to develop a Plan of Action and I
 
suggest that he request our Mission Chief to submit his comments and seek such

advice as seems desirable from the Ambassador, the MAAG and USIS but that 
no 
attempt be made to develop a formal Country Team position at this time. The Plan
of Action would be developed in the first instance as an ICA working paper.
Following its submission to you, such formal interagency consultation as is
 
necessary either in Washington or in the field should be undertaken. This method

of handling the Evaluation Reports is in accordance with my understanding of

the conclusions reached at the recent meeting on the subject.
 
Attached is a proposed memorandum for your signature which containsinstructions to the Regional Director on the subject of the review he will be re­
quired to make.
 
I attach a copy of the report.
 
Attachments
 
' t 
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":'	SENT DElPAR'-REPEATED, INFORMATI0N-WASHINGTON-TICA37 
AND-QINCUNG OGA37 
REF NCjLZjALtEAkW41 1N RE PORT RECE QED.-TODAYQjo ~~SUGGEST;E". C'' -BRYANT,'.ASST. EOOI.ORIN L'EHIA 
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To: Dr. Raymond T. Moyer 
Regional Director, 0/E 
Date: MIy 9 1956 
From: J. H. Smith, 
Director 
Jr. 
Subject: Korea Evaluation Report 
I have authorized a second, but limited, distribution of the Korea 
Evaluation Report. A list of those to whom copies of this Report have been 
sent is attached to this memorandum. The Report is not being made available 
to the Department of State until I have had an opportunity to talk with Mr. 
Dillon about the changes in distribution. 
I would like you now to undertake a review of the ICA program in 
Korea in the light of the conclusions and recommendations of this Report but 
not limiting yourself only to what is presented in the Report. 
The Plan of Action which you will develop as a result of your review 
should set forth the policies and principles which, in your judgment, should
 
govern the conduct of our operation in Korea and provide the bases for pro­
gramming and administrative action. This Plan of Action should be presented
 
to me not later than August 8, 1958. 
Your review should be regarded as an agency, and not as an inter­
agency, undertaking. You should enlist the help of other elements in ICA/W and 
of our USOM in this task. The Plan of Action should be developed as an ICA 
paper and, along with the recommendations which you propose regarding matters 
lying wholly within the province of ICA, it should contain recommendations as 
to what this agency ought to do regarding those matters which require our con­
sultation with or action on the part of State and Defense, or of any other 
U. S. Government agency. In this Plan of Action you should treat in detail 
only of those things which require action beyond your province or that of the 
Mission Director, though you may wish to record in it the actions which have 
been taken in your office or in the field to improve the Korea program during 
the course of the review. Copies of the Report should be sent to the Mission 
Director so that he may participate in the review. You should instruct him 
that this review is an internal matter and that, though he may want to consult 
with the Ambassador and other U. S. officials in the country, he is not re­
quested to develop an official Country Team position. 
Copies of the Report will be sent in due course to the Anbassador
 
from State.
 
I am aware that this memorandum is not in accord with the provisions
 
of Manual Order 311.1 which sets forth the procedures for the conduct of the
 
Regional Director's review. I believe it is important at this time to depart
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from the provisions of that Order. The Manual Order will be revised in the 
light of our experience in conducting the present series of Regional Directors, 
Reviews. 
If additional copies of the Report are needed for your review, they 
should be requested through ny office. 
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INTRODUCTION
 
General 
Impressed with the accomplishments of economic aid to Korea, the Evaluation Team 
concluded that the program has generally met the U. S. objectives of maintaining 
essential Korean consumption levels and advancing that country toward self-support to 
the extent feasible. Along with this broad approval, the Team suggested that U. S. 
assistance to public utilities (excepting power and railways), public services in 
general, and other activities not directly alleviating Korea's foreign exchange 
situation be limited henceforth to technical assistance. Of equal significance was 
the Team's endorsement of OEC's 1957 sharply declining five-year aid level projection, 
based in part on assumption that increased U. S. surplus grain imports will be pro­
vided to permit the export of substantial amounts of Korean rice. 
Action by the Director 
The Team's general approval of present operations and future planning is reflected 
in its twenty-two specific recommendations, most of which support existing policies 
and programs in whole or in part. No issue of such consequence as to require action 
by the Director or inter-agency negotiations is raised. The body of this response, 
therefore, consists of comments on each of the Team's recommendations together with 
an O/FE recommendation and plan of action. All actions proposed can be implemented 
at the level of the Regional Office and the Mission. 
Program Principles 
U. S. economic assistance serves the two broad objectives of assuring Korea's
 
survival by helping to maintain its military forces and shore up its civilian economy,
 
and of increasing its productive capacity in order to reduce its dependence on 
foreign aid. These objectives are accomplished through the use of defense support, 
technical cooperation, and Development Loan Fund Corporation financing. 
Trend of Aid Requirements 
OECs October 1957 projection of an aid level that would decline non-project
commodity-wise from $210 million in FY 1959 to $117 million in FY 1963 (including 
annual $40 million P. L. 480 programs), and project-wise from $100 million in 
FY 1960 to $29 million by FY 1963 (including TC and DLF components), in which the 
Team concurred, is considered on the basis of information now available to be too 
drastic. This projection is believed to have given insufficient weight to such 
factors as the growing use of non-project funds for investment commodities, obstacles 
to substantial Korean rice exports, overoptimistic assumptions regarding import 
reductions through expanded R0K industrial production, and the unrealistic exchange 
rate. It is believed that U. S. policy objectives will permit only a gradual annual 
decline in the level of dollar aid.
 
Balance of Payments Gap 
I cannot agree with the Team's sweeping recommendation "that those phases of
the economic development program not directly and 
 immediately related to alleviatingthe foreign exchange situation be broadly confined financingto with technical
cooperation funds during the next several years." Although a principal aim of U. S.aid is to narrow Korea's wide balance of payments gap, the Team's recommendation inits.application to the agriculture, health, education, and community developmentprograms, would, I believe, be injurious to the objectives of the aid program as awhole. These objectives could not be achieved by financing only projects thatdirectly and immediately produce or save foreign exchange while neglecting
strengthen tasic institutions, installations, and facilities. 
to 
This exception to the
Team's overly restricted concept is not to imply that there should be any letup inthe search for ways and means to close Korea's extreme balance of payments gap. Onthe contrary, the need for closing this gap is reflected in the comments and plans

of action that follow.
 
Exchange Rate Problem 
While concentrating on the balance of payments problem, the Team has paidlittle attention to the overvalued hwan° The harmful effects of the unrealistic
exchange rate have been ameliorated somewhat by authorizing exporters to impprt highprofit commodities with their dollar earnings, permitting missionaries to auctiontheir dollars, and requiring purdhases of government bonds by importers of certainaid goods. Legislation just enacted substituting an exchange tax of 150 hwan per
dollar for the bond purchases will help further but will not compensate for theunrealistic exchange rate sufficiently to encourage exports, discourage imports which
hamper domestic development, increase the impact of U. S. aid imports, support theprice stabilization effort, and avoid the warping of the entire economy. 
The existing
exchange rate agreement does not permit precipitate, unilateral action on the part of
the U. S. Nevertheless, even granting that the existing exchange rate agreementprovides an incentive for sound fiscal management, the harmful consequences otherwise 
are justification for an early U. S.-ROK re-examination of the rate.
 
Long Range Planning 
The Team was impressed by the need both for a survey of resources and a long
range development plan. 
With the shift in emphasis from rehabilitation to economic
development, the advent of new capital from the Development Loan Fund Corporation,

and pending measures to improve the investment climate, these steps are in order.The projected Korean Economic Development Council will aid the Korean Government's
economic planning processes, 
 To satisfy the equally important need to reassess theKorean aid program for the guidance of Washington agencies concerned, a U. S. Govern­
ment-directed study would be useful. 
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IRRIGATEON PROGRAM
 
1. Problem: Need for economic and technical evaluation of irrigation projects. 
2. Team Recommendation No. 1: 
"...that immediate steps be taken to assign to OBC one or more U. S. 
technicians experienced in making economic evaluations of irrigation 
programs, in order to determine the feasibility of the present projects." 
3. Comments 
Considerable difficulties have been experienced in providing the necessary 
personnel for economic and technical examination of the Korean irrigation pro­
gram and for supervision of the dollar and counterpart assistance furnished. 
ICA inherited this large-scale program from other U. S. and U. N. agencies. The 
difficulties will soon be overcome by the Agricultural Engineer Advisor on 
Irrigation recently added to the OEC staff and by the team of three irrigation 
specialists to be supplied by the Uo S. Bureau of Reclamation to advise on 
projects now under construction and plan the future course of irrigation 
development. 
4. O/FE Recommendation: 
Concurs in Team recommendation. 
5. Plan of Action: 
Recruitment of the U. S. Bureau of Reclamation team will be expedited and 
OEC will be urged to defer new irrigation projects until an overall plan of 
development can be drawn up and approved. 
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AGRICULTURAL INSTITUTIONS
 
1. Problems Integration of agricultural teaching and research. 
2. Temn Recommendation No. 2: 
"...that OEC urge the Korean Government to combine the Suwon Agricultural
 
College and the Institute of Agriculture in the interest of economy and
 
more effective use of limited resources."
 
3. Comment:
 
Although it would be more logLeal to have the agricultural teaching,
 
experimentation, and extension functions carried out at Suwon by a single
 
institution similar to the land grant colleges in the U. S., Korea and other
 
Far East countries traditionally subordinate their colleges of agriculture to 
the Ministry of Education and their experiment stations to the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry. The action of the U. S. Military Government in 1947 
in uniting the College of Agriculture, the Experiment Station, and the Extension
 
Bureau was reversed by the new government of Korea in 1949 when it restored
 
the College of Agriculture to its previous status. A similar consolidation was
 
attempted but not achieved in the Philippines during the nearly 50year U. S.
 
tenure there. Short of far stronger pressure than is justified or warranted,
 
the Korean Government could not at this time be persuaded to combine the College

of Agriculture and the Institute of Agriculture under either of the ministries
 
concerned. More is to be gained by exertions to coordinate the resources of
 
the two institutions.
 
4. O/FE Recommendation:
 
That OEC efforts to bring about the closest possible coordination between
 
the two Suwon institutions be continued,
 
5. Plan of Action:
 
OEC will be urged to intensify efforts to improve coordination between
 
the two Suwon institutions, possibly through a Korean advisory body for joint
 
planning and programming of agricultural teaching, experimentation, and
 
extension.
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AGRICULTURAL PROGRAM FUNDING
 
1. Problem: Support and funding of agricultural program. 
2. Team Recommendation No. 3:
 
"...that future agricultural projects be funded largely from technical
 
cooperation funds and that only those projects which relate directly to
 
improvement of the foreign exchange position be funded with defense
 
support funds. Among the former would be agricultural extension, for 
example, as distinct from the control of disease and insects which might
vitally affect rice production, a potential export...." 
3. Comment:
 
This recommendation would apply to the agricultural program the Team's
 
general proposal to restrict the use of defense support funds to activities
 
which directly improve Korea's foreign exchange position. As explained in
 
the Introduction under the "Balance of Payments" heading, such a limitation
 
could have the effect of hindering rather than facilitating Korea's economic
 
growth. Moreover, activities such as agricultural extension actually relate
 
directly to increased production and thereby potentially to improvement of
 
Korea's foreign exchange position. It is inconsistent to advocate, as the
 
Team does, dollar aid for the control of plant disease and insects in order to
 
improve rice production 
- a potential export - and simultaneously oppose aid
 
for agricultural extension, the instrument for carrying out disease and insect
 
control.
 
4, 0L Recommendation:
 
That balance of payments effects be broadly considered in planning
 
agricultural aid projects in Korea.
 
5. Plan of Action:
 
No action needed.
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FISHRES
 
1. Problems Support of fisheries program. 
2. Team Recommendation No. 4: 
"If the necessary action is taken by the Korean Government in regard to 
/eorganization of7 the guilds, it is recommended that defense support 
funds, in addition to technical assistance funds, be employed for assisting 
fisherman in acquiring boats and equipment, with particular emphasis on 
proposals which develop fishing for the export market." 
3. Conment: 
Since Korea's fisheries production has lagged behind that of other sectors 
of the economy, this recommendation would make further defense support aid for 
fisheries contingent, first, on reorganization of the guild system now oppressing 
Korean fishermen, and second, on emphasizing development for export. The Govern­
ment has already decided to make a detailed study of the fishing industry which, 
upon completion, will constitute, among other things, a blueprint for investing 
new aid funds more effectively. 
Fisheries development in the view of OEC should place the main emphasis 
on increasing the domestic food supply. The Team takes the position that, as 
production is stepped up, exports should takerrecedence over increasing home 
consumption. (The rice export proposal is a move in this direction.) If the 
Team recommendation is acted upon favorably, aid funds for fisheries would be 
used mainly for such things as refrigeration equipment, canning facilities, and 
specialized vessels and gear.
 
4. 0/VE Recommendation: 
That encouragement be given to the projected ROK fisheries study preparatory
 
to arriving at a comprehensive joint U.S.-ROK understanding in this field aWd 
that potentialities of fisheries production for export be more fully explored. 
5. Plan of Action: 
OEC will be urged to proceed along the lines of O/FE's above recommenda­
tion. 
S~v.r 
UNC LASN1IE J
 
nFISERE PROGRAM 
1. Problem: Need for refrigeration equipment for export fish products.
 
2. Team Recommendation No. 5: 
"...that defense support funds, as well as technical assistance funds, be
 
used to assist in the construction of modern refrigeration equipment
 
for preparing and holding marine products when commercial fishing for
 
export is assured."
 
3. Comments; 
Modern refrigeration is among the various facilities needed for develop­
ment of fisheries exports. Commercial refrigeration, canning, and packing

could be financed as part of the industrial development program, aided with
 
defense support and Development Loan assistance and through fishermen's co­
operatives following reorganization and strengthening of fishing guilds.
 
4. O/FE Recommendation:
 
That the need for auxiliary facilities such as refrigeration be included
 
in the overall fisheries promotion plan mentioned in connection with Team
 
recommendation No. 4o
 
5. Plan of Actions
 
OEC will be urged to include commercial and cooperative development of
 
necessary auxiliary facilities in joint U. So-Korean planning of the fisheries
 
program.
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HEALTH PROGRAM4
 
1. Problems Support and funding of public health program. 
2. Team Recommendation No. 6: 
"°..that the health program be continued with technical assistance funds 
only. This would mean substantial reduction in financial support to such 
activities as disease control, water works rehabilitation, city drainage, 
and construction of wells and sanitation facilities." 
3. Comment: 
The Team considered the use of defense support funds for a health program 
unjustified because of the resulting increased population pressure on an already 
inadequate resource base. Since overpopulation in relation to economic resources 
is a worldwide problem, health matters in Korea should be treated within the 
framework of overall U. S. policy, not in terms of conditions in a single 
country. An important factor in the case of Korea is the presence of U. S. 
troops and the resulting concern about the prevention of epidemics. Moreover, 
important felt needs of the people have to be taken into account as a means of 
helping to combat unrest and communist propaganda. Nevertheless responsibility 
for the health program is being increasingly assumed by the Korean Government 
and defense support aid for health projects is already on the decrease, 
4. O/FE Recommendation: 
Transfer of responsibility for administering and financing public health 
activities to the Korean Government should continue, 
5. Plan of Action: 
No action needed. 
U,CLAL1E
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EDUCATION PROGRAM
 
1. Problem. Support and funding of education program. 
2. Team Recommendation No. 7:
 
"The continued use of defense support funds is recomnwnded in educational
 
activities that have both an immediate and a direct influence on foreign
 
exchange. Such activities would include, for example, the training of
 
marine diesel mechanics because of the immediate and direct effect on
 
the fishing industry which has a substantial potential for producing export
 
products. The recommendation would imply, likewise, not using defense
 
support funds for such activities as classroom construction."
 
3. Comment: 
Few., if any, education projects could qualify for defense support funds 
under the Team's recommendation, which is in conflict with ICA and specific 
NSC policy on aid to education in underdeveloped countries. The scarcity of 
administrative, managerial and technical skills and the need for major changes
 
in habits and thinking are recognized as the two most basic problems for
 
accelerated economic development of Korea. Their solution, according to the
 
Directorgs May 16, 1958 memorandum on "Development of the FY 1960 Mutual
 
Security Program", requires a major effort in the fields of training and.
 
education. In keeping with this policy, the Korea aid program emphasizes
 
general education and vocational training. However, no additional dollar aid,
 
except possibly small amounts in the AFAK program for public relations purposes,
 
is earmarked for classroom construction.
 
4o /FE Recommndation: 
That the present realistic program of aid to education be continued.
 
5. Plan of Action:
 
No action needed.
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HOUIM PROGRAM
 
. MProblem: What type of housing program should be financed from defense supportu~ds? 
2. Team Recommendation No. 8: 
"...that no further defense support funds be used on the 'low-and moderate­
cost' housing project. In keeping with the objective of assisting Korea to 
reach and maintain essential standards of living comparable with those of 
1949-50, it is further recommended that defense support funds continue tobe used for self-help housing program for refugees. It is also recommended 
that defense support funds continue to be used for the project to develop
the use of native materials for construction." 
3. Coment: 
Housing, as confirmed by the Team, is the only major area in which Korea's
restoration of the pre-war consumption level has seriously lagged behind. The 
present program is designed to develop, with defense support funds, a sound 
system of home mortgage financing as well as efficient housing construction 
and domestic building materials industries. Under the "low and moderate cost"housing project. loans for defense support-financed building materials imports 
are repaid in local currency with interest, and the revolving fund thus created 
is the source of funding for a continuing housing program. As the domesticbuilding materials industry expands along with facilities for financing housing
construction. it is expected that defense support aid will be correspondingly
reduced to the point where the remaining import needs can be met under the 
salable commodities program. 
Present plans call for continuing defense support aid to the aided self­
help housing program both for refugees and unemployed migrants from rural 
areas. 
As part of the industrialization program aiming at reducing Korea's
trade imbalance, technical and financial assistance in the development of the 
building materials industry will be furnished from both defense support and 
the Development Loan Fund. 
4, O/FE Recommendation:
 
That ICA aid to the rehabilitation phase of the Korea housing project be
gradually phased out. Continuing support should be given the aided self-help
housing program and development of indigenous building materials. 
5. Plan of Action: 
ICA comments and recommendation will be conveyed to OEC. 
- 10 
RURAL SERVIC'% COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
 
1. 	 Problem: Can the community development program serve as a substitute for
 
agricultural extension and rural health services?
 
2. 	 Team Recommendation No. 9: 
"...that a program of community development, including the use of voluntary 
workers at the village level, be undertaken with technical assistance funds." 
(As "a substitute for the agricultural extension and the public health 
workers .") 
3. 	 Comment: 
A broad community development program is now being initiated in Korea9 
supplementing other programs previously launched in the fields of rural health 
and agricultural extension. Concerning the latter program, exception is taken 
to the Team' view that Korean farmers are sufficiently expert to dispense with 
technical assistance. Improved farming is the one means of preventing Korea~s 
food deficit from growing with the growing population. It also is essential 
that the Korean Government develop sound institutionsto carry out agricultural 
and health programs on a long-range basis. An agricultural etonsiaon organiza­
tion along with a minimum number of rural health centers is therefore essential. 
But since resources are not adequate to support proper governmental field forces 
in health and agricultural extension, and their effectiveness will develop
slowly, the community development program is intended to supplement the work of 
the specialized technical services in the villages. This requires a carefully 
coordinated program in extension, rural health and community development to 
guard against costly duplication of field forces. While aid will consist in 
the main of technical assistance, some defense support-financing of materials 
is justified to increase the effectiveness of these services.
 
4. 	O/FE Recommendation: 
That 	development of rural health and agricultural extension services be 
closely coordinated with the community development organization to assdre 
maximnm integration at minimum cost without duplication of effort. 
5. 	 Plan of Action: 
O/FE's recommendation will be conveyed to the field. 
PUBLIC ADINISTRATION PROGRAM
 
1. Problems Necessity for expanding the public administration program. 
2. Team Recommendation No. 10: 
"...that an expanded public administration program be initiated in all those 
fields of public administration and business administration in which the 
Koreans show real interest in obtaining help. Such a program normally
need not require the use of defense support funds but if such funds were 
essential to the success of the program the Team would be inclined to agree 
that this would be a,. exception to the general approach recommended in this 
report." 
3. Comments 
The Team endorses the expansion of -the public administration program which 
is now underway. The Korean Government is receptive to more assistance in this 
field. In the past six months, advisors in customs, banking, foreign invest­
ment9 and supply management have arrived in Korea together with three contract 
groups which will carry out programs in statistical reorganization and in 
development of schools of business and public administration. During FY 1959 it 
is expected that three more contracts will be signed to provide advisory services 
for overhauling the tax structure, surveying the organization and administra­
tion of governmental services, and assisting the projected Economic Development 
Council.o 
4. 0/FE Recommendations 
Concurs in the Team recommendation.
 
5. Plan of Action, 
No action needed.
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KORMAN COAL FODR RAILWAY USE
 
1. Problem: Development of Korean coal as rail locomotive fuel.
 
2. Team Recommendation No. 11: 
"Although certain efforts to use Korean anthracite have been made in the
 
past, it is recommended that a new trial on a sufficiently large scale,
 
with proper mining, cleaning and grading, be undertaken by OEC in order
 
to determine definitively the feasibility of using local coal in
 
locomotives ."
 
3. Comment:
 
Studies are being made under the continuing ICA mine development program

concerning the beneficiation of indigenous coal for many purposes, including

its use as locomotive fuel. However, the fact that the aid-financed oil
 
burning diesel locomotives in Korea are now operating far more economically

than the displaced steam engines, which consumed large quantities of imported

bituminous coal, decreases the prospect of using more local coal in locomotives.
 
Nevertheless, the search for improved iithods of mining and utilizing Korean
 
anthracite coal continues, with a view to expanding its use for industry,

electric power generation. and household purposes. Exporting anthracite to
 
Japan and elsewhere is also a possibility when production outgrows domestic
 
needs.
 
4. O/FE Recommendation:
 
That the program of developing Korean anthracite resources be systematically
 
pursued without interfering with the dieselization program for the railroads.
 
5. Plan of Action:
 
No action needed.
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ELECTRIC POWER
 
1. Problems ICA support for additional electric power generation.
 
2. Team Recommendation No. 12:
 
"The 	Team supports present GEC plans for using defense support funds for 
the construction of two new poer plants." 
3. Comment: 
Funding for one (thermal) of two power plants referred to by the Team
 
has been provided under the FY 1958 defense support program. The other
 
power plant (hydro-electric) was eliminated from the defense support program

when the Development Loan Fund, to which the Korean Government applied for 
a $25 million loan for this purpose, indicated that it was giving favorable 
consideration to the ROK application. 
4e. OIFE Recommendation:
 
That assistance in financing Korea's electric power needs be furnished
 
from all aid sources as appropriate.
 
5. Plan of Action:
 
No action needed. 
U0 
COMMUNICATIONS PROGRAM
 
1. Problem: Financing maintenance and development of the Korean telecommunica­
tions system. 
2. Team Recommendation No. 13: 
"Since both foreign exchange earnings and hwan earnings are sufficient to
 
support the maintenance and development of the telecommunications system,
 
it is recomended that Korea finance this activity from its own budget.
 
It is suggested that ICA continue its technical assistance program in
 
this field."
 
3. Comment:
 
No defense support financing of telecommunications is included in the
 
FY'1959 program or contemplated for later years. Technical assistance is
 
being continued. 
The ROK Government, however, has obtained DLF approval of a loan for
 
further improvement of Korean communications facilities. It is too early, in
 
the face of the huge balance of payments gaps, to deny U. S. aid financing to
 
exchange earning projects as suggested by the Team. Such a policy would not
 
necessarily assure the best possible use of Korea's limited exchange earnings
 
in meeting the dollar needs of its economy. 
4. O/FE Recommendation,. 
That no objection be interposed to the DLF loan for Korean telecommunica­
tions, and that the programming of Korean dollar earnings and available dollar 
aid resources be closely coordinated. (A policy of withholding U. S. capital 
aid from exchange earners should not be adopted at this time.) 
5. Plan of Action:
 
No action needed.
 
l!5­
FERTI ZER PRODUCTION
 
l. Problems Financing of additional fertilizer plants.
 
2. Team 	Recommendation No. 1[:
 
"...that construction of any additional fertilizer plants be deferred until
 
such time as there is sufficiently active Korean participation in the manage­
ment of the plant presently under construction to indicate the ability of
 
Koreans to take the whole responsibility for management."
 
3. 	 Comment: 
This recommendation reflects current ICA planning. In late 1957, ICA
 
financing of a second major fertilizer plant was deferred indefinitely.

This decision should not, however, preclude consideration of proposals for
 
financing 	small, specialized plants, such as for fused phosphate, under the
 
medium industry loan program.
 
4!. OL 	Recommendation:
 
Concurs in Team recommendation, with respect to large plants.
 
5. 	 Plan of Action:
 
No action needed.
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INDIJTRAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
 
1. Problem: ICA support of industrial investment in Korea. 
2. Team Recommendation No. 15:
 
"As OEC recognizes, the immediate enlargement of the staff of U. S.-trained
 
technicians for the technical review of all loan applications is urgently
 
needed. This staff should be constituted as to be useful not only in
 
review of loan applications but also in training Koreans in review techniques ."
 
Team Recommendation No. 16:
 
"... that the medium and large industrial loan program, including the use of
 
defense support funds, be expanded, with special emphasis on industries designed
 
to achieve foreign exchange savings through local production of products
 
presently imported. To a substantial extent increases in these loans will
 
depend on additional training of Koreans, which would be facilitated by the
 
assignment of additional U. S. technicians.."
 
Team Recommendation No. 17:
 
"* ..the early establishment of an industrial training and development center with 
the use of both technical cooperation funds and defense support funds, as needed." 
3.• Comment: 
The Team endorses ICA's policy of assisting Korea's industrialization and
 
recommends that the program be expanded.
 
It is axiomatic that the rate at which economically sound and effective
 
industrialization can proceed in an underdeveloped country is governed by its
 
institutional framework, human and material resources, and availability of
 
foreign capital. In the case of Korea, there are involved such factors as the
 
shortage of skills and resources, an unfavorable investment climate, unorthodox
 
credit and fiscal policies, and market limitations. Technical assistance may

be able to provide managerial and engineering skills in a relatively short period
 
but it takes longer to develop entrepreneurial experience. Consistent with the
 
Team's recommendations, Korea's capacity to plan and implement industrial
 
projects is gradually being increased with the help of a major U. S. engineering
 
advisory group under contract with the Korean Government, QEC's expanding staff
 
of industrial engineers and project officers, the Korean Reconstruction Bank,
 
and the projected Industrial Development Center. Simultaneously Korea's access
 
to foreign capital sources is growing. Investment funds are becoming available
 
from the Development Loan Fund Corporation. The prospective Investment Guarantee
 
Agreement and enactment of pending foreign investment legislation promise to
 
improve the climate for investment of private foreign capital.
 
Even though replacement of imports with domestically produced goods is a
 
prime objective of U.S. aid, only those industries that meet essential
 
commodity needs of the economy should receive suqhmaid.
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(Industrial Development Program) 
4. O/f 	Recommendation:
 
That present programs for Korean industrialization be continued to the 
extent that this will help obtain maximum utilization of available domestic 
and foreign capital resources. 
5. 	 Plan of Action: 
No action needed at this time. 
- 18 ­
TRANSPORTATION
 
1. Problem: Financing transportation improvement.
 
2. Team Recommendation No. 18:
 
"Since the Korean Government clearly cannot meet its foreign exchange
 
requirement for the operation and improvement of the railway from present
 
revenues, it is recommended that defense support funds continue to be used
 
for maintenance and essential development. OEC should continue to press

the Korean Government for increased rates in order that the railway may
 
earn revenues sufficient at least to cover costs of operation and the hwan
 
equivalent of costs of development."
 
Team Recommendation No. 19:
 
"...phasing out of funding through the use of defense support funds of a
 
program of highway construction. Defense support should be concentrated
 
on dollar requirements for materials and equipment needed for maintenance
 
of the present road system."
 
3.•Comments: 
The ICA program contemplates continued improvement and extension of the
 
Korean transportation system with defense support funds but with a possible
 
shift of emphasis from railroads, harbors and bridges to major highways. No
 
substantial additional investment in transportation should be made, however,
 
until the future role of the different modes of transportation has been
 
determined. Korea's external and internal resources are far too limited to
 
permit further programming in the absence of an overall national transportation
 
policy.
 
The Team, without benefit of an overall transportation study, recommended
 
continued defense support aid to railroads while opposing such aid for highway

construction. Yet it stands to reason that the highest overall return on
 
invested capital can be obtained only from one integrated network making the
 
maximum use of highways, railroads, and coastal shipping as complementary
 
rather than competitive modes of transportation. Construction or extensive
 
rebuilding of major highways paralleling the efficient railroad network would
 
not be economically justified for some time to come, but the relative advantage 
of feeder highways, in preference to railroad spurs or extensions to isolated
 
farming and mining regions or into growing metropolitan and industrial areas
 
should be explored.
 
- 19 ­
(Transportation) 
Regarding the matter of railway rates, both freight and passenger rates 
have been repeatedly raised. A further freight rate increase comparable to 
the 98% increase on January 1, 1958, is presently under consideration. Passenger
rates are considered adequate and revenues from passenger travel this calendar 
year are expected to cover all operating expenses. In order to improve rate
making procedures further, creation of a Utilities Commission is under considera­
tion. 
4. O/FE Recommendation: 
That programming of additional aid in substantial amounts for any form
of transportation await adoption of an overall transportation policy based on 
a study of the relative roles and investment priorities of water, railway,
and highway facilities. 
5. Plan of Action., 
OEC will be urged to proceed along the lines of O/FE's recommendation. 
- 20 ­
I4NRAIS PROGRAM
 
1. Problem: Minerals exploration.
 
2. Team 	Recommendation No, 20"
 
"The Team supports the OEC plan for exploration work in minerals in order 
to stimulate further activities in mining and recommends that, if needed, 
defense support funds be used as well as technical assistance funds. It 
also supports OEC's intention to examine present laws governing mining 
with a view to revision which will encourage the attraction of foreign 
capital ." 
3. Comment:
 
This recommndation is an endorsement of the present ICA program in
 
the minerals field.
 
4. 	 OFE Recommendation.
 
Concurs in Team recommendation.
 
5. 	 Plan of Action:
 
No action needed.
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SURPLUS AND OBSOLETE EQUIPMENT
 
1. Problem: Possible use of obsolete or military surplus equipment. 
2. Team Recommendation No. 21o 
"It is recommended that CEC explore the possibility of using obsolete 
equipment in the program in Korea as well as surplus military equipment 
acquired on a world-wide basis." 
3. Commnt: 
Korea takes considerable amounts of excess U. S. Government property
including some obsolete equipment and is in position to utilize still more 
as it becomes available periodically in Japan, the Philippines and Korea 
itself. ICA works closely in this field with the Interservice Materials 
Utilization Agency, which is the central clearing agency for all Department 
of Defense excess equipment, and with the Personal Property Utilization 
Division of GSA. The main drawback to the use of increasing amounts of 
these materials is the sporadic nature of excess' declarations and the short 
interval between them and final sale. 
It is understood that ICA may establish a clearing house in Japan to 
handle matters pertaining to excess military equipment. 
th. 0/FE Recommendation: 
That efforts to facilitate the utilization of excess equipment be 
continued. 
. Plan of Action: 
No action needed. 
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POPULATION PROBLEM
 
1. Problem: What to do about population pressure.
 
2. Team 	Recommendation No. 22:
 
"...that consideration be given by the U. S. and ROK Governments to making

a study of the population problem with a view to developing outlets, possibly
in Latin America, for Korean agricultural workers....also...that financial
 
assistance be provided, through the OEC Community Development Division, to
 
the mothers' education program.
 
3. Comment: 
As in the case of recommendation No. 6, the problem involved is worldwide. 
No general U. S. policy in this sensitive area exists. 
4. O/FE 	Recommendation:
 
That the initiative in this field be left to the Korean Government and
 
people and that any requests for technical or financial assistance be carefully

evaluated from an overall policy viewpoint.
 
5. 	 Plan of Action:
 
No action needed.
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be made at an early dato. This is the substitution in the &.reant of the 
new cotmtry-wide ',holesale Price Index for the : oUl Vholeale Price Index. 
Reent studies by the 011' nuggest that this new index is more reprenetattw
of price chongms in . oren than is the :'soul holesale I-rice index and 0Js,
therefores plans to submit to Iu\/V for review a fozzl proposal to the effect 
of using the new index in place of the old index lor purposes of the agree. 
nent. 
The ti.%, to{,ethar .ith the &-btssador and CI4C;JP, has presented to 
the IK GoWvrnxtnt a propoal, under which tourists, UNC nd diplomatic
personnel would be authorized to purchase hwhn at trate keyed to present
free fmarket rator, ,iuch as the eiport dollar and the KAU dollar rates. 
The rAte ould qpply only to |.oroonal eptmditures by representatives of 
the above-riontionod group. Official purchaoe of 1Abasles and 'JUI wou'd 
continue under the systea now in iorco, i.e. namely at hwan 5W: t,1.00
A:plication of the free market raite ayetem to this last rwnaining eea 
(other then officiL1 U'C Iurchases) bubject to the hwan 500: tl.00 rate in 
expected by the three aJ.. to benefit not only troop oruleleuento here 
but the W1K dollar income fnwiu goods and services sold to temporary residents 
in Korerio The HI'K Covervent was receptive to the proposul u-d promised to 
let us know the re ,ultu of their study of' it at on early date. 
Laoaz I1ange Pbinnin: Or. :.oyer states that: "The projected horeain 
i'conomnic Pevcloprnwwt ;ouncil will aid the orot Government's econo .ec planning 
processes. To satisfy the equally imortant need to reassess the i'Lorean aid 
program, for the quidance of ;;*ashington agencies concerned, a Us.,. Lovcrnment­
directed study wuld be useful." 
Such a reassesamcnt, we believe, would be in the interest of our pro+ran
here only If it is cerefully limited in scope and purpose. This means that 
it must be -ufficiently distinct fro it at is planned for JI.C so as to void 
the kind of duplicatIon that would detract from tho recognition UIk hopes to 
ze rendered the DJC. It means further that the reasseesment rust Le tailored 
to OC needs oo ,,a to rc;ke it an essential exe.ent in the formulation of U.s. 
policy in Eorea. Provided. then, we c diere strictly to those liuitationsg, a 
study of the type recoxiended by Dr. ;.4oyor "ould, we believe, be essential if 
we were to base the prograrrdng of further F.saistance to itoroe not on bhat 
would perha.ps be ,n ideUl "long range ,lan" but rt.thor on what has already
been vchieved, tking ;.ccount of the 1roLl;.s encountered in the brrdening 
arei. of utilizttions Lnd on practical jlro,7rL.u needs within the conflnes of 
a gradually declining aid level. 
First, ii thin total investment for development, the puoportion supported 
by U.Li. aid directly (through imprts of ciapital goods) or indirectly (troug,
inrnrts or conaumr .oodd ,nd materinls) ,1l decline c.nd vth its possibly, 
g-1.C1I1T 
the influmco oi the ICA/ progm an over-all lines of doveloriAento To 
mw dmire OoC influence, chifts of e.phaeio within our Irotzn iry well be 
xwiuirec.. The cnuiderations ent.ering into our pro rrmn forrAution will 
tend to differ from the broader p3 oinng or guiding activities expected 
from the M)(o 
Second, the 1J4.o overnments through oiC, may at times have a more 
intense interest thin would the 1orean Govornment in the success of indi­
vidwa1 rojects and the projects complex au E; Aalo, -inco the degree of 
our auccoss here is watched by the entire I;'ree :orli while the AUK Govern­
mnt, ae uould any other, will alimays fInd its choice of Lction lits d by
the ever present political exigencies of the day. Tii naturU divegence
in the v;!blation of priorities is furthor justification for the 8tuOy pro­
posed by Dr, ioyoe. 
Third, to bo i=rediat(-,y rnd directly bplicable to our program. the 
reaasesetent .tudy, as 01.C conc ivos it, joujci start A.th the existing pro­jects and those now plannod for 1W, and I)LF financing. It would not, as 
presumably should be the tdm of kXC, seek to set, down from the strt the 
genoral directions runich future development in Korea chould take. .hat 
the CJ,, study would do would be set of rather rigdovorrvent to +pply a 
tests to existing projects Lrxi9 to the extent that prospective coot data 
arn. sufficiently developed, to plimwd projectas, uith a view to ranking
these projects from the point of vieu of their contritlution to such asreed 
criteria an Irroverwnt of the baL.nce of payvnerts, absorption of eicesa 
labor, or straitht-forward contribution to grXowth. The nisults of a rank-
Ing tlong these lines A 11 give wlucble guidance to future prorarm emphasis. 
Vortunately, mch of the materiol re:uirod for such a reasesswnt is at 
hend by virtue of its past in',mlries, or czn reA.Uly be developed by, the 
Progrun Review C4o!.ttee of W-*C, Fortunately, P1eo, the roiuir.rd tcc:iquss
begun in the dnys of the Harahall Plen for the umrpean invefotnt programs,
especi-lly in the loss devk:lopd reano of Turkey, Greece,, l1tly -nd Portugal,
hrve beeti improved arid Epplied with success in Asian countric3, such as 
Pakistno :,.ven though the reliability of coat date Lni Ul.nce sheets in 
Korea leaves much to be desired, we still believe that recaesuent along
these lines All be of great assistance to present utilization nd future 
pro zbra~cin,, '41o assure that in in. uire of this type be carried out with 
the hithest obt.-inablo corwaptcncc, it would be be,;t to bring out a consul­
tant for, sey, three mont..,s to 1,y dorm the principles ;nd orgvnize the 
stAtitical research required, 
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,h'l.e such in undortnkin. ,ight re.uire the services of"three to four 
additioMI :Thrr:ns trained in stLtistics or iccountinig, itaiuld othoruise 
be ]'ossl.lEr to prodluce a creit hble piece of u.jrk vi thin Lt recisotnbe period 
of time with existing Americcn staff. * Ls to fcilit-te broadot direction 
of the utudy, ftmdint; by idministrmtive courcoo wuuld be pproprinto. 
,':C plz-l to fomaZ1:te i specific prolosv.1 for L; reOusonsent otudy, 
together i4th i. specific recruiting sugpstion, for ICIA/v review. 
( 3)
...." ... 0 
Tcv; of three irrigtion consultinto from the W.urouu of UecUumation 
arrived in i;oroa on uctobcr 31, 1958, iind nro in Irk)cc3s ol ii,ktid tho 
necessi.r:y invcti(gtilons znird prc ':rinr, , ro.ort. 
0'..L concurs in the oLJoctive of the rccoe dlations sot out in pra. 2 
as being dosirnilo :nd alo concurs in the coxont8, the reo:..cndations -nd 
the plan of Lction in i-rs. 3# I Lhnd 5, ItA/o. is auare of continuous efforts, 
to date, to develop cnd integrate tho extension, ruicarch rand teitching fecilitios 
at !tuwof. 
~(Pa6)
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0:;c'. th-t both I& and TC fmdar.fou with the Towi'-s roeonendation 
could be vol. eqrhpoyod to support the fisheries program, 
.X..;~ 
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The report on Koreals fish maW4mt and marketiun problsas by L. It. Cooley# j blishsd
DOtober 10, 1958s hug been distributed, studied, anmlyeds and is being used as a refer-
Once. Copy 1 available in ICj;/W. 
bioth of thmse reports have been broketi dovn by l:roblwa for handling by special
bark groupa of :".C cnd ?.K tocimicianss for oxoirplo: 
Modification of fisheries orgimiations 'ArIne- Affaira Director has announced
bla e to cnoolidate atbout 160 fishing guilds 
Into about 40 to 50 local orgjanir.tios.

I-tght provinciti federvtlons are to be aboliuhed, 
 which will reduce organizational
pverhed vnd cmerges to fiuihe n. 
Tfaxes ­ lilretor of l:irine Affairs has boen working with appropriate cabinet
teibers to 1 ilevLte the tax burden, Action ha. bLen token to reduce import taxeeIn fishing gear a.d diosel engines. A 3X, tax on the latter wiu eliminated. OtherLnzes are being (iscussd but uince the need for revenue is littleo acuto, imrove­ment in federal or provincial tax rates can bo expected in ti near future. 
Credit ,ad high interest rates - ounn board nwrbora are ucting on credit problemsnd are assisting Vulds to Luprove their business juzthods. The purposes for i,,hich 
shose fundo miy be used are being broadoned
-nprtions. lcal agent boks hve to aover aditional iftaseo of fi herieslowered collaterul roquirumnta where individual 
buid reputations Justify It. I4pansion of this systombears is reducing the so-callod "private loans" Wlih chnrgou . intormst perat interest rLtou up to lWA or .wre
 
r r:onth.
 
Hoat construction, coversoan and repair - The work group succeeded in dovisingodificatiomm in the financing procedure to reduce delay, lower collteral requiromits
W assist in insuring prompt puyvant of loans to end usere and collection of paymts.
IH INMIC Closer ?perviosin is being given to procure ent of muterias to prevent
p010s in dulivory. 
VOetonstratir)n ind trri-ninC - 1it work Lruup has detur-ained alcciF1li 'rojccts tobe c-rried on to 1haprove fishing operLionu. "Mis includes the u.;lection of prgreas;ivoFit-honxen to oonduct domnstrations of ne gwer in the fleet. A pe ci-.l acrose-tho­
bard projoct hbL boon started to desitn ,ndbuild zidorn 2ediwi-sizediettej-i f- dlesronetrute their effectiveness with such as corubintionanchovy la.iph.. ahrinp 
Irawl :nd purse sein block, 
larketing - The action teken to ntroduce mackerelfreoezing dUring laizt su.ersJeck production period stabilized the price of fish aurin6 glut perio(I3. ,,ction tolncourLco expansion of this rractice to include otter virieties of i18k1 is now being 
liken. Product development for both dowetic consiption and export Is receiving
 
ttention,
 
The problemns of the industry are under constant joint study -s shovm rbove. 
criodie mestings of work groups and regula conferencen between principle officials 
BEST AVAILABLE DOCUMENT 
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CIIUCDU -26SkCHLT 7 8 is 
lans he wede the tatunt that he thought the number one requiumnt fb'r the develop­
mat of this count7 was better roads md a higlway system that use adoeuate to tk 
en of present and future rt4upiinmts.. 
flogording the reco umdatian mde by the Offloe of the Fr lwst, that an overall 
trmqartation policy be baied upon a study of the relctive rules and investment 
priorities of water, railway rnd h;h7ay facilitioesp 4C feels that such study wouldbe wry deoarable and would uwloom 1C,/W sending vut aoi seeto mako such a study.
In the swantme, w awe proceeding with tho highway program an submitted to ±CAA. 
Present charge for weter transportation ure greitly in oxceos or 3~nd trans­
prttLn, There Is no reason to believe that the higlwuy system In the foreseeasble 
future vuld be In coui 'titive oanflio t with water trineportatAne. 
WAIM1 
C1M -#)L0UT(I"' 1"2306 0 7 )Fe 
end Wh) Office of nV1"ne iffhirs are being hold, There Is a decided Jiprovazent inthe overu.-lI fishoric. picture. 
The Lirrivel of iour ILaa]y neeced U.S. toctmicLcns during the vEimor of 1958
en_-blod Us to render direct p-saistonce to 
 ,.Cny Tb ses of the industry re iulringtchnicil ;:aajatimce. This has rozRtod In clooor nuperviuion of fi ierien irnmjects. 
It is folt the Alrector of the Office of ierirw ,1"ftira ond .mrbers of his stlture Wzn, t .4neere effort to "put their house in order" and aleviate tis uny ofthe hirxin nceu to lisherien development as ore w.tthln thuir scope of authorlty. Cus­tori, treditlon, politics ;nd econontios baing conuidered, it wy require ;:e tine
befom solutions to an1 problau can be found.
 
01-C a res In recommipndetion and have indicated swwe to nighet levels of
ROK Government includinM kresident Rhee. Wado not Included for this activity ROK-1959
Budget; h~cmer, 1linister of 1eiIth end ocitil Affairs has advisad (JkA; that he il 11

reuest supplemental budoet 
for this puxpose. 
Tjpfu ji:r i, , (P. 10) 
lI /~e~Aeouante and recomendations are awtited with interest. 
.C ae 

met Cormiittee (c uoC.). O/Fr.'s further recotndtion is uwaited with Interest,
 
HK ,'/o coordinating these efforts through medium of CJZ Cimunity Dovelop-
OIA* contilnues to pre-so the *:orv.w Govom..untMho H(K lxocutive brv. for increased rmilro.,4 r&kt.j, but.eprooentcd Ly tia: 4 inivtriou, hre untlo to put such;ncreaeod ratets into effects without the c:pprovtl of he W.K utionml i.sser.bly. Such 
lipprovtl is very difficult to secure and All torerore undoubtedl,Limo, :').C TrFinrrtttion 
-dviour st ,toc; tfiko conoidorbleth,-t the pbusongor ratos are corpcneatory,

he frotj1ht mton, howover, need to be uubs nti;ely Incroaod.
 
(eom hccajondi.tion 
.,. 19) 
It to not 'i','s intention to su;nport the up ofill aff et the ernim, c ajttir. &sywto:. of hiht','ys that.p &ilitieuof the rialroaw, It i Iupoooib1. !qv1oib, to 
~mt the kormin oconon ,,'th, li ke t colf-usttinn4 , aeis without n better system 
f1i'oida., 
kben Genersl )nden was hero idth ixb sndcor .Intoshl In connection td th tho UIJF 
14/ BEST AVAILABLE DOCUMENT -
Tho glivirIon hems now 40wlo1)cd sn4 mbaritet~ upoa SgN~t -nwLvy vo.Km'vtoen 
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Office Memorandum UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT /
 
TO Dr. D. A. FitzGerald, DD/O DATE: June 1, 1959 
FROM Raymond T. Myer, 0/FE 
SUBJECT: Status of Korean Evaluation Report 
1. This report summarizes the actions so far taken to implement the
recommendations which the Evaluation Team submitted in connection with its
review of the ICA program in Korea. The Evaluation Team submitted some

twenty-five recommendations in all. The 0/FE and the 
OEC have concurred,
at least in principle, in eighteen of the twenty-five, and withheld con.
 
currence in the remaining seven. Specific actions taken to implement agreed
recommendations are described below. A few actions remainof these incomplete.Thus, OEC has requested additional guidance from ICA/ on housing and communitydevelopment, and is awaiting further word from ICA on the proposed survey todevelop a long-range ICA program for Korea. On the other hand, ICA/ is wait-Ing on the field for a report on the proposed transportation survey. 
In addi­
tic., there are a few other loose ends of lesser significance. This review
of the Team's recommendations, and the actions taken pursuant to them, con­
vinces me that its Evaluation Report has fulfilled its function of indicating
the areas of possible improvement in the Korean program. Unless you have 
reasons to think othervise, I would recommend that it be accepted as the final 
report in accordance with M.O. 311.1. 
2. The 0/FE and the OEC concur fully in the following recommendations
 
of Evaluation Teame
 
Recommendation No. 1 - Evaluation of Irrigation Projects. A team oftechincians from the Bureau or Reclamation has completed survey of thea irrigation program in Korea and submitted its report. 
The ROK Minister

of Agriculture has approved the report and requested ICA assistance to 
implement its recommendations.
 
Recommendation No. 3 - Financing of Agricultural Projects. Current OECpolicy conforms in principle with the Team recommendation that TO funds shouldbe largely used to fund agricultural projects, unless such projects are directly
related to the improvement of Korea's foreign exchange position. Howeverp theOEC makes clear that there may be exceptional cases in which it may be necessary
 
to use DS to supplement TO funds.
 
Recommendation No. 5 - Fisheries Equipment. The OEC is presently carrying

out the-Team recommendation that DS fundsbe 
used for procurement of refrigera­
tion equipment for preservation o fish for export. 
Recommendation No. 10 - Public Administration Program. The Team recommended

the use or DS runds to expand public admnistration program. The recommenda­
tion is now in process of implementation.
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Recommendation No. 12 - Electric Power Generation. The Team recommended the 
supporf of 6EC plans to use D8 funds for the construction of two new power 
plants. A task order has been issued to determine suitable sites for 
thermal power plants of 30OO00 1W and 60,000 1w capacity. 
Recommendation No. 13 - Telecommunications. The Team recommended that the 
ROK M~istry of Communications finance the maintenance and development of 
telecommunications from its own resources. The recommendation does not 
exclude possible use of DLF funds in the telecommunications program. Except
 
for some TC assistance, the CEC is already carrying out the Team recommenda­
tion. 
Recommendation No. 14 - Additional Fertilizer Plant. The Team recommended 
that no ICA funds be used to finance a second fertilizer plant until the 
Koreans have demonstrated their ability to operate the Chung-ju plant suc­
cessfully. This recommendation is concurred in by O/FE and OEC. It does 
not relate to ICA financing of small local plants. 
Recommendation No. 15 - Industrial Development Staff. The Team recommended 
the enlargement of the Staff to insure proper technical and financial review 
of industrial loan applications. CF/E and OEC concurred in recommendation.
 
Pursuant thereto OEC haL added an additional industrial advisor to the Staff. 
Recommendation No. 16 - Medium and Large Industry Loans. Team endorsed 
continuance of existing program with special emphasis on financing projects 
which either earn or save foreign exchange. 
Recommendation No. 17 - Industrial Training and Development. The Team 
strongly recortmended the establishment of an industrial training and develop­
ment center. OEC has concurred in recommendation but political problems have
 
delayed its implementation. 
Recommendation No. 20 - Minerals Exploration. The Team recommended use of 
DS funds to finance mineral exploitation. cF/E and CC concurred. Aerial 
survey is now in progre8s.
 
Recommendation No. 21 - Surplus Military Equipment. Team recommended utili­
zation or surplus m1E11ary equipment wherever posible. O/FE and OEC concur. 
The only problem is the availability of usable equipment. 
Recommendation No. 25 - Long-range Development Plan. The Team recognizes 
Korea's need for a long-range development plan, and O/FE and OEC share its 
views in the matter. A technical assistance contract has been concluded 
with the University of Oregon, under the terms of which the University is 
sending a team of experts to Korea to advise and assist the ROK Economic 
Development Council in long-range planning. In addition, O/FE, with the 
concurrence of QEC, has reconiended that an independent survey be initiated 
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to determine the long-range ICA program in Korea. 
OEC has recommended that

this survey be undertaken by the Mission Staff with the assistance of one
 
Washington consultant.
 
3. O/FE and OEC concur in principle but differ in detail on the
following Team recommendations:
 
Recommendation No. 2 - Agricultural Institutions. The Team recommended com­bining the Suwon Agricultural College with the Institute of Agriculture, also
located at Suwon, in the interest of economy and improved administration.
 
OEC agrees that recommendation is a sound one but does not consider its im­plementation feasible at this time, 
 since the institutions in question are

currently under the jurisdiction of competing ministries 
- Education and
 
Agriculture.
 
Recommendation No. 4 
- Financing Fisheries. The Team recommended use of DS

and TC funds to finance thi's program, wth emphasis on projects which develop

exports. O/FE raised the question as to whether, in view of the problems

raised by competition between Japanese and U. S. fisheries, emphasis should
be placed on exports. However, it suggested that QEC explore further export

potentialities in fisheries. 
The OEC is interested in increasing fisheries
 
production for both domestic consumption and export.
 
Recommendation No. 1 -
Korean Coal for Railroad. The Team recommended that 
a renewed effort be made to determine the f easiility of using Korean anthracitein railroad locomotives. 
O/FE and OEC agree that the project should be continued
but without interfering with the current dieselization program now nearing

completion. Improved anthracite in larger volume is needed for industrial
 
purposes.
 
Recommendation No. 18 - Financing Improvements for the Korean National Railroad.The Team recommended continued use of DS funds for maintenance and essentialdevelopment of the KNR. O/FE has suggested that no additional sums be invested
in the project pending the adoption of operating policies based on a comparative

cost study. OEC accepts the recommendation of O/FE but to date has not initiated

suggested study. Meanwhile, the OEC is endeavoring to get the Ministry of

Transportation to finance a greater share of its investnEnt needs from its 
 uwn
 
resources.
 
Recommendation No. 23 - Exchange Rate. 
 The Team does not recommend an immediate

change in the exIsting 500 to 1 exchange rate. 
O/FE thinks that "immediate

attention should be given to a 
revision of the rate",, but recognizes that such
 
a revision might require changes in the existing U.S.-ROK exchange rate agree­
ment, and that this is not likely to prove feasible so long as the ROK govern­
ment is able to keep wholesale prices within agreed limits. 
OEC agrees with
the Team that the time has not yet come for a revision of the official exchange
 
rate, and suggests continued adherence to the January 1957 agreement in the 
interest of orderly progress toward a more realistic official rate. Mean­
while OEC continues to favor considerably higher multiple (unofficial) rates 
for specific purposes. 
4. O/FE and (or) OEC were unable to concur in the following recom­
mendations of the Team:
 
Recommendation No. 6 - Funding of Public Health Program. The Team recommended 
that only TC funds be used to support the program in public health. O/FE 
recommended continuance of the transfer of responsibility for financing and 
administering public health activities to the ROK Government. The QEC, with 
O/FE concurrence, continues its use of DS as well as TC funds. At the same 
time, OEC is pursuing the O/FE recommendation and urging the ROK to make 
budgetary provision for public health activities. 
Recommendation No. 7 - Funding of Education Program. The Team would restrict 
use of DS fundsto educational activities which have a direct influence on 
foreign exchange. O/FE and CEC do not accept this restriction. However, the 
program in education is now largely financed with TC funds.
 
Recommendation No. 8 - DS Funds for Housing. Team recommends that no DS 
funds be used to finance low and moderate cost housing. 0/FE recommends 
gradual phasing out of low and moderate cost housing project but would 
continue aided self-help housing program and the development of indigenous 
building materials program. The QEC feels that the low and moderate cost 
housing project should be continued because of its beneficial effect on
 
the economy, and would not limit aided self-help to refugees. CEO awaits 
further clarification of ICA/W position. 
Recommendation No. 9 - Substitution of Community Development Program for 
Agricultural and Rural Health Services. Team recommends substitution of 
community development program for agricultural and rural health services. 
O/FE recommends closer coordination of these programs. These activities
 
are coordinated and OEC is awaiting further instructions.
 
Recommendation No. 19 - Funding of Highway Construction. Team recommends 
the phasing out of highway construction financed with DS funds. O/FE recommends 
that no substantial investment be made for highways pending the adoption of 
a transportation policy based on the results of a comparative cost study. 
OEC does not concu in Team recommendation, because it believes that substantial 
economic gains can be achieved by a relatively small dollar investment in 
highways. OC recently indicated to S/Transportation that it would initiate 
a survey of current transportation needs but, so far, ICA/W has had no report 
on survey. 
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Recommendation No. 22 - Population Control. Team recommends 6tudy of popula­
tion problem with emphasis on emigration and educational program an plannedparenthood. O/FE recommends that initiative in these matters be left with 
the RCe. GEC believes that, if rate of increase in production can be main­
tained, there will be no need to reduce population pressures. It further
 
believes that neither dollar nor counterpart funds should be used to campaign
for planned parenthood. 
Recommendation No. 24 - Economic Development and Foreign Exchange. The Team
recmmends "that those phases of the economic development program not directly
and immediately related to alleviating foreign exchange situation be broadly
confined to financing with technical funds". Neither the 0/FE nor the QEC
thinks it would be wise or practicable to make foreign exchange earnings the 
sole criterion in formulating future program judgments. 
JUL 6 1955
 
O/#E - Dr. Raymond T. Hoyer 
/s/D. A. FitzGerald
DD/O - D. A. FitzGerald 

Status of Korean valuation Report
 
The actions reported in your memorandum of June 1 concerning the
 
reconimendntions of the Korea evaluation report appear to represent

appropriate action pursuant to the "Review of the Korea Evaluation
 
Report" which was transmitted to the Director on October 8, 1958o
 
suject to the following comments: 
l. Recomendation 10 on the Public Actinistration Program is 
reported as being "in process of implementation." I understand that
 
this means more specifically that the Public Administration Program has 
been c~cpanded by advisors in customs# banking, foreign investment and
 
supply management, together with three contractors %ho will carry out 
programs in statistical reorganization and development of schools of
 
business and public administration. I understand that further expan­
sion in the form of additional contracts is being planned. This 
appears to constitute appropriate action pursuant to the recomzaendation.
 
2. Recommendation No. 2 proposed combining Suwon Agricultural
College with the Institute of Agriculture. An stated in your memorandum, 
OEC while agreeing that the recommendation is a sound one, does not
 
consider implementation feasible at this time. I think that we must
 
accept the 03C judgent on the feasibility of implementation.
 
3. The 0/FE review of recomendations 18 and 19 proposed a study
of transportation facilities as a basis for an overall transportation 
policy. The status report indicates that ICA/W is awaiting a report
 
on the results of this survey. I suggest that the report, hen received,,
 
be made a part of the record in final reporting on the Korean evaluation.
 
4. Because of its importance, I would suggest that the final 
decision on the proposal for a survey by the Mission staff (recemada­
tion 25) to determine the long-range ICA program in Korea be reported 
as part of this record. 
cc: EXSECAD/E F)EI''" E',E ''T
 
DD/0:MR 4cCormick: egm: 6/30/59 
I S~~!SS~:LU
 
KOREA - SUIM.RY OF EVALUATION REPORT RECM211DATIONS AND PLANS OF ACTION ULk lLij 
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Recommendation 

Assign U.S. technician 
to evaluate feasibility 
of irrigation projects. 

Urge ROK to combine Suwon Agri. College and 

Institute of Agri. 

Fund agri. projects from TC; only those 
relating directly improvement foreign exchange 

position funded with DS.
 
Employ DS funds in addition to TC in assisting

fishermen in acquiring boats and equipment, 

Use DS and TC funds for fish refrigeration. 

Continue health program with TC funds only;
reduce other activities--over-population. 

Continue use of DS funds for educational 

activities that directly influence foreign 

exchange, 
Discontinue use DS funds for low-cost 

housing. Continue use DS for refugee 

housing program . 
Use TC funds for CD program. (As substitute 

for extension and pub, health workers) 

Expand Pub. Admin. program where Korean 

interest shown. 

Action Plan 
Recruitment of U.S. Bureau of Reclamation team to
 
be expedited; new irrigation projects to 
be deferred 
until overall plan drawn up and approved,
 
(Combination not feasible) 
Improve coo 
. :ion
 
possibly through a Korean advisory bod- A, 
joint
 
planning and programming.
 
Disagree. Limitation would hinder economic growrth. 
No action needed. 
Encourage projected ROK fisheries study; explore

potentialities of fisheries production for export;
 
policy re export vs. domestic rpoduction.
 
To be included in joint U.S.-Korean planning of
 
fisheries program.
 
No action needed. Disagree re single country de­emphasis; but responsibility for health program
 
being increasingly assumed by ROK.
 
(Disagree) 
- No action needed; conflicts with ICA 
and NSC policy on aid to education in underdeveloped 
countries. 
Gradually phase out rehabilitation phase of Korea 
housing project. Continue support of aided self­
help and indigenous materials.
 
(Extension and health centers still essential)
 
Closely coordinate development of rural health 
and agricultural extension services with CD organi­
zation.
 
No action needed. Expansion of Pub. Admin. program
 
already begun.
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Recommendation 
 Jik1U|L 
Resume attempts to develop anthracite to deter-

mine feasibility of use in locomotives, 
Use DS funds for construction two new power 
plants, 

ROK should finance telecom. system from its 

own budget. ICA continue TC program for this 
activity, 

Defer construction additional fertilizer plants
until there is active liorean participation in 

management of plant presently under construction.
 
Enlarge staff of U.S.-trained technicians for 

technical review of industrial loan applica-

tions. 

zxpand industrial loan program; special

ennhasis on industries designed to achieve
 
foreign exchange savings.

Lstablish industrial training and development
 
center--;se i)3 and TC funds. 
Continue use DS funds for foreign exchange 

costs of maintenance and essential develop-

ment railways. 

Phase out DS funding for highway construction; 

concentrate DS on dollar requirements for 

maintenance.
 
Use DS and TC funds for exploration work in 
minerals. 
Explore possibility of using obsolete equip-

ment as well as surp&us military equipment, 
Action Plan 
(Disagree re use in locomotives because of aid­
financed dieselization program for railroads.) 
Systematically pursue program of developing 
anthracite resources, for other uses.
 
No action needed. Funding for one plant provided 
under FY 1958 DS program. ROK has applied for 
DLF loan for financing the other. 
(Disagree. Should not withhold U.S. aid from
 
exchange earners No DSnow.) planned; DLF loan
approved--no objection. 
Coordinate programming
 
of dollar earnings and aid. 
No action needed. Recommendation reflects current
ICA policy re large plants.,
 
No action needed.at this time. Continue present 
programs for Korean industrialization, with maxi­
mum utilization of capital resources--domestic 
and foreign. 
Program plans shift to highway emphasis; Team
 
emphasizes railways. Need integrated network.
 
Await adoption of overall transportation policy

before programming substantial aid for any form
 
of transportation.
 
No action needed. Recommendation endorses present 
program. 
No action needed. Substantial excess property 
used. 
Recormendation 
 Action Plan
 
22 p.77 U.S. and ROK study population 
 No action needed. Leave initiative in this field
to ROK. 
oolo;512'5159
 
